Zimperium Reports Poisoned Third-Party Scripts Routing iPhones to Coruna and DarkSword

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Summary

Zimperium says poisoned third-party scripts on at least 21 major websites routed iOS visitors to Coruna and DarkSword exploit infrastructure. Its article describes device-version routing, WebKit exploitation, sandbox escape, and post-exploitation activity.

Key points

  • Zimperium cites an InfoStealers report identifying poisoned scripts or widgets from Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe, and Minute-ly across at least 21 websites.
  • The article says injected loaders fetched secondary payloads and routed eligible iPhone visitors to Coruna or DarkSword staging infrastructure.
  • According to the article, the chains select targets by iOS version: Coruna for iOS 15.x–17.2.1 and DarkSword for iOS 18.4–18.7.2.
  • The described exploit chain uses WebKit vulnerabilities, including CVE-2022-48503 in the Coruna chain, followed by a PAC bypass and browser sandbox escape.
  • Zimperium says the native payloads can access process memory, exfiltrate data, and erase Safari website data and crash logs.
  • The article also describes a desktop branch that inspects page content for payment-card details, swaps cryptocurrency wallet addresses, and harvests readable session cookies.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Compromised or injected third-party JavaScript and widgets silently load secondary malicious payloads on legitimate websites.
  • The JavaScript profiles visitors and routes eligible iPhones running specified iOS versions to Coruna or DarkSword exploit infrastructure without user interaction.
  • A desktop/browser branch inspects DOM content for payment-card details, swaps cryptocurrency wallet addresses, and harvests readable session cookies.
  • The iOS exploit chain uses WebKit and WebAssembly vulnerabilities, bypasses PAC, escapes the browser sandbox, and deploys native Mach-O modules in memory.
  • Post-exploitation activity includes reading process memory, monitoring active applications, exfiltrating data over encrypted C2 channels, and deleting Safari website-data records and crash logs.
Defensive Notes
  • Use on-device runtime and exploit detection to identify anomalous process execution, sandbox escapes, privilege escalation, and system-integrity tampering.
  • Use on-device web protection to block connections to secondary exploit-staging servers and C2 infrastructure.
  • Maintain visibility into iOS builds across the device fleet and prioritize patching; the article identifies targeting of iOS 15.x–17.2.1 and 18.4–18.7.2.
  • The article says retrospective network-log checks alone may not establish whether a device was exploited, because scripts may be cleaned or rotated and payloads may erase Safari data and crash logs.

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