Falcon C2 Uses Malicious Browser Scripts and Extensions to Target Government Entities

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Summary

Unit 42 details Falcon, a browser-based C2 framework used in campaigns against government entities across at least five countries. Its extensions collect credentials and communications, hijack sessions, and support Antino, a Rust implant using OneDrive for C2.

Key points

  • Unit 42 observed Falcon campaigns targeting government entities in one Middle Eastern and four Southeast Asian countries between March and May 2026.
  • Falcon implants are delivered through compromised web portals and use obfuscated JavaScript, encrypted WebSocket C2, and commands that can execute arbitrary JavaScript.
  • Its Chrome and Firefox extensions masquerade as utilities such as PDF viewers and can collect credentials, cookies, browsing data, clipboard contents, emails, and messages.
  • The extension can proxy requests using the victim’s stored credentials and intercept or replace downloads, potentially enabling session hijacking and further malware delivery.
  • Falcon can deliver Antino, a Rust implant that uses Microsoft OneDrive for C2 and supports commands including shell execution, file transfer, and system-information collection.
  • Unit 42 assesses with high confidence that Falcon and PeckBirdy are variants of the same framework, citing overlaps in URL structures, payload delivery, communication protocols, and session identifiers.
  • Unit 42 recommends monitoring for suspicious developer-mode extensions, unusual session-storage keys, injected scripts on internal portals, and anomalous OneDrive activity.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Attackers injected JavaScript into compromised webmail portals and government web applications, causing visiting users' browsers to load the Falcon implant and exposing credentials and sessions.
  • A malicious Chrome extension mimicking a PDF viewer was sideloaded in developer mode in one observed intrusion. The article does not establish how the operator deployed it.
  • In a Southeast Asian police entity, a custom module harvested usernames and displayed a fake Adobe Flash Player update prompt to selected users; clicking the prompt served the Antino implant.
  • Falcon's extension could intercept legitimate file downloads and replace them with an operator-controlled payload URL.
Defensive Notes
  • Monitor for browser extensions installed in developer mode, especially extensions mimicking common utilities or requesting broad permissions.
  • Look for Hm_lvt_ cookies or local-storage keys on internal and government web applications where Baidu Analytics has no legitimate reason to appear.
  • Review internal portal templates and headers for newly added script tags loading unfamiliar external resources, particularly heavily numeric JavaScript with a small decoder.
  • Audit OAuth activity to OneDrive tenants outside the organization's tenancy, including repeated small JSON writes to paths such as antino/heartbeat/ or antino/antino_upload/.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINfonts[.]chrorne[.]comListed as a Falcon C2 domain.
DOMAINfonts[.]tarotfree101[.]topListed as a Falcon C2 domain.
DOMAINrobot[.]avbliud[.]comListed as a Falcon C2 domain.
DOMAINwps-cn[.]comListed as a payload delivery domain.
SHA256065d18fcfeddbd718c054f4b21c3cde5b9291db921d01f343d7ac0d4b41f29ceSHA-256 of icon128.png from the Falcon Chrome extension.
SHA2560c39264337a1186b2e765e24073399cbdcba118306614eb411e315887af578bdSHA-256 of the Antino sample executable flashcenter_pp_ax_install_en.exe.
SHA25624d69139cb2d32598f0f4983876f6320485fac134a66ade59cab76b50b4128f7SHA-256 of twitter-dm.js from the Falcon Firefox extension.
SHA256265c2b36060e4b21c25aa86a8bb22d1db5f806117b484774c75c65b5b38222e0SHA-256 of sandbox.html from the Falcon Chrome extension.
SHA2562ebe36f1322b77264a33fded81cd4b8817f93362945070bf0bb5845dd27c0575SHA-256 of background.js from the Falcon Firefox extension.
SHA2562ed834d92bfefc9d07a9f1a48f986974ae2a29669029f8163a1f6e8706388fcdSHA-256 of offscreen.html from the Falcon Chrome extension.
SHA25632af8413cbd38ce8beb257288cb8e6aa2f9b781d56d0f5272bffbcdc22d999f4SHA-256 of page.html from the Falcon Chrome extension.
SHA256356b96c2267c5f2d8c07693643626e090b6389318b4ffa74699fa1732da5a00cSHA-256 of offscreen.js from the Falcon Chrome extension.
SHA2563e535d63af8a95221fb517fa1b3e4a0029d3463d8b767443abdff385ee8cb6e9SHA-256 of analytics-core.js from the Falcon Chrome extension.
SHA2563e923f11db08413fca8a3a69d33d8896cfd56309e5179e8604d7fb7110428da2SHA-256 of twitter-dm.js from the Falcon Chrome extension.
SHA2563eab406d841fa22a4b0200c95c1afab068347f835400d5771e8de60aef732016SHA-256 of icon16.png from the Falcon Chrome extension.
SHA2565711586125909863b91c1b5ff7cf70ef5d35249d67b11d7a23dc864405cddfe2SHA-256 of icon48.png from the Falcon Chrome extension.
SHA25666e9098551a1c0c74077d6cf55570e5d307a4a5ef0b0f2053e139394e61c442dSHA-256 of sandbox.js from the Falcon Chrome extension.
SHA256857429faffe0e0747ce299e86eed063ed781b4e403b917ca7e853e89bedf072cSHA-256 of content-script.js from the Falcon Firefox extension.
SHA25688e8b07bdf294ace0357d35acb7e108c66ba65a2c4ad66351fb8f7806dae0862SHA-256 of content-script.js from the Falcon Chrome extension.
SHA256898656c33effb51e109c548fc213f157f151a870ea64a4601eda74ae75bd3af6SHA-256 of offscreen.js from the Falcon Firefox extension.
SHA256b33f2e95943e3ff0a72dea1be9fdea03d986bada4def34f6991b3113ec161ad7SHA-256 of manifest.json from the Falcon Firefox extension.
SHA256b3d8ea89b19a87bf2fdd63127086681059f41d67b6e5f8c939f5636a1b2315ceSHA-256 of sandbox.js from the Falcon Firefox extension.
SHA256b6a7be724871ed3e81c986b74d62da8911c82a336c4c1857b35f2446b2d49fdaSHA-256 of manifest.json from the Falcon Chrome extension.
SHA256e2b6b1becdbcc340121e163b5afdfc5437a480ca132248ed5c7c309c45ac3dbbSHA-256 of page.js from the Falcon Chrome extension.
SHA256f8b86238e179d88a9979b6f97750a39dda1d07b54d634bc1348fdfb0944a3b92SHA-256 of background.js from the Falcon Chrome extension.
URLhxxps[:]//microsoft-flash[.]com/download/Adobe_installer.exeSpecific URL that served the Antino implant after a fake update prompt.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1056.003 · Web Portal CaptureInjected JavaScript on a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Roundcube portal intercepted credentials as users signed in.T1059.001 · PowerShellAntino's diagnostic answer file causes a PowerShell snippet to execute in the context of sdiagnhost.exe.T1059.007 · JavaScriptThe browser implant executes JavaScript commands through eval, and Falcon's modules run JavaScript in the browser.T1071.001 · Web ProtocolsThe Falcon implant maintains C2 over a persistent WebSocket connection protected by TLS.T1090.001 · Internal ProxyFalcon lets the operator use the victim's browser as a proxy to access resources, including internal network resources.T1102.002 · Bidirectional CommunicationAntino uses OneDrive heartbeat and command files for two-way communication with the operator.T1113 · Screen CaptureThe operator captured a full-page screenshot of a document viewed in a justice department's internal system.T1114.002 · Remote Email CollectionThe extension uses a victim's Gmail session cookie to retrieve email data and upload selected account contents to C2.T1115 · Clipboard DataThe extension monitors cut, copy, and paste events and caches clipboard data for operator-directed upload.T1176 · Software ExtensionsA malicious Chrome extension mimicking a PDF viewer was sideloaded in developer mode; Falcon also has Chrome and Firefox extensions.T1189 · Drive-by CompromiseFalcon JavaScript was injected into compromised webmail and government sites and loaded when victims visited them.T1539 · Steal Web Session CookieThe extension collects browser cookies, and operators can use victim session cookies for authenticated requests.T1547.001 · Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderAntino adds itself to the Windows Registry Run key for persistence.T1555.003 · Credentials from Web BrowsersThe extension monitors the browser credentials store and collects passwords and autofill data.T1567.002 · Exfiltration to Cloud StorageAntino uses OneDrive for C2 and uploads exfiltrated files to the antino/antino_upload/ path.

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