Researchers Map 916 Exposed ARTEX Pentest Consoles in the U.S.

Summary
SOCRadar researchers confirmed 916 live ARTEX-family consoles among 1,295 U.S. candidates in a Nov. 11, 2026 snapshot; 896 used HTTP. They also describe trojanized Docker builds that can provide unauthenticated root access.
Key points
- Researchers confirmed 916 live ARTEX-family consoles from 1,295 de-duplicated U.S. candidates using a single redirect-following GET probe per host; they did not authenticate, enumerate endpoints or exploit hosts.
- Of the live consoles, 896 used plain HTTP, and 512 were concentrated in 19 contiguous /24 blocks, mostly on AS54600; shared builds, certificates and ETags supported cluster analysis, but did not identify a named fleet operator.
- A total of 231 U.S. ARTEX hosts also exposed a Sub2API AI gateway on another port, which researchers say can serve as an additional hunting pivot.
- Researchers describe trojanized Docker images tomicdd/artex and congdonglinux/artex. A hidden login-handler function executes CAPTCHA input containing a secret marker as root before credential checks.
- Separate public reporting counted 62 consoles running the backdoored build, including 26 in the U.S.; those figures are distinct from SOCRadar's exposure count.
- The investigation recommends checking ARTEX deployments for the named image sources, treating affected instances as compromised, rotating credentials and rebuilding from source; it also identifies console-title, favicon, port and certificate pivots.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Trojanized ARTEX builds add a hidden verifyCaptcha() function to the login handler. If the CAPTCHA input begins with a secret marker, the remainder is executed with `sh -c` as root before credential checks, enabling an unauthenticated root shell.
- In the reported Storm-0940 ConnectWise Cloud Backup campaign, ARTEX was used to accelerate scanning, reconnaissance, password spraying, and OAuth application abuse.
- 896 of the 916 confirmed U.S. consoles were served over plain HTTP, exposing operator sessions to on-path observers.
- Open directories on exposed hosts contained operator files and tooling, including HTA droppers, batch loaders, a wpad.dat file, and a MITM root CA private key.
- Defensive Notes
- Treat instances built from tomicdd/artex or congdonglinux/artex as compromised; rotate credentials, LLM API keys, and sessions, then rebuild from source.
- Keep authorized ARTEX deployments off the public internet and behind TLS and authentication.
- Use the console title suffix 自主渗透测试控制台, current favicon hash -576220750, and ports 8787 and 8790 as hunting pivots; shared certificates, SSH host keys, and listed network blocks can help cluster deployments.
- Investigate ARTEX consoles reachable from your network until their ownership and purpose are confirmed.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| IPV4 | 144[.]172[.]64[.]60 | One of the reported Storm-0940 infrastructure hosts used in the ConnectWise Cloud Backup supply-chain campaign. |
| IPV4 | 181[.]41[.]194[.]136 | Host with an exposed directory containing HTA droppers, batch loaders, a wpad.dat file, and a MITM root CA private key. |
| IPV4 | 38[.]244[.]50[.]120 | ARTEX host identified behind a South Korean finance-sector intrusion; the article reports exposed ARTEX configurations and session histories on a separate host. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.004 · Unix ShellThe trojanized ARTEX login handler executes attacker-supplied input through `sh -c` as root.T1110.003 · Password SprayingThe article reports ARTEX was used to speed up password spraying in the Storm-0940 campaign.T1190 · Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationThe ARTEX backdoor provides unauthenticated command execution through the exposed console's login handler.T1595 · Active ScanningThe article reports ARTEX was used to speed up scanning during the Storm-0940 campaign.
People
Threat Actors
Products
Tools
CyberStrikeAI192.253.229.113 CTG Server Ltd, Los Angeles 8787: ARTEX, 8080: CyberStrikeAI, 8790: 麸鸟渗透智能体 Agent WorkbenchLunaFox ASM192.236.166.73 RackNerd / HostPapa 8787: ARTEX, 8080: CyberStrikeAI, 443: LunaFox ASMNew API192.238.245.116 SpeedVM Network (AS138995), Los Angeles 8787: ARTEX, 8080: Sub2API, 80: New API (LLM proxy)ScopeSentryARTEX hosts pair the console with a distinct attack or LLM-proxy tool such as CyberStrikeAI, LunaFox, ScopeSentry, New API or agent-workbench rebrands, separate from the broader Sub2API bundling.
Countries
China2 to 4, 2026, counted 62 consoles serving the backdoored build (26 in the U.S., 17 in Hong Kong and 7 in China) out of 1,645 ARTEX hosts worldwide, a separate count from the 1,465 cited above.South Korea38.244.50.120 U.S., offline ARTEX host behind a South Korean finance sector intrusion; an open directory on port 18899 exposed a Claude Code CLAUDE.md file, while session histories and ARTEX configs sat on a separateUnited StatesARTEX is an open-source, LLM-driven autonomous penetration-testing framework, and its web console is now deployed at scale on U.S.
