ThreatFabric Details Bazuka Android Fraud Framework with 23 Modules

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Summary

ThreatFabric describes Bazuka, an Android fraud framework with a downloader, core and 23 modules for overlays, keylogging, SMS/2FA theft and remote control, plus ADB bridging and LLM-assisted victim management.

Key points

  • ThreatFabric researchers identified Bazuka while investigating an NFC relay application and documented a downloader/dropper, a core and 23 modules.
  • Modules support keylogging, phishing overlays, remote control, SMS and 2FA interception, clipboard cryptocurrency-address swapping, and NFC card interaction.
  • The core loads DEX modules in memory, communicates with its C2 over separate control and data WebSocket channels, and encrypts frames with ChaCha20-Poly1305.
  • Bazuka can use Accessibility and ADB shell commands to acquire permissions; its embedded ADB functionality can enable Wireless Debugging and intercept the pairing PIN.
  • The control panel integrates language models to help operators assess and select victims and develop strategies for navigating permission prompts.
  • Researchers found evidence of distribution through traffer-created lures. The control panel suggests a possible Google Play route, but they found no evidence it had been used.
  • The control panel frontend code was accessible without authentication, although access to victim data remained backend-protected; some APIs nevertheless returned results unexpectedly.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Traffers use dedicated landing pages and lures such as adult content or IPTV apps to persuade victims to download Bazuka droppers or downloaders.
  • The dropper requests permission to install applications from third-party sources, then downloads and installs an APK through the PackageManager session mechanism.
  • Researchers found control-panel settings intended to minimize dropper permissions to potentially pass Google Play review; the article reports no evidence that distribution through Google Play had actually occurred.
  • After installation, the core downloads DEX modules and uses overlays, Accessibility, ADB shell commands, and wireless debugging to obtain permissions and control the device.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINc2api[.]brokerok[.]orgSubdomain embedded in Bazuka samples as part of the malware's server infrastructure.
DOMAINc2data[.]brokerok[.]orgHardcoded Bazuka command-and-control server address for the Data channel used for exfiltration.
DOMAINc2proxy[.]brokerok[.]orgSubdomain embedded in Bazuka samples as part of the malware's server infrastructure.
DOMAINc2ws[.]brokerok[.]orgHardcoded Bazuka command-and-control server address for the Control WebSocket channel.
DOMAINgargona[.]cashDomain associated with a Bazuka server at 170.168.61[.]117; the article reports that server was operational during the research.
IPV4170[.]168[.]61[.]117Operational Bazuka server address associated with gargona[.]cash at the time of the research.
IPV495[.]181[.]213[.]21Bazuka server address; the article reports it was offline at the time of the research.
SHA2560785f8ca820ccfb62be61ac4bd55fd5295a771cab9e4cd91fc4eb1e3c43af3dbSHA-256 of Bazuka's smsmessage.dex module, which reads, monitors, sends, and attempts to delete SMS messages.
SHA2561c29e14001edcfc548e1ae43572aa17f91ad89ce09a0e9028737077d7af97d30SHA-256 of Bazuka's self_adb.dex module, which implements an embedded ADB client.
SHA25638bf5b694512cf14620edc0af700c08e7570fa5a20b4c3c052c7fe8823b2ec5fSHA-256 of Bazuka's location.dex module, which determines victim location.
SHA2563cb8711a51331123247476eef768c435d6286a21cd8ac5479a6276349632c82bSHA-256 listed in the article's Dropper/Downloader file-hash section for a Bazuka sample.
SHA2563da80bbcf6c6e7ff117db4cdfe1422375ecf1db97b61574359f97a1da43566aeSHA-256 of Bazuka's device_control.dex module, which manages the device and runs commands through the ADB bridge.
SHA2564d572669d6000304a692874c1583021dfdb4f2f113ea487e470f7e4c486e503aSHA-256 of a Bazuka downloader that directly downloaded the payload core and NFC module.
SHA2564dcad3a1547c72d08ccb86dc393e14935c7f06ebe3ca63ba30e51b98ab4930e1SHA-256 of Bazuka's screen_control.dex module, which captures screen-lock PINs, passwords, and unlock patterns.
SHA2565be63e04a98988d8d15d12cdf2af8cd6b1b6b8681e511587bb1a22ebcb32583fSHA-256 of Bazuka's tapread-nfc_module.dex, which interacts with contactless bank cards.
SHA2565cf38406fbed48fe110bcf1e84314429e1f649a2539c00b78216a5808fb53aa0SHA-256 of Bazuka's optics.dex module, which supports remote control, screencasting, and phishing overlays.
SHA2567361a1ad372367dfc11421385632586da4aaf164c41f67e0acb2ccdb7931e3c1SHA-256 of Bazuka's file_manager.dex module, which accesses the device file system.
SHA25684849921d229c4e6c1a43af86582bff7560e938e96ad8b01b0ff13dafe559757SHA-256 of Bazuka's clip_monitor.dex module, which replaces cryptocurrency wallet addresses in the clipboard.
SHA2568ee9d88db8874662c7743bb0f7d06e852c372b2bdb1846a12afb71a62b8f0a7bSHA-256 of Bazuka's ussd.dex module, which sends USSD requests from the victim's device and receives responses.
SHA256910911b7d1be3f67c926067e923ba86be6100366e52f0fe30484176353bf1701SHA-256 of Bazuka's input_recorder.dex keylogging module.
SHA256ac57a003ad4464ac357ae78e8e4eb24aae9d8442545129f82ad683efa1b2ad99SHA-256 of Bazuka's system_checker.dex module, which checks the runtime environment and implements anti-analysis measures.
SHA256b7987e06d515fa06751a014a034b680f5a2c185bf0eb1fcf76c29b8626527d53SHA-256 of Bazuka's proxy.dex module, which implements a reverse TCP proxy on infected devices.
SHA256b97b3ca1fdce56ae41418b287ca0e97d93ea16ec7b9182bdde459bba8b09f661SHA-256 of Bazuka's media.dex module, which captures photos and streams camera video and microphone audio.
SHA256c08a5f3df1693b03540db8c6c001b5e7f98ea6121ad4aca9c6904c798f4f4635SHA-256 of Bazuka's call_forwarding.dex module.
SHA256c181d5c6c098f9f4ac6b10e4b1d69a0278bb3e07f260d0013244113c8504f39aSHA-256 of Bazuka's twofa.dex module, which captures one-time verification codes.
SHA256d0ba986440b06c4b587690acd3e594cc674c82408cd4f5c59c7f6675a2b4d9c0SHA-256 of Bazuka's session_ui.dex module, which displays phishing HTML overlays.
SHA256de97f4864e94eb9fecd018d51c36fc0a2e0d3a67e9bb83ab0e5ac29ad101f292SHA-256 of Bazuka's preflight.dex module, which checks the runtime environment and implements anti-analysis measures.
SHA256f046b50166c8229b49839eeebcc7fd14bf3f198e4ec1bfde8a5b271e1407dec5SHA-256 of a Bazuka dropper documented in the article; it downloaded and installed the next-stage APK.
SHA256ffc35c48d8a5cb1ee3e5bdc80e0df3e8509e8dd840edd0b9fb0ff5d5880834d0SHA-256 of Bazuka's contacts.dex module, which retrieves the victim's contacts.

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