Researchers Detail Operation CloudFire Google Session-Hijacking Campaign

· Original article ↗

Summary

Material Security researchers describe Operation CloudFire, a phishing campaign using calendar invites, trusted redirects and a live reverse proxy to capture Google sessions and MFA responses. They report the activity appears to have scattered.

Key points

  • Since mid-August 2026, the campaign used Google Calendar invites and other familiar-looking lures to target corporate users.
  • Attackers routed victims through trusted redirects to a live reverse proxy that relayed passwords and second-factor approvals to Google in real time.
  • Cloudflare Turnstile challenges and browser-built phishing pages made the credential-capture sites difficult for reputation checks and crawlers to identify.
  • Material Security says its detections caught more than 99% of malicious messages, with a 0.01% reclassification rate.
  • Researchers reported gateway and backend URLs to Cloudflare; Cloudflare confirmed the phishing pages and displayed warnings for reported destinations.
  • A hijacked session could provide access to Google Workspace mail and Drive and allow OAuth grants in the victim’s name.
  • Researchers say the lures have shifted to Google Drive sharing invites and activity has scattered; an unfinished Microsoft 365 branch was also found.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Phishing messages delivered as Google Calendar invites used routine pretexts and links routed through trusted Google URLs; some variants used Google Drive sharing links or Intuit transaction notification links.
  • A live reverse proxy presented the genuine Google sign-in page, captured passwords and relayed SMS codes, authenticator codes, Tap-Yes approvals, or phone-based account recovery in real time.
  • Attackers used compromised accounts to send invites to saved contacts and other recipients.
  • After recipients cleared a Cloudflare Turnstile challenge, JavaScript built the credential-capture page in the browser.
Defensive Notes
  • Assess message intent, where links ultimately lead, technical indicators, and the sender-recipient relationship together rather than relying on any single reputation or link signal.
  • Treat calendar invites as a threat surface and use the account's history alongside technical signals when analyzing them.
  • Review Google Workspace audit logs and be prepared to revoke sessions, contain OAuth grants, and reset affected accounts promptly.
  • The researchers reported gateway and backend URLs through Cloudflare's abuse reporting system; Cloudflare confirmed the phishing pages and placed warnings in front of reported destinations.

MITRE ATT&CK

Vendors

Products

Tools

Countries

Related Articles