OPTIMJACK Used Compromised Optimizely Scripts to Deliver Malicious JavaScript

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Summary

Report URI identified malicious Optimizely snippets across 178 organizations. The payload could manipulate cryptocurrency addresses, skim some payment-card data, collect browser data and attempt iOS exploit delivery; successful theft or device compromise is not known.

Key points

  • Report URI identified 188 infected snippets associated with 178 organizations. Optimizely said an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability, removed injected code and added protections.
  • Attackers inserted loaders into Optimizely project JavaScript; the altered snippets continued to be served through trusted delivery infrastructure. Some affected organizations served copies from their own domains.
  • Report URI observed payload capabilities including cryptocurrency address substitution, collection of some card details and non-HttpOnly cookies, page screenshots, and attempted exploit-kit delivery to some iOS users. Successful compromise or collection is not established.
  • The injection was observed on November 16, 2026. Report URI said the monitored infected files were clean by that day; StepSecurity estimated most sites were exposed for about 16 hours.
  • In Report URI’s analysis of 159 sites, 24 CSP configurations blocked the payload, 17 limited data theft but not address substitution, 50 allowed relevant activity, and 68 had no CSP.
  • Recommended investigation includes reviewing project and experiment code, customer-hosted snippets, permissions and change histories, and preserving historical browser, proxy, DNS and script-response evidence.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • An unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely Web Experimentation and inserted a JavaScript loader into affected customers’ Project JavaScript configurations. Optimizely confirmed the vulnerability was fixed and injected code removed; public reporting did not establish how the attacker obtained write access across projects.
  • The modified snippets delivered malicious code through Optimizely’s delivery infrastructure or customer-hosted copies of snippets, so the affected organizations’ application source code and web servers did not need to be compromised.
  • Loader variations fetched a remote payload, concealed its destination using Base64 encoding, or embedded the payload and could use JavaScript eval() as a fallback.
  • The payload could replace cryptocurrency addresses, capture payment-card details entered in affected first-party forms, collect non-HttpOnly cookies, capture page screenshots, and attempt to route some iPhone and iPad users to exploit-kit code. The article does not establish that every capability succeeded or how many records or devices were affected.
  • Report URI reported webshell[.]lol in connection with an earlier injection wave involving other vendors. The article cautions that this earlier wave’s timeline and delivery path should not be conflated with the Optimizely injection.
Defensive Notes
  • Review Optimizely Project JavaScript configurations, experiment-level custom code, change histories, project permissions, user accounts, API tokens, and integrations for unauthorized changes.
  • Identify all Optimizely project snippets in use, including customer-hosted copies. Do not rely only on searches for cdn.optimizely.com or known malicious domains.
  • Preserve and review historical script responses, response headers, CSP reports, browser telemetry, proxy records, and DNS logs from the November 16 exposure period; a clean script retrieved later does not establish what visitors previously received.
  • Hunt for unexpected script insertion, Base64-encoded destinations, references to attacker-reported infrastructure, and unfamiliar use of eval(). Correlate findings with browser, proxy, and DNS records.
  • Assess potential exposure based on the payload’s reported capabilities: card number, expiration date, and security code entered into affected first-party forms; cryptocurrency addresses copied or submitted; and non-HttpOnly cookies. The observed skimmer did not collect cardholder names or billing addresses and could not read fields inside cross-origin hosted payment iframes.
  • Use restrictive CSP directives, including script-src and connect-src, while recognizing that connect-src restrictions may limit exfiltration without preventing in-page cryptocurrency address substitution. CSP is defense in depth, not a substitute for monitoring changes to trusted scripts.
  • Monitor externally delivered code, apply script integrity checks where technically appropriate, and establish clear security ownership and change-management processes for third-party integrations.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAIN1688360[.]ccReport URI identified this attacker-associated host as the main payload and data-collection destination.
DOMAIN5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icuReported as a domain associated with routing to iOS exploit code.
DOMAINeil786npto9u5bq[.]icuReported as a domain associated with routing to iOS exploit code.
DOMAINwebshell[.]lolReported in connection with an earlier malicious script-injection wave and subsequently suspended; the article distinguishes that wave from the Optimizely injection.
SHA256f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40Publicly reported SHA-256 hash for one later build of the malicious track.js payload; the article notes it is not a complete campaign signature.

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