Sophos Investigates Malicious ScreenConnect Client Deployments

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Summary

Sophos observed unauthorized ScreenConnect client deployments and a command chain that downloaded and silently installed a client, then retrieved a second-stage script. ConnectWise is investigating potentially linked extensions and advises disabling identified ones.

Key points

  • Sophos observed curl.exe downloading a ScreenConnect installer from 185[.]99[.]255[.]28 to Windows Temp, followed by a silent msiexec.exe installation.
  • ScreenConnect scripts staged batch files and used PowerShell with execution-policy bypass to retrieve a second-stage script from ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev.
  • The activity originated from three instance IDs that Sophos considers likely compromised; two other IDs were identified as malicious instances.
  • ConnectWise confirmed the incident, is investigating multiple third-party extensions that may be linked to the activity, and recommends disabling identified extensions as a precaution.
  • Organizations are advised to review ScreenConnect command history for unexpected client deployments or remote commands, and investigate the described download-and-install activity.
  • SophosLabs is assessing existing countermeasures and possible additional detections, while reviewing activity across customer environments.

Article Details

Event Type
Active campaign involving unauthorized ScreenConnect client deployments
Impact
The activity involved downloading and silently installing ScreenConnect clients, executing remote commands, and retrieving a second-stage script. Sophos assessed that three ScreenConnect instances were likely compromised. ConnectWise confirmed the incident and is investigating third-party extensions possibly linked to the activity.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV4185[.]99[.]255[.]28Source from which curl.exe downloaded the ScreenConnect client installer in an observed malicious deployment.

MITRE ATT&CK

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