SOCRadar Maps n0n Ransomware Operations From Exposed Operator Workspace

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Summary

SOCRadar researchers say an exposed operator workspace let them reconstruct n0n’s credential-based intrusions, data theft and destructive extortion, including its locker, infrastructure and AI-assisted tooling. They found no exploit code or CVE references.

Key points

  • SOCRadar’s Threat Research Unit says snapshots of an exposed Python file server revealed 1,719 files and activity linked to at least 23 organizations in 14 countries.
  • The documented intrusions used weak or compromised credentials, including FortiGate SSL-VPN credential stuffing, RDP and WinRM password sweeps, and exposed AWS keys; researchers found no exploit code or CVE references.
  • The recovered C++ locker source describes an AES-256-CBC encryptor; the compiled binaries were not recovered, and operator scripts handled additional actions such as stopping services and deleting backups.
  • The investigation describes victim-specific exfiltration pipelines and data destruction. For three staged cloud-database cases labeled “gl-0day,” the access vector remains unknown.
  • The operator used the opencode AI coding agent, configured with 154 model entries and more than $7,216 in API spending; researchers characterized the operation as human-directed, not fully autonomous.
  • SOCRadar counted 93 entities on n0n’s leak portal and $283.7 million in listed demands as of October 19, 2026; these portal listings and demands do not independently verify every claimed compromise.
  • Recommended defenses include strengthening MFA and remote-access controls, limiting cloud-key permissions, and maintaining offline or immutable backups.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Credential stuffing against FortiGate SSL-VPN appliances using residential proxy pools.
  • RDP and WinRM sweeps using default or weak passwords.
  • Use of exposed, long-lived AWS IAM keys and stolen administrative browser sessions for hosting-provider portals.
  • Harvesting SaaS and CI/CD API tokens and cloud credentials from source code and deployment pipelines.
  • Persistence through hidden administrator accounts, SSH authorized keys, scheduled tasks, and OpenSSH on port 2222.
  • Credential and session collection from browser stores, IMAP mailboxes, and incoming MFA codes.
  • Exfiltration through Base64-encoded ZIP POSTs to C2, SigV4 requests over Tor, SSH-tunneled TAR archives, and public file-hosting services.
  • Encryption and destructive actions including S3 object deletion, shadow-copy deletion, free-space wiping, and changing firewall rules to BLOCK.
Defensive Notes
  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on RDP, SSL-VPN, and administrative portals; monitor FortiGate /remote/logincheck for credential stuffing and invalidate credentials found in infostealer logs.
  • Restrict firewall-management interfaces with IP allow-lists and MFA, remove shared or default credentials, require approval for policy changes, and monitor REST token creation from unfamiliar IPs.
  • Replace long-lived cloud keys with short-lived roles, separate S3 list/read/delete permissions, enable Object Lock and versioning, and alert on high-volume DeleteObjects calls.
  • Maintain air-gapped or immutable backups because the operation deletes shadow copies, wipes free space, and may delete provider-hosted backups.
  • Isolate management browsers and keep MFA passcodes out of local administrator mailboxes.
  • Hunt for C:\Users\Public\n0n\, .n0n file renames following service stops, SYSTEM tasks such as SvcSync or NetAssist, Chrome remote-debugging use, authorized_keys entries ending in root@3090-AI, Snort rule n0n-lock (sid 2100001), and JSON POSTs to /x/i containing ippay-web.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINn0n-cases[.]netDomain used to send direct extortion emails to victims from the n0n operation.
DOMAINn0n[.]toClearnet domain for the n0n leak site; reported inactive at the time of the article's checks.
EMAILnotice@n0n-cases[.]netSender address used for direct extortion emails sent to victims.
IPV4185[.]157[.]161[.]148Operator-controlled staging server that exposed the live working directory and hosted the AI coding agent and kserver C2 panel.
IPV4188[.]214[.]135[.]130Operator infrastructure identified as the leak-site backend, victim-record host, and host for wallet and C2-related services.
IPV481[.]161[.]239[.]10Operator-controlled loot vault where exfiltrated data terminated and leak-building and C2 services were hosted.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelData was exfiltrated to C2 as ZIP archives encoded in Base64 and sent by POST.T1053.005 · Scheduled TaskLocker and audit runs were configured as scheduled tasks, including recurring SYSTEM tasks.T1059.001 · PowerShellPowerShell scripts were used for strikes, exfiltration, and implant activity.T1070.004 · File DeletionThe operator overwrote the toolkit multiple times and deleted it; launchers also self-deleted.T1078.004 · Cloud AccountsThe operator used exposed, long-lived AWS IAM access keys to access cloud resources.T1110.004 · Credential StuffingThe operator used residential proxy pools to credential-stuff FortiGate SSL-VPN appliances.T1133 · External Remote ServicesInitial access used internet-facing FortiGate SSL-VPN, RDP, and WinRM services.T1136.001 · Local AccountThe operator created hidden local administrator accounts such as svc_upd and svc_reg.T1485 · Data DestructionThe operator deleted S3 data and, in one claimed case, removed servers and backups.T1486 · Data Encrypted for ImpactThe custom n0n locker encrypted files on Windows and Linux, with an OpenSSL stage also used against FMC appliances.T1489 · Service StopThe Windows wrapper stopped MSSQL, MySQL, and W3SVC before encryption.T1490 · Inhibit System RecoveryThe operation deleted shadow copies and wiped free space to impede recovery.T1530 · Data from Cloud StorageThe operator performed bulk S3 pulls with per-bucket byte caps.T1547.001 · Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderA Run key was set to open the ransom note at user logon.T1562.001 · Disable or Modify ToolsThe Windows wrapper stopped and disabled Symantec Endpoint Protection.

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