RondoDoX Botnet Exploits Next.js Vulnerability in Multi-Month Campaign

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Summary

CloudSEK analyzed nine months of C2 logs showing RondoDoX targeting web applications and IoT devices, with Next.js Server Actions exploitation and botnet deployments surging in December 2025.

Key points

  • CloudSEK reports three campaign phases from March to December 2025, supported by command-and-control logs and attack timestamps.
  • The activity included automated probing of web applications and IoT devices, including routers and network appliances.
  • From December 13, the actors used Next.js Server Actions exploitation to test for remote code execution and deploy payloads.
  • Payloads included Rondo botnet variants, Mirai, and a coinminer; some scripts also removed competing malware and established persistence.
  • CloudSEK identified six C2 servers and reported more than 40 repeat attacks against the vulnerability within six days.
  • The report recommends patching vulnerable Next.js applications, hardening and segmenting IoT devices, and blocking identified C2 infrastructure.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Automated exploitation of internet-facing web applications, including Next.js Server Actions, Drupal, Struts2, WordPress Gravity Forms, and WebLogic.
  • Command injection through router and IoT device diagnostic interfaces.
  • Next.js Server Actions exploitation to execute commands, download ELF payloads, and run them in the background.
  • Deployment of botnet payloads and coinminers across IoT devices and compromised servers.
Defensive Notes
  • Audit Next.js applications using Server Actions, validate serialized input, apply vendor patches, and consider disabling exposed Server Actions until patches are validated.
  • Segment IoT devices, disable remote management, change default credentials, apply firmware updates, and restrict outbound connections to trusted destinations.
  • Use web application firewall rules and input validation to block command injection; disable unnecessary command-execution features in administrative interfaces.
  • Block the identified C2 IP addresses at perimeter firewalls and DNS resolvers; monitor for the reported URI patterns and suspicious process execution, permission changes, and outbound connections.
  • Require VPN or jump-host access for device management interfaces, enable multifactor authentication, and log administrative actions.
  • Patch critical internet-facing vulnerabilities promptly and maintain an inventory of devices and firmware versions.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV438[.]59[.]219[.]27C2 server reported serving Rondo botnet malware.
IPV441[.]231[.]37[.]153C2 server listed in the article's confirmed C2 infrastructure.
IPV45[.]231[.]70[.]66Additional C2 found by pivoting on an image hash, according to the article.
IPV45[.]255[.]121[.]141C2 server for the Next.js exploitation wave's botnet deployment.
IPV451[.]81[.]104[.]115C2 and payload host used in the Next.js exploitation wave.
IPV470[.]184[.]13[.]47C2 server listed in the article's confirmed C2 infrastructure.
IPV474[.]194[.]191[.]52C2 server used to deploy Rondo script variants.
IPV489[.]144[.]31[.]18Listed as a confirmed C2 server in the article's IOC table.
SHA25650be5257678412f0810d46e0b0bc573eb65c6ce4617346c1527ff0dc9b7fc79eSHA-256 identified as a persistence payload.
SHA256858874057e3df990ccd7958a38936545938630410bde0c0c4b116f92733b1ddbSHA-256 of the /nuts/x86 Mirai payload.
SHA256895f8dff9cd26424b691a401c92fa7745e693275c38caf6a6aff277eadf2a70bSHA-256 of the /nuts/poop coinminer payload.
SHA2568e0bc23a87d349e5a5356252ce17576093b7858fdf6ea84919fbdcb2e117168eSHA-256 of the /nuts/bolts health-check payload.

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