Huntress Details CitrixBleed 2 Intrusions Leading to DragonForce Ransomware

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Summary

Huntress describes six similar 2026 intrusions in which attackers exploited CitrixBleed 2 to hijack sessions, escalate privileges, and establish persistence; one intrusion ended with DragonForce ransomware encryption.

Key points

  • Huntress investigated six similar intrusions at unrelated organizations between January and June 2026, attributing the activity with high confidence to an initial access broker or affiliate.
  • Attackers sent malformed pre-authentication NetScaler login requests to exploit CVE-2025-5777, leaking appliance memory and enabling theft and replay of valid session tokens.
  • In one case, logs showed a legitimate user’s authenticated session being used from an attacker IP without a successful attacker login, indicating session hijacking that bypassed the need to complete MFA.
  • Attackers used a registry symlink and the AppMgmt service to run a privilege-escalation tool as SYSTEM, then created rogue local administrator accounts.
  • Persistence commonly involved ScreenConnect or Zoho Assist; later activity included RDP, PsExec, Impacket, and Mimikatz.
  • One intrusion reached DragonForce ransomware deployment, but rapid response limited encryption to a single host.
  • Huntress recommends patching NetScaler, retaining and reviewing logs, terminating outstanding sessions, and checking for unauthorized accounts and remote-management tools.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Exploitation of CVE-2025-5777 against exposed Citrix NetScaler Gateway or AAA virtual servers: malformed pre-authentication login POST requests with an empty login parameter caused memory disclosure, enabling theft and replay of valid session tokens.
  • A portable local privilege-escalation tool abused a registry symbolic link and the Group Policy refresh/AppMgmt service chain to relaunch itself as SYSTEM.
  • The operator created rogue local administrator accounts, then used remote-management software and RDP for persistence and follow-on access.
  • The operator used PsExec and Impacket for remote execution and lateral movement, and Mimikatz to dump credentials.
  • DragonForce ransomware was executed in the most progressed intrusion, encrypting one victim environment.
Defensive Notes
  • Patch Citrix NetScaler appliances to the latest software version and regularly review them for updates.
  • Forward and retain NetScaler logs because appliance logs rotate quickly; investigate malformed login POST bursts, binary data in AAA LOGIN_FAILED User fields, and sessions without corresponding logins.
  • Terminate outstanding sessions on appliances vulnerable to CVE-2025-5777, since harvested session tokens may remain usable after patching.
  • Audit vulnerable Citrix environments for unexpected CtxAppVCOMService, ctxsvc, and test accounts, while recognizing that test may be legitimate in some environments.
  • Audit for unexpected ScreenConnect and Zoho Assist installations.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINopa[.]tlsd[.]shopNetbird relay domain used by the operator.
DOMAINrelay[.]dltsolutions[.]topAttacker-controlled ScreenConnect relay infrastructure.
DOMAINrelay[.]eurofin[.]digitalAttacker-controlled ScreenConnect relay infrastructure.
DOMAINvtps[.]usListed as a ScreenConnect relay used in the intrusions.
SHA256c4fcae3847946173bf0b3cedf5d97a9e3d18090023842f942ba544fa7fda180dSHA-256 hash identified as DragonForce ransomware.
SHA256c84739655ce1af0a0269138263d47567418f69e0f75e249f8e23bc21802209e2SHA-256 hash identified as an LPE tool.
SHA256eb083365dc70d0294e8c4f55a2e78be0edb0f3497f2a06a70c9f474dafab48d8SHA-256 hash identified as an LPE tool.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1003 · OS Credential DumpingThe operator ran Mimikatz to dump credentials.T1021.001 · Remote Desktop ProtocolThe operator used the newly created administrator accounts to log in interactively over RDP.T1059.003 · Windows Command ShellThe operator used Windows command-shell commands, including commands to start AppMgmt and run gpupdate.T1068 · Exploitation for Privilege EscalationThe LPE tool used a registry symbolic link and AppMgmt/Group Policy execution chain to obtain SYSTEM privileges.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferThe operator downloaded Atera and pulled the DragonForce ransomware binary into the victim environment.T1112 · Modify RegistryThe LPE tool planted a REG_LINK and modified protected registry configuration, then restored the original registry state.T1136.001 · Local AccountAfter elevating to SYSTEM, the operator created rogue local accounts and added them to the local Administrators group.T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationThe operator exploited the pre-authentication CVE-2025-5777 flaw on exposed NetScaler appliances.T1219 · Remote Access ToolsThe operator installed ScreenConnect, Zoho Assist, or Netbird/Atera remote-management tooling for persistence and access.T1486 · Data Encrypted for ImpactDragonForce ransomware encrypted a victim environment in the most progressed incident.T1539 · Steal Web Session CookieMemory disclosure enabled theft and replay of an authenticated user's live session token.T1569.002 · Service ExecutionThe operator used PsExec against local hosts for remote execution and a SYSTEM shell.

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