ThreatFabric Details Bazuka Android Fraud Framework with 23 Modules

Summary
ThreatFabric describes Bazuka, an Android fraud framework with a downloader, core and 23 modules for overlays, keylogging, SMS/2FA theft and remote control, plus ADB bridging and LLM-assisted victim management.
Key points
- ThreatFabric researchers identified Bazuka while investigating an NFC relay application and documented a downloader/dropper, a core and 23 modules.
- Modules support keylogging, phishing overlays, remote control, SMS and 2FA interception, clipboard cryptocurrency-address swapping, and NFC card interaction.
- The core loads DEX modules in memory, communicates with its C2 over separate control and data WebSocket channels, and encrypts frames with ChaCha20-Poly1305.
- Bazuka can use Accessibility and ADB shell commands to acquire permissions; its embedded ADB functionality can enable Wireless Debugging and intercept the pairing PIN.
- The control panel integrates language models to help operators assess and select victims and develop strategies for navigating permission prompts.
- Researchers found evidence of distribution through traffer-created lures. The control panel suggests a possible Google Play route, but they found no evidence it had been used.
- The control panel frontend code was accessible without authentication, although access to victim data remained backend-protected; some APIs nevertheless returned results unexpectedly.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Traffers use dedicated landing pages and lures such as adult content or IPTV apps to persuade victims to download Bazuka droppers or downloaders.
- The dropper requests permission to install applications from third-party sources, then downloads and installs an APK through the PackageManager session mechanism.
- Researchers found control-panel settings intended to minimize dropper permissions to potentially pass Google Play review; the article reports no evidence that distribution through Google Play had actually occurred.
- After installation, the core downloads DEX modules and uses overlays, Accessibility, ADB shell commands, and wireless debugging to obtain permissions and control the device.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | c2api[.]brokerok[.]org | Subdomain embedded in Bazuka samples as part of the malware's server infrastructure. |
| DOMAIN | c2data[.]brokerok[.]org | Hardcoded Bazuka command-and-control server address for the Data channel used for exfiltration. |
| DOMAIN | c2proxy[.]brokerok[.]org | Subdomain embedded in Bazuka samples as part of the malware's server infrastructure. |
| DOMAIN | c2ws[.]brokerok[.]org | Hardcoded Bazuka command-and-control server address for the Control WebSocket channel. |
| DOMAIN | gargona[.]cash | Domain associated with a Bazuka server at 170.168.61[.]117; the article reports that server was operational during the research. |
| IPV4 | 170[.]168[.]61[.]117 | Operational Bazuka server address associated with gargona[.]cash at the time of the research. |
| IPV4 | 95[.]181[.]213[.]21 | Bazuka server address; the article reports it was offline at the time of the research. |
| SHA256 | 0785f8ca820ccfb62be61ac4bd55fd5295a771cab9e4cd91fc4eb1e3c43af3db | SHA-256 of Bazuka's smsmessage.dex module, which reads, monitors, sends, and attempts to delete SMS messages. |
| SHA256 | 1c29e14001edcfc548e1ae43572aa17f91ad89ce09a0e9028737077d7af97d30 | SHA-256 of Bazuka's self_adb.dex module, which implements an embedded ADB client. |
| SHA256 | 38bf5b694512cf14620edc0af700c08e7570fa5a20b4c3c052c7fe8823b2ec5f | SHA-256 of Bazuka's location.dex module, which determines victim location. |
| SHA256 | 3cb8711a51331123247476eef768c435d6286a21cd8ac5479a6276349632c82b | SHA-256 listed in the article's Dropper/Downloader file-hash section for a Bazuka sample. |
| SHA256 | 3da80bbcf6c6e7ff117db4cdfe1422375ecf1db97b61574359f97a1da43566ae | SHA-256 of Bazuka's device_control.dex module, which manages the device and runs commands through the ADB bridge. |
| SHA256 | 4d572669d6000304a692874c1583021dfdb4f2f113ea487e470f7e4c486e503a | SHA-256 of a Bazuka downloader that directly downloaded the payload core and NFC module. |
| SHA256 | 4dcad3a1547c72d08ccb86dc393e14935c7f06ebe3ca63ba30e51b98ab4930e1 | SHA-256 of Bazuka's screen_control.dex module, which captures screen-lock PINs, passwords, and unlock patterns. |
| SHA256 | 5be63e04a98988d8d15d12cdf2af8cd6b1b6b8681e511587bb1a22ebcb32583f | SHA-256 of Bazuka's tapread-nfc_module.dex, which interacts with contactless bank cards. |
| SHA256 | 5cf38406fbed48fe110bcf1e84314429e1f649a2539c00b78216a5808fb53aa0 | SHA-256 of Bazuka's optics.dex module, which supports remote control, screencasting, and phishing overlays. |
| SHA256 | 7361a1ad372367dfc11421385632586da4aaf164c41f67e0acb2ccdb7931e3c1 | SHA-256 of Bazuka's file_manager.dex module, which accesses the device file system. |
| SHA256 | 84849921d229c4e6c1a43af86582bff7560e938e96ad8b01b0ff13dafe559757 | SHA-256 of Bazuka's clip_monitor.dex module, which replaces cryptocurrency wallet addresses in the clipboard. |
| SHA256 | 8ee9d88db8874662c7743bb0f7d06e852c372b2bdb1846a12afb71a62b8f0a7b | SHA-256 of Bazuka's ussd.dex module, which sends USSD requests from the victim's device and receives responses. |
| SHA256 | 910911b7d1be3f67c926067e923ba86be6100366e52f0fe30484176353bf1701 | SHA-256 of Bazuka's input_recorder.dex keylogging module. |
| SHA256 | ac57a003ad4464ac357ae78e8e4eb24aae9d8442545129f82ad683efa1b2ad99 | SHA-256 of Bazuka's system_checker.dex module, which checks the runtime environment and implements anti-analysis measures. |
| SHA256 | b7987e06d515fa06751a014a034b680f5a2c185bf0eb1fcf76c29b8626527d53 | SHA-256 of Bazuka's proxy.dex module, which implements a reverse TCP proxy on infected devices. |
| SHA256 | b97b3ca1fdce56ae41418b287ca0e97d93ea16ec7b9182bdde459bba8b09f661 | SHA-256 of Bazuka's media.dex module, which captures photos and streams camera video and microphone audio. |
| SHA256 | c08a5f3df1693b03540db8c6c001b5e7f98ea6121ad4aca9c6904c798f4f4635 | SHA-256 of Bazuka's call_forwarding.dex module. |
| SHA256 | c181d5c6c098f9f4ac6b10e4b1d69a0278bb3e07f260d0013244113c8504f39a | SHA-256 of Bazuka's twofa.dex module, which captures one-time verification codes. |
| SHA256 | d0ba986440b06c4b587690acd3e594cc674c82408cd4f5c59c7f6675a2b4d9c0 | SHA-256 of Bazuka's session_ui.dex module, which displays phishing HTML overlays. |
| SHA256 | de97f4864e94eb9fecd018d51c36fc0a2e0d3a67e9bb83ab0e5ac29ad101f292 | SHA-256 of Bazuka's preflight.dex module, which checks the runtime environment and implements anti-analysis measures. |
| SHA256 | f046b50166c8229b49839eeebcc7fd14bf3f198e4ec1bfde8a5b271e1407dec5 | SHA-256 of a Bazuka dropper documented in the article; it downloaded and installed the next-stage APK. |
| SHA256 | ffc35c48d8a5cb1ee3e5bdc80e0df3e8509e8dd840edd0b9fb0ff5d5880834d0 | SHA-256 of Bazuka's contacts.dex module, which retrieves the victim's contacts. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1005 · Data from Local SystemBazuka modules retrieve local contacts, files, stored SMS messages, and other device information.T1056.001 · KeyloggingThe input_recorder module records keystrokes and entered text, including passwords and payment-related data.T1056.003 · Web Portal CaptureThe session_ui module displays phishing HTML overlays, while the optics module supports phishing overlays.T1059.004 · Unix ShellThe device_control module executes commands as shell commands through Bazuka's ADB bridge.T1111 · Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionThe twofa module captures one-time verification codes, and the malware also collects notifications from 2FA applications.T1113 · Screen CaptureBazuka captures screen content, including screen-capture streams sent through its Data channel.T1115 · Clipboard DataThe clip_monitor module monitors clipboard contents and replaces cryptocurrency wallet addresses.T1204.002 · Malicious FileVictims are persuaded to download and install a trojanized APK, including through traffer landing pages.T1407Bazuka's downloader retrieves the core and required modules, which the stager loads at runtime.T1620 · Reflective Code LoadingThe core loads downloaded DEX modules from a byte array using InMemoryDexClassLoader, without first saving the DEX to a file.
