SEO-Poisoned Fake PuTTY Downloads Deliver Oyster Backdoor

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Summary

Darktrace analyzed a campaign that used fake PuTTY download sites promoted through search results to deliver the Oyster backdoor, observing persistence, command-and-control traffic, possible data exfiltration, and unusual RDP activity.

Key points

  • In a campaign identified in June 2025, fake PuTTY sites such as putty[.]run led users to malicious installers hosted on separate domains.
  • The installer deployed a functional PuTTY copy alongside Oyster, a backdoor also known as Broomstick or CleanUpLoader.
  • Oyster used a scheduled task for persistence and DLL sideloading, including execution of a malicious DLL through rundll32.exe.
  • Darktrace observed C2 traffic with unusual URI paths and spoofed user-agent strings, including “WordPressAgent.”
  • In one case, an infected device downloaded a ZIP file and made HTTP POST requests consistent with possible data staging and exfiltration.
  • Anomalous RDP sessions and scanning followed some infections, suggesting possible lateral movement; the article does not confirm ransomware deployment in these cases.
  • Darktrace reported that its network detection identified malicious activity and that Autonomous Response could block the threat when configured.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • SEO poisoning and typosquatted PuTTY download sites deliver a trojanized installer that installs PuTTY while deploying the Oyster backdoor.
  • The malware uses DLL side-loading, including a DLL often named twain_96.dll executed through rundll32.exe.
  • Oyster communicates with command-and-control infrastructure over HTTP and may download additional files.
  • Observed follow-on activity included RDP sessions and scanning, and probable data exfiltration via outbound HTTP POST requests.
Defensive Notes
  • Darktrace reports that its anomaly-based network detection identified malicious activity and that Autonomous Response could shut down the threat when properly configured.
  • Monitor for connections to typosquatted software-download domains, rare external IP addresses, Oyster-associated URI patterns, and suspicious HTTP user-agent strings such as WordPressAgent.
  • Investigate scheduled tasks running every few minutes, DLL side-loading through rundll32.exe, unusual RDP activity, and outbound HTTP POST requests with upload-like paths.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINputty-app[.]naymin[.]comTyposquatted PuTTY endpoint identified as an indicator in the campaign.
DOMAINputty[.]runTyposquatted PuTTY download domain used to lure users in the SEO-poisoning campaign.
IPV4185[.]196[.]8[.]217Listed as an Oyster campaign indicator; associated with malicious activity.
IPV4185[.]208[.]158[.]119Listed as an Oyster campaign indicator; associated with malicious activity.
IPV485[.]239[.]52[.]99Listed as an Oyster campaign indicator; associated with malicious activity.

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