Picus Details Payload Ransomware’s Babuk-Based Encryption and GPO Disruption

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Summary

Picus analyzes Payload ransomware’s Babuk-derived Windows and Linux/ESXi encryptors, per-file Curve25519/ChaCha20 encryption, anti-forensics, and credential-based access. It also describes a reported domain-wide disruption using malicious GPOs without deploying an encr

Key points

  • The article says Payload activity surfaced in February 2026 and targets Windows and Linux/ESXi systems.
  • Picus reports that Payload’s encryptors derive from leaked Babuk source, but replace HC-128 with ChaCha20 and use a fresh Curve25519 key pair for each file.
  • The Windows encryptor reportedly patches ETW functions, clears Windows event logs, stops services, and can delete itself using an NTFS alternate data stream.
  • The Linux/ESXi build parses VMware’s vmInventory.xml to find virtual machine disk paths for encryption.
  • The article describes an April 2026 intrusion in which stolen domain credentials were used through a FortiGate SSL VPN; two domain-root GPOs disrupted systems without a Windows encryptor.
  • The article reports that the GPOs disabled Windows Firewall and changed domain-wide settings, while the operator also exfiltrated data.
  • Picus promotes its platform for simulating Payload attacks to test security controls.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Operators used stolen valid domain credentials to authenticate to an organization's perimeter through FortiGate SSL VPN; the article reports no CVE exploitation.
  • In the April 2026 incident, two malicious Group Policy Objects linked at the domain root distributed ransom notes and a wallpaper, changed pre-logon notices, disabled Windows Firewall, and disabled local Administrator accounts across the domain.
  • Operators stole data before encryption. The article reports exfiltration from file servers and other systems on the day the GPOs were authored.
  • Payload encryptors target Windows and Linux/ESXi hosts. The Linux build parses /etc/vmware/hostd/vmInventory.xml to locate virtual machine disk paths.
  • Some intrusions disrupted Windows domains through malicious GPOs without deploying an encryptor to Windows endpoints.
Defensive Notes
  • The article identifies C:\payload.log as a host indicator that can survive encryptor self-deletion.
  • Review domain-root GPO creation and linking, including changes that disable Windows Firewall or local Administrator accounts; the reported April incident's impact followed the GPO changes by a day.
  • The encryptor can clear every Windows event log channel and patch ETW functions in its own process, potentially removing log evidence and reducing ETW-based visibility for that process.
  • The article recommends using the Picus Platform to simulate Payload attacks and test security controls.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1005 · Data from Local SystemIn the April 2026 incident, exfiltration was observed from file servers and several other systems.T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationThe ransom note is stored in the .rdata section as an RC4-encrypted, base64-encoded blob.T1057 · Process DiscoveryThe encryptor enumerates processes through toolhelp snapshots before terminating processes on its kill list.T1070.004 · File DeletionAfter renaming its stream, the binary marks its executable for deletion on close.T1078 · Valid AccountsIn the April 2026 incident, a compromised domain account was used to authenticate to the perimeter.T1083 · File and Directory DiscoveryThe Windows encryptor walks local and network drives; the Linux build parses the ESXi inventory XML to find virtual machine disk paths.T1133 · External Remote ServicesThe operator logged in through the organization's FortiGate SSL VPN using stolen credentials; the article reports no vulnerability exploitation.T1135 · Network Share DiscoveryThe Windows encryptor reaches network drives by default; its s switch skips network shares.T1484.001 · Group Policy ModificationOperators created two GPOs and linked them at the domain root to distribute settings across the domain.T1486 · Data Encrypted for ImpactPayload encrypts files with ChaCha20 using a fresh Curve25519 key pair for each file.T1489 · Service StopThe encryptor stops services and terminates processes, including services related to databases, virtualization, and backups.T1490 · Inhibit System RecoveryThe encryptor deletes Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet.T1564.004 · NTFS File AttributesThe Windows binary renames its own $DATA stream to the NTFS alternate data stream :payload.T1685.005 · Clear Windows Event LogsThe Windows encryptor enumerates and clears every event log channel using wevtapi.dll APIs.T1686 · Disable or Modify System FirewallThe win Firewall Off GPO disabled Windows Firewall on domain, private, and public profiles across endpoints.

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