Researchers Map 916 Exposed ARTEX Pentest Consoles in the U.S.

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Summary

SOCRadar researchers confirmed 916 live ARTEX-family consoles among 1,295 U.S. candidates in a Nov. 11, 2026 snapshot; 896 used HTTP. They also describe trojanized Docker builds that can provide unauthenticated root access.

Key points

  • Researchers confirmed 916 live ARTEX-family consoles from 1,295 de-duplicated U.S. candidates using a single redirect-following GET probe per host; they did not authenticate, enumerate endpoints or exploit hosts.
  • Of the live consoles, 896 used plain HTTP, and 512 were concentrated in 19 contiguous /24 blocks, mostly on AS54600; shared builds, certificates and ETags supported cluster analysis, but did not identify a named fleet operator.
  • A total of 231 U.S. ARTEX hosts also exposed a Sub2API AI gateway on another port, which researchers say can serve as an additional hunting pivot.
  • Researchers describe trojanized Docker images tomicdd/artex and congdonglinux/artex. A hidden login-handler function executes CAPTCHA input containing a secret marker as root before credential checks.
  • Separate public reporting counted 62 consoles running the backdoored build, including 26 in the U.S.; those figures are distinct from SOCRadar's exposure count.
  • The investigation recommends checking ARTEX deployments for the named image sources, treating affected instances as compromised, rotating credentials and rebuilding from source; it also identifies console-title, favicon, port and certificate pivots.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Trojanized ARTEX builds add a hidden verifyCaptcha() function to the login handler. If the CAPTCHA input begins with a secret marker, the remainder is executed with `sh -c` as root before credential checks, enabling an unauthenticated root shell.
  • In the reported Storm-0940 ConnectWise Cloud Backup campaign, ARTEX was used to accelerate scanning, reconnaissance, password spraying, and OAuth application abuse.
  • 896 of the 916 confirmed U.S. consoles were served over plain HTTP, exposing operator sessions to on-path observers.
  • Open directories on exposed hosts contained operator files and tooling, including HTA droppers, batch loaders, a wpad.dat file, and a MITM root CA private key.
Defensive Notes
  • Treat instances built from tomicdd/artex or congdonglinux/artex as compromised; rotate credentials, LLM API keys, and sessions, then rebuild from source.
  • Keep authorized ARTEX deployments off the public internet and behind TLS and authentication.
  • Use the console title suffix 自主渗透测试控制台, current favicon hash -576220750, and ports 8787 and 8790 as hunting pivots; shared certificates, SSH host keys, and listed network blocks can help cluster deployments.
  • Investigate ARTEX consoles reachable from your network until their ownership and purpose are confirmed.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV4144[.]172[.]64[.]60One of the reported Storm-0940 infrastructure hosts used in the ConnectWise Cloud Backup supply-chain campaign.
IPV4181[.]41[.]194[.]136Host with an exposed directory containing HTA droppers, batch loaders, a wpad.dat file, and a MITM root CA private key.
IPV438[.]244[.]50[.]120ARTEX host identified behind a South Korean finance-sector intrusion; the article reports exposed ARTEX configurations and session histories on a separate host.

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