ASEC Reports October 2026 Infostealer Distribution Trends

Summary
ASEC's October 2026 report describes infostealer distribution through cracked software, SEO poisoning, file-hosting services and email. EXE files made up about 98.4% of observed execution types.
Key points
- The report draws on ASEC automated collection, email honeypot and C2 analysis systems, plus diagnostic logs from AhnLab products.
- Lzveil, StealC and Remus were frequently found in crack and keygen distribution; delivery channels included SEO poisoning, file hosts and cloud storage.
- Lzveil was observed distributed with Remus, sometimes with both executing; files were found in password-protected RAR archives inside 7Z files.
- About 98.4% of observed execution types were EXE files and 1.6% involved DLL side-loading; python37.dll was the primary malicious DLL reported.
- DarkCloud and AgentTesla were found as email attachments in messages impersonating a US laboratory equipment company and a shipping company, respectively.
- The analyzed DarkCloud sample collected documents, keylogging data, email and browser information, screenshots, and cryptocurrency wallet information, using SMTP; the AgentTesla sample used FTP.
Article Details
- Publisher
- ASEC (AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center)
- Report Period
- October 2026
- Scope
- Infostealer distribution, camouflage, and execution trends based on samples collected during October 2026 and ASEC data sources.
- Key Statistics
- EXE files accounted for approximately 98.4% of observed execution types.
- DLL side-loading accounted for approximately 1.6% of observed execution types.
- Recommendations
- Avoid untrusted links and attachments, illegal software, and browser account-saving features.
- Store important documents in encrypted form.
- Change passwords periodically and use two-factor authentication.
- Install security software and keep it up to date.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | nzqztr2208262ea[.]cfd | Listed among distribution domains that accounted for a significant proportion of infostealer distribution. |
| HOSTNAME | arkedfile[.]s3[.]us-east-1[.]amazonaws[.]com | Specific cloud-hosted hostname listed among domains used for infostealer distribution. |
| MD5 | 0094855366c30a9da7d6f4962cb2206f | MD5 listed in the report's section of infostealer sample indicators. |
| MD5 | 00f52d507bdb9e41d9409a820cabaab4 | MD5 listed in the report's section of infostealer sample indicators. |
| MD5 | 0147d60852e8bcb13fe6cf550da5bc7d | MD5 listed in the report's section of infostealer sample indicators. |
| MD5 | 0199e317cbd9346154beab5075da2492 | MD5 listed in the report's section of infostealer sample indicators. |
| MD5 | 01a975fd5694f33c845e056860ea17e8 | MD5 listed in the report's section of infostealer sample indicators. |
Malware
AgentTeslawas identified as an attachment in an email impersonating a US laboratory equipment company, while the AgentTesla infostealer was identified as an attachment in an email impersonating a shipping company.DarkCloudIn email distributing Infostealer cases, the DarkCloud infostealer was identified as an attachment in an email impersonating a US laboratory equipment company, while the AgentTesla infostealer was identified as anLzveilIn the distribution of malware disguised as “cracks” and “keygens,” Lzveil, StealC, and Remus were frequently identified.RemusIn the distribution of malware disguised as “cracks” and “keygens,” Lzveil, StealC, and Remus were frequently identified.StealCIn the distribution of malware disguised as “cracks” and “keygens,” Lzveil, StealC, and Remus were frequently identified.
Vendors
Industries
Laboratory equipmentcases, the DarkCloud infostealer was identified as an attachment in an email impersonating a US laboratory equipment company, while the AgentTesla infostealer was identified as an attachment in an emailShippingcompany, while the AgentTesla infostealer was identified as an attachment in an email impersonating a shipping company.
