Medusa Ransomware Campaigns Abuse SimpleHelp and Other RMM Tools

Summary
Darktrace describes Medusa ransomware activity across its customers, detailing how attackers abused RMM tools for access, persistence, lateral movement and data theft, including a 2025 compromise that exfiltrated about 70 GiB.
Key points
- Darktrace observed Medusa-related file encryption activity across customer environments between December 2023 and November 2025.
- In a late-2025 incident, attackers used network scanning, RDP, SMB, DCE/RPC and PowerShell for lateral movement; the initial access method was unclear.
- Attackers used SimpleHelp and other legitimate RMM tools for command-and-control, persistence, lateral movement, tool delivery and ransomware execution.
- In the investigated incident, a file server uploaded about 70 GiB of data to erp.ranasons[.]com; Darktrace also observed connections to attacker-controlled SimpleHelp servers.
- Evidence from security alerts suggested attackers used a vulnerable driver to disable security tools and PDQ Deploy to distribute executables.
- Medusa actors have also exploited vulnerabilities in products including GoAnywhere MFT, SimpleHelp, ScreenConnect, Exchange Server and Fortinet Enterprise Management Servers.
- The article recommends promptly patching exposed RMM servers and monitoring for anomalous use of remote-management tools.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Medusa operators obtain access to compromised devices or accounts through initial access brokers, who may use phishing, credential stuffing, or brute-force attacks; they also target vulnerable or misconfigured internet-facing systems.
- Reportedly exploited vulnerabilities include CVE-2025-10035 in Fortra GoAnywhere MFT License Servlet; CVE-2024-57726, CVE-2024-57727, and CVE-2024-57728 in SimpleHelp; CVE-2024-1709 in ConnectWise ScreenConnect; CVE-2021-34473 in Microsoft Exchange Server; and CVE-2023-48788 in Fortinet Enterprise Management Servers.
- The operators abuse remote monitoring and management software, including SimpleHelp, redirecting agents to unauthorized servers they control. Such tools are used for command and control, persistence, lateral movement, downloading tools, exfiltration, and ransomware execution.
- In a 2025 incident, attackers used a vulnerable driver to terminate antivirus processes, moved laterally using RDP, NTLM/SMB, DCE_RPC, and PowerShell, and used Robocopy to stage files for exfiltration.
- The article reports triple extortion: encrypting data, threatening to leak it, and applying additional pressure through DDoS attacks or contacting victims’ customers.
- Defensive Notes
- Promptly patch publicly exposed RMM servers.
- Use anomaly-based detection to distinguish legitimate administrative activity from malicious RMM use.
- Darktrace reports that its Autonomous Response capability blocked malicious activity before file encryption in some observed cases.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| HOSTNAME | erp[.]ranasons[.]com | Data-exfiltration destination used in Medusa-related activity. |
| HOSTNAME | pruebas[.]pintacuario[.]mx | Data-exfiltration destination used in Medusa-related activity; the article says it previously hosted a SimpleHelp server. |
| IPV4 | 143[.]110[.]243[.]154 | IP address associated with the data-exfiltration destination erp.ranasons[.]com. |
| IPV4 | 144[.]217[.]181[.]205 | IP address associated with the data-exfiltration destination pruebas.pintacuario[.]mx. |
| IPV4 | 185[.]108[.]129[.]62 | Malicious SimpleHelp server observed during Medusa attacks. |
| IPV4 | 185[.]126[.]238[.]119 | Malicious SimpleHelp server observed during Medusa attacks. |
| IPV4 | 193[.]37[.]69[.]154 | Suspicious IP observed on a device controlled via SimpleHelp and exfiltrating data to a Medusa-related endpoint. |
| IPV4 | 213[.]183[.]63[.]41 | Malicious SimpleHelp C2 server used in a Medusa compromise. |
| IPV4 | 213[.]183[.]63[.]42 | Malicious SimpleHelp server observed during Medusa attacks. |
| IPV4 | 31[.]220[.]45[.]120 | Malicious SimpleHelp C2 server used in a Medusa compromise. |
| IPV4 | 45[.]9[.]149[.]112 | Malicious SimpleHelp server observed during Medusa attacks. |
| IPV4 | 89[.]36[.]161[.]12 | Malicious SimpleHelp server observed during Medusa attacks. |
| IPV4 | 91[.]92[.]246[.]110 | Malicious SimpleHelp server observed during Medusa attacks. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1021.001 · Remote Desktop ProtocolRDP was used during lateral movement in the described 2025 compromise.T1021.003 · Distributed Component Object ModelThe incident description reports lateral movement using DCE_RPC.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelData was exfiltrated to endpoints that the article associates with Medusa activity.T1074 · Data StagedRobocopy was reportedly used to stage files in preparation for exfiltration.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferA device controlled through SimpleHelp downloaded additional tooling from Filemail.T1110 · Brute ForceInitial access brokers reportedly use brute-force attacks.T1110.004 · Credential StuffingInitial access brokers reportedly use credential stuffing to obtain access.T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationMedusa actors target vulnerable or misconfigured internet-facing systems and exploit reported public-facing application flaws.T1219 · Remote Access ToolsMedusa actors abuse SimpleHelp and other remote access tools for control, persistence, lateral movement, and payload execution.T1486 · Data Encrypted for ImpactMedusa ransomware encrypted files and added the .MEDUSA extension.T1570 · Lateral Tool TransferAn executable was written over SMB to another device on the same subnet.
CVE
CVE-2021-34473in Medusa attacks include ConnectWise ScreenConnect RMM (CVE-2024-1709), Microsoft Exchange Server (CVE-2021-34473, also known as ProxyShell), and Fortinet Enterprise Management Servers (CVE-2023-48788)CVE-2023-48788Server (CVE-2021-34473, also known as ProxyShell), and Fortinet Enterprise Management Servers (CVE-2023-48788) [18][19][20][21][24][25].CVE-2024-1709RMM flaws, other vulnerabilities exploited in Medusa attacks include ConnectWise ScreenConnect RMM (CVE-2024-1709), Microsoft Exchange Server (CVE-2021-34473, also known as ProxyShell), and Fortinet EnterpriseCVE-2024-57726and Zencec’s report on Medusa’s abuse of flaws in SimpleHelp’s remote support software (CVE-2024-57726, CVE-2024-57727, CVE-2024-57728) [5].CVE-2024-57727Zencec’s report on Medusa’s abuse of flaws in SimpleHelp’s remote support software (CVE-2024-57726, CVE-2024-57727, CVE-2024-57728) [5].CVE-2024-57728on Medusa’s abuse of flaws in SimpleHelp’s remote support software (CVE-2024-57726, CVE-2024-57727, CVE-2024-57728) [5].CVE-2025-10035research on Medusa actors exploiting a vulnerability in Fortra’s GoAnywhere MFT License Servlet (CVE-2025-10035)[4] and Zencec’s report on Medusa’s abuse of flaws in SimpleHelp’s remote support software
People
Threat Actors
Frozen SpiderNamed as a Big Game Hunting group reportedly affiliated with Medusa, according to some evidence.MedusaRansomware group described as operating a Ransomware-as-a-Service operation. The article identifies Storm-1175 and Spearwing as aliases for the group.SpearwingNamed as an alias of the Medusa group.Storm-1175Named as an alias of the Medusa group.UNC7885Described as a cybercriminal group reportedly affiliated with Medusa.
Malware
AbyssWorkertechnique to terminate antivirus processes on network devices, leveraging tools such as KillAV or AbyssWorker along with the PDQ Software Deployment solution [19][26].KillAVDriver (BYOVD) technique to terminate antivirus processes on network devices, leveraging tools such as KillAV or AbyssWorker along with the PDQ Software Deployment solution [19][26].Medusa ransomwareWhat is Medusa Ransomware in 2025?
Vendors
ConnectWisethe GoAnywhere MFT and SimpleHelp RMM flaws, other vulnerabilities exploited in Medusa attacks include ConnectWise ScreenConnect RMM (CVE-2024-1709), Microsoft Exchange Server (CVE-2021-34473, also known asCrowdStrikeall actions. Despite these constraints, data received through the customer’s security integration with CrowdStrike Falcon enabled Darktrace analysts to reconstruct the attack chain, although the initial access vectorDarktraceDarktrace previously investigated Medusa in a 2024 blog, but the group’s rapid expansion and new intelligence released in late 2025 has lead Darktrace’s Threat Research team to investigate further. Recent findingsFortinetRMM (CVE-2024-1709), Microsoft Exchange Server (CVE-2021-34473, also known as ProxyShell), and Fortinet Enterprise Management Servers (CVE-2023-48788) [18][19][20][21][24][25].Fortrafurther. Recent findings include Microsoft’s research on Medusa actors exploiting a vulnerability in Fortra’s GoAnywhere MFT License Servlet (CVE-2025-10035)[4] and Zencec’s report on Medusa’s abuse of flaws inMicrosoftin late 2025 has lead Darktrace’s Threat Research team to investigate further. Recent findings include Microsoft’s research on Medusa actors exploiting a vulnerability in Fortra’s GoAnywhere MFT License ServletSimpleHelpGoAnywhere MFT License Servlet (CVE-2025-10035)[4] and Zencec’s report on Medusa’s abuse of flaws in SimpleHelp’s remote support software (CVE-2024-57726, CVE-2024-57727, CVE-2024-57728) [5].
Products
AnyDesklegitimate remote access tools abused by Medusa in a similar manner to evade detection include Atera, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, eHorus, N-able, PDQ Deploy/Inventory, Splashtop, TeamViewer, NinjaOne, Navicat, andAteradestination IP addresses involved in this activity were linked to SimpleHelp servers or associated with Atera.ConnectWise ScreenConnectMFT and SimpleHelp RMM flaws, other vulnerabilities exploited in Medusa attacks include ConnectWise ScreenConnect RMM (CVE-2024-1709), Microsoft Exchange Server (CVE-2021-34473, also known as ProxyShell), andCrowdStrike Falconactions. Despite these constraints, data received through the customer’s security integration with CrowdStrike Falcon enabled Darktrace analysts to reconstruct the attack chain, although the initial access vectorDarktrace / NETWORKDarktrace assisted a European company impacted by Medusa ransomware. The organization had partial Darktrace / NETWORK coverage and had configured Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability to require manualeHorustools abused by Medusa in a similar manner to evade detection include Atera, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, eHorus, N-able, PDQ Deploy/Inventory, Splashtop, TeamViewer, NinjaOne, Navicat, and MeshAgent [4][5][15][16][17].Fortinet Enterprise Management ServersMicrosoft Exchange Server (CVE-2021-34473, also known as ProxyShell), and Fortinet Enterprise Management Servers (CVE-2023-48788) [18][19][20][21][24][25].GoAnywhere MFTRecent findings include Microsoft’s research on Medusa actors exploiting a vulnerability in Fortra’s GoAnywhere MFT License Servlet (CVE-2025-10035)[4] and Zencec’s report on Medusa’s abuse of flaws in SimpleHelp’sJWrapperwhere the compromise was contained before encryption, unusual external HTTP connections associated with JWrapper were also detected. JWrapper is a legitimate tool designed to simplify the packaging, distribution, andMeshAgentScreenConnect, eHorus, N-able, PDQ Deploy/Inventory, Splashtop, TeamViewer, NinjaOne, Navicat, and MeshAgent [4][5][15][16][17].Microsoft Exchange Serverexploited in Medusa attacks include ConnectWise ScreenConnect RMM (CVE-2024-1709), Microsoft Exchange Server (CVE-2021-34473, also known as ProxyShell), and Fortinet Enterprise Management ServersN-Ableabused by Medusa in a similar manner to evade detection include Atera, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, eHorus, N-able, PDQ Deploy/Inventory, Splashtop, TeamViewer, NinjaOne, Navicat, and MeshAgent [4][5][15][16][17].NavicatAtera, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, eHorus, N-able, PDQ Deploy/Inventory, Splashtop, TeamViewer, NinjaOne, Navicat, and MeshAgent [4][5][15][16][17].NinjaOneinclude Atera, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, eHorus, N-able, PDQ Deploy/Inventory, Splashtop, TeamViewer, NinjaOne, Navicat, and MeshAgent [4][5][15][16][17].PDQ Deploy/Inventoryin a similar manner to evade detection include Atera, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, eHorus, N-able, PDQ Deploy/Inventory, Splashtop, TeamViewer, NinjaOne, Navicat, and MeshAgent [4][5][15][16][17].rcloneApart from RMM tools, Medusa is also known to use Rclone and Robocopy for data exfiltration [3][19]. During one Medusa compromise detected in mid-2024, the customer’s data was exfiltrated to external destinationsRobocopyApart from RMM tools, Medusa is also known to use Rclone and Robocopy for data exfiltration [3][19]. During one Medusa compromise detected in mid-2024, the customer’s data was exfiltrated to external destinationsSimpleHelpGoAnywhere MFT License Servlet (CVE-2025-10035)[4] and Zencec’s report on Medusa’s abuse of flaws in SimpleHelp’s remote support software (CVE-2024-57726, CVE-2024-57727, CVE-2024-57728) [5].Splashtopmanner to evade detection include Atera, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, eHorus, N-able, PDQ Deploy/Inventory, Splashtop, TeamViewer, NinjaOne, Navicat, and MeshAgent [4][5][15][16][17].TeamViewerevade detection include Atera, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, eHorus, N-able, PDQ Deploy/Inventory, Splashtop, TeamViewer, NinjaOne, Navicat, and MeshAgent [4][5][15][16][17].
Tools
Ngrokdetected in mid-2024, the customer’s data was exfiltrated to external destinations associated with the Ngrok proxy service using an SSH-2.0-rclone client.RMM toolsMedusa actors appear to favor RMM tools such as SimpleHelp. Unpatched or misconfigured SimpleHelp RMM servers can serve as an initial access vector to the victims’ infrastructure. After gaining access to SimpleHelp
Countries
Industries
Arts, entertainment and recreationservices and the automotive industry, followed by healthcare, and finally organizations in arts, entertainment and recreation, ICT, and manufacturing.Automotivein the Asia-Pacific and Japan region. The most impacted sectors were financial services and the automotive industry, followed by healthcare, and finally organizations in arts, entertainment and recreation, ICT,Financial Services(AMS), and the remainder in the Asia-Pacific and Japan region. The most impacted sectors were financial services and the automotive industry, followed by healthcare, and finally organizations in arts,Healthcareto show little restraint, indiscriminately attacking organizations across all sectors, including healthcare, and is known to employ triple extortion tactics whereby sensitive data is encrypted, victims areICTindustry, followed by healthcare, and finally organizations in arts, entertainment and recreation, ICT, and manufacturing.Manufacturingfollowed by healthcare, and finally organizations in arts, entertainment and recreation, ICT, and manufacturing.