Hunt.io Maps BraZetsu Access-Broker Infrastructure Across Two VPS Providers

Summary
Hunt.io used certificate, DNS and scan data to link BraZetsu-associated panel and C2 infrastructure across Contabo and Njalla VPSs. The services went quiet in June; the researchers recommend hunting naming and port patterns.
Key points
- The research pivots from the published seed IP 38[.]242[.]246[.]176 to 80[.]78[.]27[.]252, where c2[.]installscenter[.]com and painel[.]installscenter[.]com appeared on separate ports.
- Certificate and scan records show the panel and C2 hostnames on ports 8083, 8443 and 2083, with Hestia Control Panel indicators.
- The researchers assess that the infrastructure likely moved from Contabo to Njalla, with medium confidence; the evidence does not identify the operator.
- The second VPS's TLS services went quiet by 20 June. A different SSH key and an nginx Laravel login were later observed there.
- BraZetsu is described in prior reporting as a Python Windows framework used by an initial-access broker; this investigation did not reverse-engineer the malware or recover victim data.
- The article recommends hunting certificate and hostname patterns alongside non-standard ports, while warning that generic Hestia indicators can produce false positives.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- BraZetsu retrieves a Pastebin dead-drop, Base64-decodes and XOR-decrypts it with p4st3_s3cr3t_k3y, and uses the resulting domain, port, and token for command-and-control configuration.
- The published analysis describes the live command channel as WebSocket over TLS on port 8443; the infrastructure hunt also identified C2 on port 2083 and a panel on ports 8083 and 8443.
- The reported framework profiles systems for ERP, SCADA, and EDR software and searches for .pfx/.p12 certificates and CNAB files; the report says it returns a dossier to the broker.
- The published reporting describes a v1 Run key persistence value named MonitorSystem.
- The shop inventories compromised Windows hosts and sells access to them; the article says follow-on activity may be carried out by other buyers.
- Defensive Notes
- Re-run the certificate-name hunt weekly and alert on new painel.* or c2.* certificates on ports 2083, 8083, or 8443.
- Review matches before blocking: the article warns that Hestia's default admin port and Portuguese painel.* names can produce false positives.
- Use first-seen and review dates when adding infrastructure to blocklists because the reported infrastructure rotates; verify 80.78.27[.]252 before blocking because its services and SSH key changed after the reported operator window.
- On endpoint detections, look for unsigned Nuitka-compiled executables, Chromium History files copied into %TEMP%, .pfx enumeration, and the MonitorSystem Run key value.
- If a host is affected, isolate it and preserve %TEMP% and the Run key before cleanup; check for follow-on activity by other actors.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | caixaentradas1inboxshop[.]site | The published report links this delivery domain to an Ousaban sample. |
| DOMAIN | infect[.]online | Older shop infrastructure identified in the published reporting. |
| DOMAIN | infectonline[.]store | Domain tied to the access-broker shop in the published indicators. |
| HOSTNAME | c2[.]installscenter[.]com | Published BraZetsu command hostname, observed on the VPS at port 2083. |
| HOSTNAME | painel[.]installscenter[.]com | Panel hostname observed on the same VPS as the C2, on ports 8083 and 8443. |
| IPV4 | 38[.]242[.]246[.]176 | Published seed VPS associated with BraZetsu reporting and AgenteV2 overlap; the hunt observed panel infrastructure on it. |
| IPV4 | 80[.]78[.]27[.]252 | VPS that hosted the reported C2 hostname and Hestia panel infrastructure from April to June 2026. |
| SHA256 | 0c65d06ecd5a4bcd214128cc5ae2fd48f449a7b0e4002c6f0e127486b90df1b5 | Certificate fingerprint for c2.installscenter[.]com on port 2083, observed 4 April to 17 May. |
| SHA256 | 0cd0cc49ea4ff48c675368f725e183608494f22fefa92d2f33577f70bb6c0d5d | BraZetsu sample hash listed in the published reporting. |
| SHA256 | 0fa785bb9f95b113539bb909da88e6cac9a433a07935571d9bcd2d85746fc5bf | BraZetsu sample hash listed in the published reporting. |
| SHA256 | 10de6185e31539cf01c8b05d9559e65e8693efd695f315de54667ef8c04de39c | BraZetsu sample hash listed in the published reporting. |
| SHA256 | 1510823e7c80b4db5333dd18cd5992881496da30032d6d69b2a82e1c5cf30246 | BraZetsu sample hash listed in the published reporting. |
| SHA256 | 30af2ec2437af0f4910d528440715540dbec6a5587f86f327316a7a781c1e2fe | BraZetsu sample hash listed in the published reporting. |
| SHA256 | 3f2f48525cf082672e38808480e214775e03dd943ff2df86172665aad96a5eaa | BraZetsu sample hash listed in the published reporting. |
| SHA256 | 473ade701a602a14d50a869762df72d1a1ca7cd395bf26b9e090d9116a447726 | Certificate fingerprint for painel.installscenter[.]com on ports 8083 and 8443. |
| SHA256 | 54e313434a7f3fa349e439857e23ab536a95c9927cf62f8358b5cdd9fabf2700 | BraZetsu sample hash listed in the published reporting. |
| SHA256 | 67fcfbdaab397ad1273135a3c6aa1d220ab76491cf945df081503401cc9732d2 | BraZetsu sample hash listed in the published reporting. |
| SHA256 | 731f269e44e3372e214e48ebaf0a05a892e914422a1fa664fb25a0fe2200528a | Certificate fingerprint for c2.installscenter[.]com on port 2083, observed 22 May to 4 June. |
| SHA256 | 91f225dcc7a01f926b03e8540d8b5e2d6c8e3763cc30f57381d702ce638fa6b0 | BraZetsu sample hash listed in the published reporting. |
| SHA256 | 93bb4a4812e77ddc17c2722340d915bd5c8387316bbdbc394c201a28cb9b7c88 | BraZetsu sample hash listed in the published reporting. |
| SHA256 | 96960409b6e1abf20eeb689d9e0a170008a15096de6a06ca5ae0d5aa56579042 | BraZetsu sample hash listed in the published reporting. |
| SHA256 | ab5c83564a38a035819a601e2e2f40c4ad07d0c12625bbb196ab4e915b087f86 | Certificate fingerprint for painel.seu-dominio[.]com on the published seed IP. |
| SHA256 | bc91f90a5677404cf9c8f4bed7b36c22027b1549ffefee129b41fab3db3108b8 | BraZetsu sample hash listed in the published reporting. |
| SHA256 | c4dd46e5b450349fd9fbf686a5a22f55f8371123b098104db663a3980646e138 | BraZetsu sample hash listed in the published reporting. |
| SHA256 | cd8fc8effea20d28e76c53f3386c783e55dcb309e1525b27f7a141d51b6f6c78 | BraZetsu sample hash listed in the published reporting. |
| SHA256 | d881a60ccd03b5417a1eed184143a18a333e7e9e9e351596a7a765843643af99 | BraZetsu sample hash listed in the published reporting. |
| SHA256 | f775fe06a4c2563cb03e1aa42eb4e9532840cce9dc168ea2ca97cee7972e6b17 | BraZetsu sample hash listed in the published reporting. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//pastebin[.]com/raw/9ChwVzzw | Published Pastebin dead-drop used to provide C2 configuration. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//pastebin[.]com/raw/aF0WCxia | Published Pastebin dead-drop used to provide C2 configuration. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//pastebin[.]com/raw/hM0nXNBP | Published Pastebin dead-drop used to provide C2 configuration. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationThe reported C2 configuration is Base64-decoded and XOR-decrypted with p4st3_s3cr3t_k3y.T1036 · MasqueradingThe published reporting lists distribution filenames such as msedge[0-9].exe and wifi_driver.exe.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelThe published reporting describes the agent returning a dossier over the C2 channel; the article says this hunt did not recover victim data.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsThe published analysis describes BraZetsu's command channel as WebSocket over TLS.T1102.001 · Dead Drop ResolverThe agent fetches its C2 configuration from Pastebin dead-drops.T1113 · Screen CaptureThe article's published ATT&CK mapping associates BraZetsu with screen collection; this hunt did not independently observe the agent.T1217 · Browser Information DiscoveryThe article recommends looking for Chromium History files copied into %TEMP%, consistent with the published browser-discovery mapping.T1518 · Software DiscoveryThe published analysis describes profiling installed ERP, SCADA, and EDR software.T1547.001 · Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderThe published reporting identifies a v1 Run key value named MonitorSystem for persistence.T1552.004 · Private KeysThe published analysis says the agent enumerates .pfx and .p12 certificates.T1573 · Encrypted ChannelThe reported command channel uses TLS.T1583.001 · DomainsThe article describes C2 and panel hostnames, including c2.installscenter[.]com and painel.installscenter[.]com, used for the cluster's infrastructure.T1583.003 · Virtual Private ServerThe article describes the cluster using VPS infrastructure at Contabo and later, with medium confidence, moving to a VPS at Njalla.
People
Threat Actors
Malware
agenteV2and infectonline.store, and one IPv4 address: 38.242.246[.]176, a Contabo VPS already seen in the AgenteV2 lineage.BraZetsuOn 31 August 2026 Group-IB described BraZetsu, a Python framework for Windows compiled with Nuitka, and attributed it with high confidence to the Brazilian actor Exilware. The same paper ties the binary to the InfectedOusabansits in the body of the paper and belongs to another phase of the chain (the report links it to an Ousaban sample delivered from the same domain). It is also not the historical A record of infect.online; previous
Vendors
CloudflareC2 hostname moved behind Cloudflare. Passive DNS shows c2.installscenter[.]com on 80.78.27[.]252 between 22 and 26 March and on Cloudflare from 26 March on.Contaboc2.installscenter.com, infect.online and infectonline.store, and one IPv4 address: 38.242.246[.]176, a Contabo VPS already seen in the AgenteV2 lineage.Let's EncryptThe premise is narrow. An operator who keeps a panel and a command channel under the same apex, with Let's Encrypt off port 443, leaves a more stable trail in the certificate inventory than the address of the month.NjallaThe cluster likely moved from Contabo (AS51167) to Njalla (AS39287).
Products
Hestia Control Panel8083 is the default Hestia Control Panel admin port; 8443 also matches the WebSocket port in the published sample analysis.Microsoft WindowsOn 31 August 2026 Group-IB described BraZetsu, a Python framework for Windows compiled with Nuitka, and attributed it with high confidence to the Brazilian actor Exilware. The same paper ties the binary to the Infected
Tools
Countries
Argentinaits evidence points mainly to Brazil, with v2 also targeting Mercado Libre and Mercado Pago domains in Argentina, Mexico and Chile. In April the shop advertised two hosts in the United States; the paper treats that asBrazilpaper describes the scope as Latin America and the Iberian Peninsula, but its evidence points mainly to Brazil, with v2 also targeting Mercado Libre and Mercado Pago domains in Argentina, Mexico and Chile. In AprilChilemainly to Brazil, with v2 also targeting Mercado Libre and Mercado Pago domains in Argentina, Mexico and Chile. In April the shop advertised two hosts in the United States; the paper treats that as insufficient toMexicopoints mainly to Brazil, with v2 also targeting Mercado Libre and Mercado Pago domains in Argentina, Mexico and Chile. In April the shop advertised two hosts in the United States; the paper treats that as
