Researchers Analyze Gunra Ransomware After Infiltrating Its Affiliate Program

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Summary

CloudSEK says it infiltrated Gunra’s newly launched affiliate program and analyzed a Windows ransomware sample that uses ChaCha20 and RSA-4096, encrypts selected files offline, and leaves R3ADM3.txt ransom notes.

Key points

  • CloudSEK researchers reported discovering Gunra’s affiliate program on a dark web forum in January 2026 and obtaining panel credentials, an operator guide, and a ransomware sample through HUMINT operations.
  • The analyzed Windows sample scans drives A–Z, skips specified system directories and file extensions, and targets other files, renaming encrypted files with the .ENCRT extension.
  • It generates a unique ChaCha20 key and nonce for each file, then protects the key material with an embedded RSA-4096 public key.
  • The sample uses worker threads for parallel file processing and writes R3ADM3.txt ransom notes in directories containing encrypted files.
  • Researchers observed no DNS, HTTP, or socket activity during encryption; victims are directed to contact the attackers through a Tor portal after encryption.
  • CloudSEK recommends offline or immutable backups, application allowlisting, endpoint monitoring for mass file changes and ransom notes, and tested incident response plans.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Gunra affiliates deploy ransomware binaries that recursively scan accessible drives and encrypt files.
  • The ransomware is distributed to affiliates through a Ransomware-as-a-Service program with a management panel and configurable locker builder.
  • The ransom note directs victims to a Tor payment portal; the article reports that portal interaction is victim-driven after encryption.
Defensive Notes
  • Maintain frequent offline and immutable backups, and regularly test restoration procedures.
  • Enforce application allowlisting and prevent execution from user-writable directories.
  • Monitor for suspicious file activity, including .ENCRT file extensions, ransom-note creation, and high-volume file modifications.
  • Apply phishing protection, enforce multi-factor authentication, and educate users on safe file handling.
  • Maintain a tested ransomware response plan, prepare to isolate systems rapidly, and preserve forensic evidence.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
MD5e57b130718373f6ba9b37f39ca1d7e3dMD5 hash identified as the ransomware locker file.
SHA25625c8cb27947042de89d634b3e260e614e5b1425a89494fa4e4295bcabfa8ee48SHA-256 hash identified as the operator PDF guide.
SHA25675e5621756e9d19efeac2bcbb2ac4711fb85243c03b0a19c05b18e31a780691eSHA-256 hash identified as the ransomware locker file.

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