Hunt IO Demonstrates Threat Hunting for Malicious Infrastructure and Exposed Cobalt Strike Files

Summary
Hunt IO demonstrates using infrastructure and keyword searches to find unreported servers and exposed Cobalt Strike files, including logs, keys and beacon activity linked with moderate confidence to Cobalt Strike Cat.
Key points
- Searching TLS certificate common names associated with Flax Typhoon surfaced four IP addresses not listed in Microsoft’s report; the article notes they may not be campaign-related.
- Hunt’s server overview provides hosting, open-port, passive DNS and historical TLS certificate information, alongside a timeline of malware and certificates.
- Keyword searches found nearly 250 Cobalt Strike events.log files on exposed servers.
- An inspected server contained operator connection details, executable names, private and public beacon keys, a beacon database, team server profile data and plaintext beacon logs.
- The beacon logs indicated credential gathering as one possible operator objective.
- A “Cobalt Strike Cat” string and other observed TTPs supported moderate confidence that the server was additional infrastructure for the modified Cobalt Strike variant.
Article Details
- Defense Focus
- Proactively discover and investigate potentially malicious infrastructure and exposed files associated with malware campaigns before they are publicly reported.
- Detection Methods
- Search TLS certificate subject.common_name values associated with known threat activity to identify additional servers.
- Use keyword searches for Cobalt Strike events.log files across exposed servers, then inspect downloaded logs and related files.
- Review server overview data and historical timelines of hosted malware and certificates to assess suspect infrastructure.
- Correlate exposed files, beacon logs, server profiles, and observed tools with reported threat activity; the article cautions that search results may or may not be campaign-related.
- Data Sources
- TLS certificate common names and historical certificate data
- Passive DNS data and hosting-provider information
- Open ports
- Exposed directories and downloadable files
- Cobalt Strike events.log files and plaintext beacon logs
- Cobalt Strike beacon keys, database files, team server profiles, and demo.cna files
- Platforms
- Hunt platform
- Defensive Actions
- Investigate newly discovered IP addresses and review their hosting, port, passive DNS, certificate, and malware history.
- Examine exposed Cobalt Strike logs and associated files for operator connection information, tooling, and activity relevant to threat assessment.
- Treat candidate infrastructure as requiring validation; the article notes that results may not be associated with the suspected campaign.
Threat Actors
Malware
Vendors
Products
Cobalt StrikeWe'll begin our hunt looking for Cobalt Strike events.log files, which, as the name suggests, contain the date and time the operator connected to the team server and, of the most interest, the IP address that made theHuntIn this post, we'll do something different and showcase how the Hunt platform can be leveraged to proactively identify infrastructure not yet publicly reported on from recent malware campaigns and search openSoftEther VPNIn the report, Microsoft noted Flax Typhoon's preference for hosting SoftEther VPN servers on their infrastructure instead of a third party. The information included the Common Name, or CN, for the associated TLS
Countries
Industries
Critical infrastructureIn June of this year, EclecticIQ researchers released a blog post identifying a modified version of Cobalt Strike targeting the Taiwanese government and critical infrastructure entities named "Cobalt Strike Cat."GovernmentIn June of this year, EclecticIQ researchers released a blog post identifying a modified version of Cobalt Strike targeting the Taiwanese government and critical infrastructure entities named "Cobalt Strike Cat."
