Expedia Confirms Third-Party Breach as Qubole Link Remains Unverified

Summary
Researchers traced Qubole-linked AWS credentials using dormant customer roles to access secrets and S3 data across multiple environments. Expedia confirmed a breach via an unnamed provider; its Qubole link and n0n’s full data claims remain unverified.
Key points
- From October 14–26, IAM users from Qubole’s AWS account assumed customer roles; Wiz reported more than a dozen affected organizations, including former customers with dormant roles.
- Sentra recorded about 100 passwords and keys read in seven minutes from cloud secret stores and Lambda environment variables; the actor tested some harvested credentials.
- The activity included S3 enumeration and data collection, in some cases involving whole buckets. Missing object-level logs left the specific objects and download volume unsettled.
- Wiz found a bootable image, sso_agent.iso, hosted on an actor’s server but reported no evidence it was deployed.
- Expedia confirmed that actors reached its systems through a compromised third-party data platform provider, but has not named the provider or confirmed n0n’s data claims.
- n0n claimed Expedia data and an extract was later reported published; the full scope and authenticity of the claims remain unverified.
- The article recommends reviewing vendor-trusted roles, removing obsolete access, restricting vendor principals, and rotating secrets those roles could read.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- From October 14 to 26, an unidentified threat actor used IAM credentials from Qubole's AWS account to assume customer-created cross-account roles. The requests used the expected external identifier, and the dormant roles remained active after some customers stopped using Qubole.
- The actor enumerated customer AWS storage, compute, databases, and identity settings, then read secrets from AWS Secrets Manager, Systems Manager Parameter Store, Lambda environment variables, and EC2 user data. It used TruffleHog to validate harvested AWS, Microsoft Entra ID, and Okta credentials.
- The actor listed S3 buckets and objects and used GetObject to collect data, sometimes downloading entire buckets, as well as production database backups.
- In a separate, unlinked activity from October 8 to 11, another unidentified actor tested customer-owned AWS keys created for Qubole integrations and compromised some environments.
- Expedia confirmed access to its systems through a compromised third-party data platform provider, but has not named the provider. Qubole is a candidate, not a confirmed link to Expedia.
- n0n claimed responsibility for the Qubole intrusion and claimed Expedia data, but neither the responsibility claim nor the full dataset claims have been independently verified. A published extract was reported.
- Defensive Notes
- Inventory IAM roles that trust external accounts and remove trust for integrations no longer in use. Restrict vendor principals by source IP or VPC endpoint; the article says a source-IP condition would have blocked the observed role assumptions.
- Review CloudTrail from October 1 for role assumptions from Qubole's AWS account, particularly requests from outside AWS address ranges. External identifiers are visible in plaintext in CloudTrail and should be treated as labels, not secrets.
- Rotate every secret the affected roles could read, including credentials in Secrets Manager and Lambda variables. Rotate credentials at their source; already-issued sessions remain usable until they expire.
- Use short-lived workload credentials instead of long-lived keys, and publish vendor egress ranges so customers can restrict access.
- Enable and retain S3 data events and server access logs, and review available KMS decrypt records. The article notes that missing object-level logging left responders unable to confirm which S3 objects were read.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| IPV4 | 185[.]209[.]199[.]73 | Shared Mullvad VPN exit used to assume roles across victim environments from October 18 to 21; correlate with identity and behavior evidence. |
| IPV4 | 45[.]83[.]220[.]211 | Shared Mullvad VPN exit used to assume customer roles on October 14 and 15; the article says to use it as a supporting hunt indicator, not as conclusive evidence alone. |
| IPV4 | 57[.]129[.]54[.]120 | Primary OVH address used for role assumptions, enumeration, and credential harvesting during the Qubole campaign; it also hosted sso_agent.iso. |
| IPV4 | 89[.]37[.]63[.]175 | Address registered to Mullvad and used for customer role assumption on October 25; the article describes it as a supporting indicator. |
| IPV6 | 2001:41d0:70d:7800:: | OVH IPv6 address used for credential enumeration and validation during the Qubole campaign. |
| SHA256 | 65f061281c9a712e9502793dc4c5035cae490b84da05f7d4223cefa65ad396e4 | SHA-256 hash of sso_agent.iso, a bootable image hosted on the Qubole campaign server; Wiz observed no deployment. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1078.004 · Cloud AccountsTwo IAM users from Qubole's AWS account obtained temporary credentials by assuming roles in customer environments.T1087.004 · Cloud AccountThe actor used AWS identity APIs, including ListRoles, while mapping accessible customer environments.T1199 · Trusted RelationshipThe actor assumed customer-created cross-account roles that trusted Qubole's AWS account; the requests carried the expected external identifier and succeeded.T1526 · Cloud Service DiscoveryThe actor enumerated AWS services, including Lambda, Secrets Manager, Systems Manager Parameter Store, and database services.T1530 · Data from Cloud StorageThe actor used GetObject to collect S3 data, sometimes downloading entire buckets, and also pulled production database backups.T1552 · Unsecured CredentialsThe actor read Lambda environment variables and scraped EC2 user data for exposed credentials.T1555.006 · Cloud Secrets Management StoresThe actor retrieved passwords and keys from AWS Secrets Manager and Systems Manager Parameter Store.T1580 · Cloud Infrastructure DiscoveryThe actor enumerated storage, compute instances, security groups, VPCs, databases, database snapshots, and KMS keys in customer environments.T1583.003 · Virtual Private ServerThe Qubole campaign worked primarily from an OVH virtual private server after beginning from a Mullvad VPN exit.T1619 · Cloud Storage Object DiscoveryThe actor called ListBuckets, ListObjects, and HeadObject to discover S3 data before selecting it for collection.T1657 · Financial Theftn0n listed Expedia as unpaid and exposed, claimed data, and a published extract was reported; the article does not verify the full data claims.
People
Threat Actors
APT39The article identifies APT39 as an alias of REMIX KITTEN and describes travel-sector targeting attributed to Rana Intelligence Computing, which the US Treasury said worked for Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security.N0nAn extortion threat actor that claimed Expedia data and claimed responsibility for the Qubole intrusion. The article says the Qubole responsibility claim is unverified; the full Expedia data claims have not been independently confirmed.
Vendors
Amazon Web ServicesAn AWS role silent since spring came back to life on October 14. The request came from Qubole's trusted AWS account, carried the correct external identifier, and used a session name beginning with quiam-. To AWS, itMullvadcredentials for AWS account 805246085872, which Qubole's platform uses. The threat actor began from a Mullvad VPN address on October 14 and worked mostly from an OVH server from October 15 through October 26, addingOVHplatform uses. The threat actor began from a Mullvad VPN address on October 14 and worked mostly from an OVH server from October 15 through October 26, adding a second IAM user from the same account on October 18.QuboleAn AWS role silent since spring came back to life on October 14. The request came from Qubole's trusted AWS account, carried the correct external identifier, and used a session name beginning with quiam-. To AWS, it
Products
AWSAn AWS role silent since spring came back to life on October 14. The request came from Qubole's trusted AWS account, carried the correct external identifier, and used a session name beginning with quiam-. To AWS, itQuboleAn AWS role silent since spring came back to life on October 14. The request came from Qubole's trusted AWS account, carried the correct external identifier, and used a session name beginning with quiam-. To AWS, it
Tools
opencodeI examined in a China-nexus campaign run by AI agents. SOCRadar found an exposed n0n server running opencode, an open-source AI coding agent. Its configuration held 154 model entries across seven providers,TruffleHogManager, Systems Manager Parameter Store, and Lambda environment variables. The threat actor ran TruffleHog to test the stolen secrets. It validated AWS keys, Microsoft Entra ID client secrets, and Okta client
Countries
Chinadoes show is an AI-assisted extortion threat actor operating at volume, the same shift I examined in a China-nexus campaign run by AI agents. SOCRadar found an exposed n0n server running opencode, an open-source AIIranIn 2020, the US Treasury sanctioned Rana Intelligence Computing, which it said worked for Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security. Industry tracks the activity as REMIX KITTEN (aka APT39). Treasury said RanaUnited Stateshad recorded 222 n0n listings since September, including 100 added during November and 100 naming US organizations. The pricing and pressure are standard eCrime, and Wiz describes the Qubole targeting as
