Researchers Identify Suspected Oyster Backdoor Infrastructure Using JARM and HTML Hashes

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Summary

Hunt.io used a JARM fingerprint and HTML response hash to identify four suspected Oyster backdoor domains hosted on OVH, then corroborated findings with VirusTotal and CleanUp.dll connections.

Key points

  • Oyster, also known as Broomstick or CleanUpLoader, has been linked to malvertising campaigns impersonating popular software, including a Microsoft Teams installer.
  • The backdoor sends victim information to hard-coded command-and-control domains through HTTP POST requests.
  • Analysts combined a JARM fingerprint with the HTML response body hash for a webpage titled “Soon” to find infrastructure resembling domains previously reported by Rapid7.
  • The query returned seven IP addresses, including three previously reported by Rapid7 and four additional suspected infrastructure hosts on OVH SAS.
  • VirusTotal results linked CleanUp.dll samples to Oyster and showed the /api/connectivity path used to transmit victim information.
  • The article cautions that a VirusTotal score of zero does not establish that an IP address or domain is benign.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Malvertising campaigns disguised Oyster backdoor as installers for popular software, including a Microsoft Teams installer.
  • CleanUp.dll and CleanUp30.dll attempted to communicate with hard-coded C2 domains.
  • The backdoor sends victim information to a C2 domain in an HTTP POST request.
Defensive Notes
  • Hunt.io used a query combining JARM fingerprint 15d3fd16d29d29d00042d43d000000ed1cf37c9a169b41886e27ba8fad60b0 with HTTP response body hash 0c90ad9910cfb37c9969e14388707ef765ef5e73 to identify suspected Oyster infrastructure.
  • The article cautions that a VirusTotal score of 0 does not establish that an IP or domain is benign.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINcodeforprofessionalusers[.]comDomain identified by the article's detection query as suspected Oyster backdoor infrastructure.
DOMAINdotnetisforchildren[.]comDomain identified by the article's detection query as suspected Oyster backdoor infrastructure.
DOMAINfirstcountryours[.]euDomain identified as suspected Oyster backdoor infrastructure and listed among domains contacted by a CleanUp.dll sample.
DOMAINpostmastersoriginals[.]comDomain identified by the article's detection query as suspected Oyster backdoor infrastructure.
DOMAINretdirectyourman[.]euDomain Rapid7 identified as a malicious C2 contacted by Oyster backdoor DLLs.
DOMAINsupfoundrysettlers[.]usDomain Rapid7 identified as a malicious C2 contacted by Oyster backdoor DLLs.
DOMAINwherehomebe[.]comDomain Rapid7 identified as a malicious C2 contacted by Oyster backdoor DLLs.
IPV4139[.]99[.]221[.]140IP identified by the article's detection query as suspected Oyster backdoor infrastructure.
IPV4149[.]248[.]79[.]62IP associated with the malicious C2 domain wherehomebe[.]com.
IPV4162[.]19[.]237[.]181IP identified by the article's detection query as suspected Oyster backdoor infrastructure.
IPV4193[.]43[.]104[.]208IP identified by the article's detection query as suspected Oyster backdoor infrastructure.
IPV4206[.]166[.]251[.]114IP associated with the malicious C2 domain retdirectyourman[.]eu.
IPV451[.]195[.]232[.]46IP identified by the article's detection query as suspected Oyster backdoor infrastructure.
IPV464[.]95[.]10[.]243IP associated with the malicious C2 domain supfoundrysettlers[.]us.
SHA10c90ad9910cfb37c9969e14388707ef765ef5e73HTTP response body hash used with the JARM fingerprint to identify suspected Oyster infrastructure.

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