Tortilla Campaign Exploits Exchange Servers to Deploy Babuk Ransomware

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Summary

Cisco Talos details Tortilla’s campaign exploiting ProxyShell vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange to deploy Babuk, disable backups, delete shadow copies and encrypt files. The chain uses PowerShell, staged loaders and pastebin[.]pl.

Key points

  • Talos observed the campaign targeting vulnerable Exchange servers, likely exploiting ProxyShell and using a China Chopper web shell for initial access.
  • A modified EfsPotato downloader runs obfuscated PowerShell, bypasses AMSI and downloads additional modules from fbi[.]fund or xxxs[.]info.
  • The staged loader retrieves an unpacker from pastebin[.]pl, decrypts the Babuk payload in memory and injects it into a process such as AddInProcess32.exe.
  • Babuk terminates backup-related services, deletes Volume Shadow Copies and encrypts files with the .babyk extension; the actor demands $10,000 in Monero.
  • The campaign predominantly affected users in the U.S., with smaller numbers in several other countries. Talos assessed Tortilla as a relatively new actor operating since July 2021.
  • Talos recommends patching externally facing servers, maintaining sound backups and monitoring for service termination, high disk I/O and shadow-copy deletion.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • The campaign likely gained initial access by exploiting ProxyShell vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Server; Talos assessed this with moderate confidence.
  • Downloaders used a modified EfsPotato exploit targeting ProxyShell and PetitPotam vulnerabilities, followed by obfuscated PowerShell commands to retrieve and run additional modules.
  • The campaign used China Chopper web shells on observed infected systems; Talos believed the web shell ran the initial download command.
  • The malware downloaded an intermediate unpacker from pastebin.pl, decrypted the Babuk payload in memory, and injected it into a newly created process.
  • Babuk disabled backup-related services, deleted volume shadow copies with vssadmin, and encrypted files on the victim server and mounted drives.
Defensive Notes
  • Apply the latest available security patches to externally facing servers, applications, and important internal assets.
  • Enable behavioral protection on endpoints and servers and monitor for abrupt service termination, unusually high drive I/O, shadow-copy deletion, and system configuration changes.
  • Maintain sound backups, central logging, and XDR coverage for important organizational resources.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINfbi[.]fundActor-controlled domain used to host and distribute campaign modules.
DOMAINxxxs[.]infoActor-controlled domain used to host campaign modules before the actor switched to fbi[.]fund.
EMAILmitnickd@ctemplar[.]comRansomware contact email disclosed to victims for payment-related instructions.
EMAILzar8b@tuta[.]ioRansomware contact email disclosed to victims for payment-related instructions.
IPV4168[.]119[.]93[.]163Listed by the article as an IOC; its specific role is not described.
IPV4185[.]219[.]52[.]229Actor-controlled download server hosting malicious campaign modules.
IPV454[.]221[.]65[.]242Listed by the article as an IOC; its specific role is not described.
SHA25607fb7b42fe8d4a2125df459efd86de0f27b91b59d82b85b530c1e7c552c9e235Hash of a sample from a previous campaign.
SHA25608d799cc27063bc7969ae935ca171b518d0b41b1feaa9775bae06bd319291b41Hash of a Stage 2 Swrort variant containing the ransomware payload.
SHA2560994c1fc7f66f88eead2091f31a2137f69d08c3cf9ee0f4a15a842f54253c9d9Hash of a Stage 2 Swrort variant containing the ransomware payload.
SHA2561d28c4c85e241efbbe326051999b9a8e1d8eeb9a3322da5cb9a93c31c65bbb49Hash of a Stage 2 Swrort variant containing the ransomware payload.
SHA25647033d071e1c79cc03f8b4081f5f6d470d45e32a90b06ee96bfe6c3df2f47d40Hash of a Stage 1 DLL downloader.
SHA2564fa565cc2ebfe97b996786facdb454e4328a28792e27e80e8b46fe24b44781afHash of a leaked Babuk builder.
SHA25656b7e6dd46e38a30ead82790947a425661ad893f54060381c9b76616c27d3b9fHash of a Stage 1 DLL downloader.
SHA2565f35dbf807c844c790b9cffc9f83eca05d32f58b737ba638c9567b8d22119f96Hash of a Stage 2 Swrort variant containing the ransomware payload.
SHA256752d66990097c8be7760d8d6011b1e91daa1d5518951d86f9fdf3d126d54872aHash of the modified EfsPotato downloader variant.
SHA256949c262359f87c8a0e8747f28a89cf3d519b35fbc5a8be81b2cd9e6adc830370Hash of a PowerCat netcat-clone sample associated with the actor.
SHA256b3b66f7e70f1e1b1494677d0ed79fcc7d4901ffae53d89fd023c8b789bb0fe62Hash of a related sample described as a reverse shell connecting to the actor-controlled server.
SHA256bd26b65807026a70909d38c48f2a9e0f8730b1126e80ef078e29e10379722b49Hash of a Babuk ransomware payload.
URLhxxp[:]//185[.]219[.]52[.]229:8080/vefEPjwOdNF9qNw[.]htaListed as a campaign IOC on the actor-controlled server.
URLhxxp[:]//185[.]219[.]52[.]229/tortilla[.]exeMalicious payload download URL on the actor-controlled server.
URLhxxp[:]//185[.]219[.]52[.]229/tortillas/tore[.]exeMalicious module download URL on the actor-controlled server.
URLhxxp[:]//185[.]219[.]52[.]229/tortillas/tortilla[.]exePayload download URL on the actor-controlled server.
URLhxxp[:]//fbi[.]fund/dark[.]exeMalicious loader download URL on actor-controlled infrastructure.
URLhxxp[:]//fbi[.]fund/tortillas/tore[.]exeMalicious module download URL on actor-controlled infrastructure.
URLhxxp[:]//fbi[.]fund/tortillas/tortilla[.]exePayload download URL on actor-controlled infrastructure.
URLhxxp[:]//xxxs[.]info/kaido[.]exeMalicious executable URL from a related campaign on an actor-controlled domain.
URLhxxps[:]//pastebin[.]pl/view/raw/a57be2caSpecific URL used to retrieve the campaign's intermediate unpacking module.

MITRE ATT&CK

CVE

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Threat Actors

Malware

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Tools

certutil.exeThe PowerShell command invokes a web request and downloads the payload loader module using certutil.exe from a URL hosted on the domains fbi[.]fund and xxxs[.]info, or the IP address 185[.]219[.]52[.]229.ClamAVThe following ClamAV signatures have been released to detect this threat:ConfuserExsystem (SMS) application not to be confused with the SMS messaging protocol. The module is packed with ConfuserEx, a free, open-source protector for .NET applications. This stage is downloaded by a process launched byEfsPotatoThe initial downloader is a modified EfsPotato exploit to target proxyshell and PetitPotam vulnerabilities. The downloader runs an embedded obfuscated PowerShell command to connect and download a packed downloaderOrbital Advanced SearchCisco Secure Endpoint users can use Orbital Advanced Search to run complex OSqueries to see if their endpoints are infected with this specific threat. For specific OSqueries on this threat, click filepath and mutex.PowerCatTortilla has been experimenting with other payloads, such as the PowerShell-based netcat clone Powercat, which is known to provide attackers with unauthorized access to Windows machines.SnortOur telemetry also indicates that the actor's infrastructure was active in attempting to exploit a number of vulnerabilities in other products most commonly triggering the following Snort rules:vssadminas Veeam backup service. It also deletes volume shadow service (VSS) snapshots from the server using vssadmin utility to make sure the encrypted files cannot be restored from their VSS copies. The ransomware module

Countries

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