Medusa Ransomware Campaigns Abuse SimpleHelp and Other RMM Tools

· Original article ↗

Summary

Darktrace describes Medusa ransomware activity across its customers, detailing how attackers abused RMM tools for access, persistence, lateral movement and data theft, including a 2025 compromise that exfiltrated about 70 GiB.

Key points

  • Darktrace observed Medusa-related file encryption activity across customer environments between December 2023 and November 2025.
  • In a late-2025 incident, attackers used network scanning, RDP, SMB, DCE/RPC and PowerShell for lateral movement; the initial access method was unclear.
  • Attackers used SimpleHelp and other legitimate RMM tools for command-and-control, persistence, lateral movement, tool delivery and ransomware execution.
  • In the investigated incident, a file server uploaded about 70 GiB of data to erp.ranasons[.]com; Darktrace also observed connections to attacker-controlled SimpleHelp servers.
  • Evidence from security alerts suggested attackers used a vulnerable driver to disable security tools and PDQ Deploy to distribute executables.
  • Medusa actors have also exploited vulnerabilities in products including GoAnywhere MFT, SimpleHelp, ScreenConnect, Exchange Server and Fortinet Enterprise Management Servers.
  • The article recommends promptly patching exposed RMM servers and monitoring for anomalous use of remote-management tools.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Medusa operators obtain access to compromised devices or accounts through initial access brokers, who may use phishing, credential stuffing, or brute-force attacks; they also target vulnerable or misconfigured internet-facing systems.
  • Reportedly exploited vulnerabilities include CVE-2025-10035 in Fortra GoAnywhere MFT License Servlet; CVE-2024-57726, CVE-2024-57727, and CVE-2024-57728 in SimpleHelp; CVE-2024-1709 in ConnectWise ScreenConnect; CVE-2021-34473 in Microsoft Exchange Server; and CVE-2023-48788 in Fortinet Enterprise Management Servers.
  • The operators abuse remote monitoring and management software, including SimpleHelp, redirecting agents to unauthorized servers they control. Such tools are used for command and control, persistence, lateral movement, downloading tools, exfiltration, and ransomware execution.
  • In a 2025 incident, attackers used a vulnerable driver to terminate antivirus processes, moved laterally using RDP, NTLM/SMB, DCE_RPC, and PowerShell, and used Robocopy to stage files for exfiltration.
  • The article reports triple extortion: encrypting data, threatening to leak it, and applying additional pressure through DDoS attacks or contacting victims’ customers.
Defensive Notes
  • Promptly patch publicly exposed RMM servers.
  • Use anomaly-based detection to distinguish legitimate administrative activity from malicious RMM use.
  • Darktrace reports that its Autonomous Response capability blocked malicious activity before file encryption in some observed cases.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
HOSTNAMEerp[.]ranasons[.]comData-exfiltration destination used in Medusa-related activity.
HOSTNAMEpruebas[.]pintacuario[.]mxData-exfiltration destination used in Medusa-related activity; the article says it previously hosted a SimpleHelp server.
IPV4143[.]110[.]243[.]154IP address associated with the data-exfiltration destination erp.ranasons[.]com.
IPV4144[.]217[.]181[.]205IP address associated with the data-exfiltration destination pruebas.pintacuario[.]mx.
IPV4185[.]108[.]129[.]62Malicious SimpleHelp server observed during Medusa attacks.
IPV4185[.]126[.]238[.]119Malicious SimpleHelp server observed during Medusa attacks.
IPV4193[.]37[.]69[.]154Suspicious IP observed on a device controlled via SimpleHelp and exfiltrating data to a Medusa-related endpoint.
IPV4213[.]183[.]63[.]41Malicious SimpleHelp C2 server used in a Medusa compromise.
IPV4213[.]183[.]63[.]42Malicious SimpleHelp server observed during Medusa attacks.
IPV431[.]220[.]45[.]120Malicious SimpleHelp C2 server used in a Medusa compromise.
IPV445[.]9[.]149[.]112Malicious SimpleHelp server observed during Medusa attacks.
IPV489[.]36[.]161[.]12Malicious SimpleHelp server observed during Medusa attacks.
IPV491[.]92[.]246[.]110Malicious SimpleHelp server observed during Medusa attacks.

MITRE ATT&CK

CVE

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ConnectWisethe GoAnywhere MFT and SimpleHelp RMM flaws, other vulnerabilities exploited in Medusa attacks include ConnectWise ScreenConnect RMM (CVE-2024-1709), Microsoft Exchange Server (CVE-2021-34473, also known asCrowdStrikeall actions. Despite these constraints, data received through the customer’s security integration with CrowdStrike Falcon enabled Darktrace analysts to reconstruct the attack chain, although the initial access vectorDarktraceDarktrace previously investigated Medusa in a 2024 blog, but the group’s rapid expansion and new intelligence released in late 2025 has lead Darktrace’s Threat Research team to  investigate further. Recent findingsFortinetRMM (CVE-2024-1709), Microsoft Exchange Server (CVE-2021-34473, also known as ProxyShell), and Fortinet Enterprise Management Servers (CVE-2023-48788) [18][19][20][21][24][25].Fortrafurther. Recent findings include Microsoft’s research on Medusa actors exploiting a vulnerability in Fortra’s GoAnywhere MFT License Servlet (CVE-2025-10035)[4] and Zencec’s report on Medusa’s abuse of flaws inMicrosoftin late 2025 has lead Darktrace’s Threat Research team to  investigate further. Recent findings include Microsoft’s research on Medusa actors exploiting a vulnerability in Fortra’s GoAnywhere MFT License ServletSimpleHelpGoAnywhere MFT License Servlet (CVE-2025-10035)[4] and Zencec’s report on Medusa’s abuse of flaws in SimpleHelp’s remote support software (CVE-2024-57726, CVE-2024-57727, CVE-2024-57728) [5].

Products

AnyDesklegitimate remote access tools abused by Medusa in a similar manner to evade detection include Atera, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, eHorus, N-able, PDQ Deploy/Inventory, Splashtop, TeamViewer, NinjaOne, Navicat, andAteradestination IP addresses involved in this activity were linked to SimpleHelp servers or associated with Atera.ConnectWise ScreenConnectMFT and SimpleHelp RMM flaws, other vulnerabilities exploited in Medusa attacks include ConnectWise ScreenConnect RMM (CVE-2024-1709), Microsoft Exchange Server (CVE-2021-34473, also known as ProxyShell), andCrowdStrike Falconactions. Despite these constraints, data received through the customer’s security integration with CrowdStrike Falcon enabled Darktrace analysts to reconstruct the attack chain, although the initial access vectorDarktrace / NETWORKDarktrace assisted a European company impacted by Medusa ransomware. The organization had partial Darktrace / NETWORK coverage and had configured Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability to require manualeHorustools abused by Medusa in a similar manner to evade detection include Atera, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, eHorus, N-able, PDQ Deploy/Inventory, Splashtop, TeamViewer, NinjaOne, Navicat, and MeshAgent [4][5][15][16][17].Fortinet Enterprise Management ServersMicrosoft Exchange Server (CVE-2021-34473, also known as ProxyShell), and Fortinet Enterprise Management Servers (CVE-2023-48788) [18][19][20][21][24][25].GoAnywhere MFTRecent findings include Microsoft’s research on Medusa actors exploiting a vulnerability in Fortra’s GoAnywhere MFT License Servlet (CVE-2025-10035)[4] and Zencec’s report on Medusa’s abuse of flaws in SimpleHelp’sJWrapperwhere the compromise was contained before encryption, unusual external HTTP connections associated with JWrapper were also detected. JWrapper is a legitimate tool designed to simplify the packaging, distribution, andMeshAgentScreenConnect, eHorus, N-able, PDQ Deploy/Inventory, Splashtop, TeamViewer, NinjaOne, Navicat, and MeshAgent [4][5][15][16][17].Microsoft Exchange Serverexploited in Medusa attacks include ConnectWise ScreenConnect RMM (CVE-2024-1709), Microsoft Exchange Server (CVE-2021-34473, also known as ProxyShell), and Fortinet Enterprise Management ServersN-Ableabused by Medusa in a similar manner to evade detection include Atera, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, eHorus, N-able, PDQ Deploy/Inventory, Splashtop, TeamViewer, NinjaOne, Navicat, and MeshAgent [4][5][15][16][17].NavicatAtera, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, eHorus, N-able, PDQ Deploy/Inventory, Splashtop, TeamViewer, NinjaOne, Navicat, and MeshAgent [4][5][15][16][17].NinjaOneinclude Atera, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, eHorus, N-able, PDQ Deploy/Inventory, Splashtop, TeamViewer, NinjaOne, Navicat, and MeshAgent [4][5][15][16][17].PDQ Deploy/Inventoryin a similar manner to evade detection include Atera, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, eHorus, N-able, PDQ Deploy/Inventory, Splashtop, TeamViewer, NinjaOne, Navicat, and MeshAgent [4][5][15][16][17].rcloneApart from RMM tools, Medusa is also known to use Rclone and Robocopy for data exfiltration [3][19]. During one Medusa compromise detected in mid-2024, the customer’s data was exfiltrated to external destinationsRobocopyApart from RMM tools, Medusa is also known to use Rclone and Robocopy for data exfiltration [3][19]. During one Medusa compromise detected in mid-2024, the customer’s data was exfiltrated to external destinationsSimpleHelpGoAnywhere MFT License Servlet (CVE-2025-10035)[4] and Zencec’s report on Medusa’s abuse of flaws in SimpleHelp’s remote support software (CVE-2024-57726, CVE-2024-57727, CVE-2024-57728) [5].Splashtopmanner to evade detection include Atera, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, eHorus, N-able, PDQ Deploy/Inventory, Splashtop, TeamViewer, NinjaOne, Navicat, and MeshAgent [4][5][15][16][17].TeamViewerevade detection include Atera, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, eHorus, N-able, PDQ Deploy/Inventory, Splashtop, TeamViewer, NinjaOne, Navicat, and MeshAgent [4][5][15][16][17].

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