CYFIRMA Finds Persistent China-Nexus Cyber Activity Against Japan and Taiwan

Summary
CYFIRMA’s East Asia assessment finds persistent China-nexus activity against Japan and Taiwan but no measurable cyber spike tied to Japan’s Taiwan statement. It says the 2026 Japan data-theft wave remains unattributed and recommends specific exposure-reduction steps.
Key points
- CYFIRMA counted 98 of 247 China-nexus APT campaigns listing Japan and 72 of 109 listing Taiwan; it cautions that campaign counts reflect collection breadth and do not establish a trend.
- The report found no evidence of a cyber-activity spike tied to Prime Minister Takaichi’s 2025 Taiwan-contingency statement.
- Japan’s 2026 data-theft disclosures span web and API theft, service-provider exposure, cloud-provider ransomware, and routine ransomware or fraud; no government, CERT, or vendor attribution was identified in the reviewed reporting.
- A supercomputer breach at a national research center on 16 November 2026 is identified as having potential espionage relevance, but no attribution has been made.
- The report recommends patching internet-facing Ivanti, SharePoint, Exchange, and WinRAR; limiting exposure of FortiGate, SMB, and RDP; and reviewing data held by service providers.
- Key provisions of Japan’s active cyber-defense law took effect on 1 October 2026, including incident-reporting requirements for 258 designated critical-infrastructure operators.
Article Details
- Publisher
- CYFIRMA
- Report Period
- 2024 to 2026-11-17; report issued 2026-11-17
- Scope
- Japan and Taiwan, with analysis of Sino-Japanese relations and related cyber activity.
- Sample Size
- CYFIRMA APT campaign dataset: 247 campaigns listing Japan and 109 listing Taiwan; campaigns may list multiple target countries.
- Key Statistics
- 98 of 247 campaigns (40%) list Japan and 27 distinct China-origin actors; multi-country campaign records mean counts reflect collection breadth more than attacker intent.
- 72 of 109 campaigns (66%) list Taiwan and 35 actors, 19 of them shared with Japan; multi-country campaign records mean counts reflect collection breadth more than attacker intent.
- Macnica reported 119 public web-system breach disclosures in Japan through 2026-10-06, 81 since July; disclosure counts may overstate intrusions because compromised providers generated multiple notices.
- Trend Micro counted 607 published security incidents in Japan from January through September 2026, compared with 594 for all of 2025.
- From 2026-10-01, incident reporting was required of 258 designated critical-infrastructure operators across 15 sectors in Japan.
- Recommendations
- Patch or isolate internet-facing Ivanti, Microsoft SharePoint, and Exchange systems, and update WinRAR on endpoints.
- Restrict internet exposure of FortiGate, SMB, and RDP services, with priority in Taiwan.
- Review personal and corporate data held by service providers and cloud hosts, and confirm their notification duties.
- Brief HR, payroll, and finance staff about job-application, tax, HR, and invoice lures.
- Designated critical-infrastructure operators in Japan should confirm incident-reporting procedures under the provisions effective 2026-10-01.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1189 · Drive-by CompromiseDrive-by compromise was recorded in 7 of 124 campaigns.T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationExploiting public-facing applications was the most frequently recorded technique in the cited China-origin campaigns: 13 of 124 campaigns.T1486 · Data Encrypted for ImpactA ransomware incident at a major Japanese cloud provider involved servers being encrypted.T1557 · Adversary-in-the-MiddleUNK_SparkyCarp was reported to use an adversary-in-the-middle credential kit in phishing against a Taiwanese semiconductor firm.T1566.001 · Spearphishing AttachmentSpear-phishing attachments were recorded in 10 of 124 campaigns.T1566.002 · Spearphishing LinkSpear-phishing links were recorded in 8 of 124 campaigns.
People
Threat Actors
APT10The source explicitly pairs APT10 with Stone Panda as an alternate name; CYFIRMA lists the actor in campaigns targeting Japan and Taiwan.APT40The source explicitly pairs APT40 with Leviathan as an alternate name; CYFIRMA lists the actor in campaigns targeting Japan and Taiwan.BlackTechCYFIRMA lists BlackTech as a China-origin lead actor in 6 Japan-listing and 4 Taiwan-listing campaigns.Bronze ButlerCYFIRMA lists Bronze Butler as a China-origin lead actor in 9 Japan-listing and 3 Taiwan-listing campaigns, last seen 2026-11-15; the source pairs it with Tick as an alternate name.Lazarus GroupCYFIRMA lists North Korea-origin actors in 48 Japan campaigns and identifies Lazarus Group in 33 of them.LeviathanCYFIRMA lists Leviathan as a China-origin lead actor in 7 Japan-listing and 3 Taiwan-listing campaigns, last seen 2026-11-16; the source pairs it with APT40 as an alternate name.MISSION2074CYFIRMA lists MISSION2074 as a China-origin lead actor in 10 Japan-listing and 5 Taiwan-listing campaigns, last seen 2026-11-09; the source pairs it with APT41 as an alternate name.NoName057(16)The pro-Russian group claimed 66 denial-of-service attacks on 26 Japanese organizations in late August 2026. Check Point observed no data theft, defacement, or backend compromise.SPIRE CASTLEThe source explicitly pairs APT41 with MISSION2074 as an alternate name; CYFIRMA lists the actor in campaigns targeting Japan and Taiwan.Stone PandaCYFIRMA lists Stone Panda as a China-origin lead actor in 15 Japan-listing and 5 Taiwan-listing campaigns, last seen 2026-11-09; the source pairs it with APT10 as an alternate name.TA4922Proofpoint reporting says TA4922 sent localized HR, payroll, tax, and invoice lures, mostly to targets in Japan, from March 2025 to April 2026.TickThe source explicitly pairs Tick with Bronze Butler as an alternate name; CYFIRMA lists the actor in campaigns targeting Japan and Taiwan.UAT-5918Public reporting cited by CYFIRMA describes UAT-5918 conducting espionage against Taiwanese critical infrastructure through exposed web services.UNK_FistBumpThe report describes UNK_FistBump as a China-aligned cluster involved in job-seeker phishing targeting HR staff in Taiwan's semiconductor sector.UNK_SparkyCarpThe report describes UNK_SparkyCarp as a China-aligned cluster that conducted adversary-in-the-middle credential phishing against a Taiwanese semiconductor firm from November 2024 to June 2025.Winnti GroupCYFIRMA lists Winnti Group as a China-origin lead actor in 11 Japan-listing and 3 Taiwan-listing campaigns, last seen 2026-11-14.
Malware
Mirailures (Tropic Trooper), tax- and HR-themed phishing delivering the ValleyRAT trojan (Silver Fox), a Mirai-based IoT botnet used to find vulnerable networks for clients (Integrity Technology Group / Flax Typhoon),ValleyRATExamples include military-themed lures (Tropic Trooper), tax- and HR-themed phishing delivering the ValleyRAT trojan (Silver Fox), a Mirai-based IoT botnet used to find vulnerable networks for clients (Integrity
Vendors
D-LinkJapan’s sit in manufacturing — and edge hardware is a shared exposure, with Taiwan-headquartered vendors (D-Link, Zyxel, QNAP) heavily represented in the US Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue.IvantiRecommended actions: Organizations operating in Japan and Taiwan should patch internet-facing Ivanti, Microsoft SharePoint and Exchange systems first, reduce internet exposure of FortiGate, SMB and RDP services, andMicrosoftRecommended actions: Organizations operating in Japan and Taiwan should patch internet-facing Ivanti, Microsoft SharePoint and Exchange systems first, reduce internet exposure of FortiGate, SMB and RDP services, andQNAPmanufacturing — and edge hardware is a shared exposure, with Taiwan-headquartered vendors (D-Link, Zyxel, QNAP) heavily represented in the US Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue.Zyxelsit in manufacturing — and edge hardware is a shared exposure, with Taiwan-headquartered vendors (D-Link, Zyxel, QNAP) heavily represented in the US Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue.
Products
Fortinet FortiGateinternet-facing Ivanti, Microsoft SharePoint and Exchange systems first, reduce internet exposure of FortiGate, SMB and RDP services, and review the data held by their service providers.Metabaseweigh against a state-directed campaign: similar cases occurred in 13 other countries, the exploited Metabase flaw was used widely after disclosure, disclosed victims are mostly consumer brands, and some data wasMicrosoft Exchange Serveroperating in Japan and Taiwan should patch internet-facing Ivanti, Microsoft SharePoint and Exchange systems first, reduce internet exposure of FortiGate, SMB and RDP services, and review the data held byMicrosoft SharePointactions: Organizations operating in Japan and Taiwan should patch internet-facing Ivanti, Microsoft SharePoint and Exchange systems first, reduce internet exposure of FortiGate, SMB and RDP services, and review theWinRAR(7); recurring entry points since mid-2025 are Ivanti products, Microsoft SharePoint and Exchange, and WinRAR.
Tools
Countries
ChinaThird, cyber activity runs beneath the freeze: Japan and Taiwan remain persistent, current targets of China-nexus activity, although our data cannot show whether the Taiwan statement itself triggered a measurable rise.JapanPrime Minister Takaichi’s Taiwan-contingency statement, Beijing’s multi-front pressure campaign, and a persistent cyber-espionage layer across Japan and Taiwan are reshaping the relationship for the long term.RussiaRussia-China coordination. No shared infrastructure or tooling found between Russian and Chinese actors operating against Japan.South Korealook alike on the share of services flagged vulnerable (6.84% vs 6.82%, both above the US at 4.4% and South Korea at 2.0%) but differ sharply on entry points: Taiwan is far denser in exposed FortiGate devices and SMB,TaiwanPrime Minister Takaichi’s Taiwan-contingency statement, Beijing’s multi-front pressure campaign, and a persistent cyber-espionage layer across Japan and Taiwan are reshaping the relationship for the long term.United Stateslegislation allows the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to exercise collective self-defense alongside American forces.
Industries
financeHR, payroll and finance teams are the targets of the job-application, tax, HR and invoice lures described in Sections 02 and 03.Information TechnologyIn our APT dataset, the sectors most often listed in China-origin campaigns against Japan are information technology (57), professional goods and services (56), manufacturing (54), government (49) and telecommunicationsManufacturingcampaigns against Japan are information technology (57), professional goods and services (56), manufacturing (54), government (49) and telecommunications and media (46); Taiwan’s profile is similar.Professional Goods & Servicesmost often listed in China-origin campaigns against Japan are information technology (57), professional goods and services (56), manufacturing (54), government (49) and telecommunications and media (46); Taiwan’sSemiconductors17 NOVEMBER 2026 · TAIWAN · SEMICONDUCTORS · ECONOMIC SECURITYTelecommunications and mediatechnology (57), professional goods and services (56), manufacturing (54), government (49) and telecommunications and media (46); Taiwan’s profile is similar.
