Threat Actors Increasingly Use Malicious Excel XLL Add-Ins to Deliver Malware

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Summary

Cisco Talos traces malicious Excel XLL add-ins from early use in 2017 to wider adoption by APT groups and commodity malware, detailing how they execute code and deliver payloads as VBA macro protections expand.

Key points

  • XLL files are Windows DLLs that Excel loads as add-ins; functions such as xlAutoOpen can run code when an add-in loads.
  • Talos found malicious XLL use beginning in 2017, with adoption rising notably from late 2021 as commodity malware families began using the technique.
  • APT10, TA410, DoNot and FIN7 are among the actors linked to XLLs; observed malware includes Dridex, FormBook, Warzone and Ducktail.
  • Some XLLs arrive as email attachments or lures and download or load additional malware; Excel-DNA lets developers build .NET-based XLLs.
  • Talos describes VirusTotal search methods and YARA rules for hunting native and Excel-DNA-based XLL files.
  • Blocking VBA macros in downloaded Office documents does not prevent XLL-based code execution; Talos recommends its security products and provides applicable Snort SIDs and ClamAV signatures.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Malicious XLL add-ins are delivered as email attachments; opening an XLL causes Excel to load and execute its code.
  • XLL add-ins use xlAutoOpen, xlAutoClose, or other exported functions to run code when Excel loads the add-in or handles an event.
  • FIN7 used XLL email attachments as downloaders for additional components.
  • A Warzone campaign used an XLL attachment in an email impersonating the Hungarian police.
  • A Ducktail XLL decoded and decrypted an embedded Base32 data blob, loaded it into Explorer through reflection, then downloaded the stealer payload from Discord.
  • XLL samples used process injection, including an APT10 sample that injected Anel into svchost.exe.
  • The article reports that FormBook can record keystrokes, steal locally stored and web-form passwords, and take screenshots.
Defensive Notes
  • Microsoft began rolling out Office versions that block VBA macros by default in documents marked as downloaded from the internet, but this does not prevent malicious XLL add-ins.
  • The article warns that users may disregard Excel's warning about potentially malicious XLL code.
  • Cisco lists endpoint, email, firewall, network analytics, malware analysis, web, and DNS-security products as available protections for the described threat.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
SHA25609271afc6f7ac254b4942a14559a0015fb4893d9bb478844ced2f78c0695929eXLL test sample used to launch calc.exe.
SHA25655228eec31193a900e8216ab245391f1e40feb742d780caa91fdb1000d8434c2FormBook XLL downloader delivered as an email attachment.
SHA2567a234d1a2415834290a3a9c7274aadb7253dcfe24edb10b22f1a4a33fd027a08FIN7 XLL attachment used as a downloader for the next stage.
SHA25690205826eb40d5d4b454c2cfde44abe49f6c3b471681c700e30b45eb5078eee2Warzone payload hosted at the URL used by the XLL downloader.
SHA2569dd2425c1a40b8899b2a4ac0a85b047bede642c5dfd3b5a2a2f066a853b49e2dTA410 process-injection DLL identified as an XLL-stage component.
SHA256a5d46912f0767ae30bc169a85c5bcb309d93c3802a2e32e04165fa25740afac1APT10-associated XLL sample that injects the Anel backdoor payload into svchost.exe.
SHA256d7c3dd8bc55649b2a77dc921e70f5f208946f64aedfdaabd7b02a247669a73aaDucktail XLL downloader containing an encoded and encrypted data blob.
SHA256d8286133d3d21b7e2b83a6c071147b8ef993e963ad6bdb0f95d665869557a444DoNot-associated DLL named 1.xll, identified as a native-based XLL payload.
SHA256f2c5327b7bf88c65d0552d8664aca2ac542c8d37ae19582ba56690f1df420b53Dridex XLL downloader.
SHA256f5c27b7bdea3861a9414a0dc6b08556ea50423d63297e08eedff69ae9c240caeWarzone XLL attachment that downloads the payload.
SHA256fdfdfc8878f39424920d469bcd05060a6f7c95794aaa2422941913553d3dd01fMeterpreter reverse-shell XLL sample.
URLhxxp[:]//172[.]245[.]120[.]8/pdfreader[.]exeURL used by the Warzone XLL to download the payload; the article says it hosted Warzone and later AgentTesla and Lokibot samples.

MITRE ATT&CK

People

Threat Actors

Malware

AgentTeslafamilies that use XLLs as the infection vector and are not specifically described in this post include AgentTesla, Ransomware Stop, Vidar, Buer Loader, Nanocore, IceID, Arkei, AsyncRat, BazarLoader and others.Anelwas submitted to VirusTotal in December 2017 and it contains functionality to inject the Backdoor Anel payload into the process space of svchost.exe.Arkeidescribed in this post include AgentTesla, Ransomware Stop, Vidar, Buer Loader, Nanocore, IceID, Arkei, AsyncRat, BazarLoader and others.AsyncRATdescribed in this post include AgentTesla, Ransomware Stop, Vidar, Buer Loader, Nanocore, IceID, Arkei, AsyncRat, BazarLoader and others.AveMariaWarzone (Avemaria) RATBazarLoaderthis post include AgentTesla, Ransomware Stop, Vidar, Buer Loader, Nanocore, IceID, Arkei, AsyncRat, BazarLoader and others.Buer Loadervector and are not specifically described in this post include AgentTesla, Ransomware Stop, Vidar, Buer Loader, Nanocore, IceID, Arkei, AsyncRat, BazarLoader and others.CarbanakPowerShell. The main goal of FIN7 is obtaining financial gain for the group. FIN7 most commonly uses  Carbanak malware.CerbuWin.Malware.Cerbu-9980304-0DridexFor quite some time after that, the usage of XLL files is only sporadic and it does not increase significantly until the end of 2021, when commodity malware families such as Dridex and Formbook started using it.DuckTailDucktail is an information stealer malware targeting users in the digital advertising sector, attributed to a threat actor operating in Vietnam. Ducktail attempts to steal browser stored credentials and cookies with theFormBookFor quite some time after that, the usage of XLL files is only sporadic and it does not increase significantly until the end of 2021, when commodity malware families such as Dridex and Formbook started using it.IceIDspecifically described in this post include AgentTesla, Ransomware Stop, Vidar, Buer Loader, Nanocore, IceID, Arkei, AsyncRat, BazarLoader and others.KoobickWin.Malware.Koobick-9980509-0LokiBotAt the time of analysis, the URL hosted the Warzone payload 90205826eb40d5d4b454c2cfde44abe49f6c3b471681c700e30b45eb5078eee2, and later hosted samples of AgentTesla and Lokibot.MeterpreterIn the same month, a Meterpreter reverse shell sample, fdfdfc8878f39424920d469bcd05060a6f7c95794aaa2422941913553d3dd01f, was submitted.NanoCoreand are not specifically described in this post include AgentTesla, Ransomware Stop, Vidar, Buer Loader, Nanocore, IceID, Arkei, AsyncRat, BazarLoader and others.StopUnfortunately, it would be naive to assume that Office will stop being targeted, now that VBA macros have been blocked.Vidarthe infection vector and are not specifically described in this post include AgentTesla, Ransomware Stop, Vidar, Buer Loader, Nanocore, IceID, Arkei, AsyncRat, BazarLoader and others.WarzoneWarzone (Avemaria) RATZusyWin.Malware.Zusy-9980503-0

Vendors

Products

Cisco DuoCisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network.Cisco Secure EmailCisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign.Cisco Secure EndpointCisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post.Cisco Secure FirewallCisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.Cisco Secure Malware AnalyticsCisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products.Cisco Secure Network/Cloud AnalyticsCisco Secure Network/Cloud Analytics (Stealthwatch/Stealthwatch Cloud) analyzes network traffic automatically and alerts users of potentially unwanted activity on every connected device.Cisco Secure Web ApplianceCisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them.ClamAVThe following ClamAV signatures are applicable to this threat:ExcelThreat Spotlight: XLLing in Excel - threat actors using malicious add-insMicrosoft OfficeFor decades, Microsoft Office applications have served as one of the most significant entry points for malicious code.SecureXSecureXSnortOpen-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.UmbrellaTA410 is a cyberespionage umbrella group loosely linked to APT10, known mostly for targeting US-based organizations in the utilities sector, and diplomatic organizations in the Middle East and Africa. TA410 has been

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