Check Point Shows Grok and Copilot Can Relay Malware C2 Through Web Fetch

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Summary

Check Point Research demonstrated a proof of concept using Grok and Microsoft Copilot web-fetch features to relay data and commands without accounts or API keys. The researchers warn that AI-driven malware could use similar techniques.

Key points

  • Researchers demonstrated bidirectional command-and-control through Grok and Microsoft Copilot by prompting them to fetch attacker-controlled webpages and return content.
  • The proof of concept appended host reconnaissance data to URL parameters and retrieved a planted command from a fake website.
  • A C++ implant used WebView2 to automate the AI interfaces, parse responses, and execute a returned command; the demonstration ran calc.
  • The researchers report that encoding or encrypting query data could bypass some model-side safeguards.
  • The article describes model-driven target selection, anti-sandbox decisions, and selective file theft or encryption as potential future uses, not established widespread practices.
  • Suggested defenses include hardening AI web-fetch features and monitoring AI-service traffic for unusual automated use.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Demonstrated C2 relay: malware prompts Grok or Microsoft Copilot to fetch an attacker-controlled URL, sends host data in query parameters, and receives commands through the AI response.
  • The proof of concept embedded WebView2 in a C++ application to open the AI web interface; JavaScript in the loaded page submitted prompts to Copilot.
  • The proof of concept encoded or encrypted query data to bypass model-side safeguards and parsed returned content to execute a command.
  • The article describes AI-driven host triage, target selection, and selective data theft or encryption as potential future malware capabilities, not as confirmed deployments.
Defensive Notes
  • AI providers should harden web-fetch features, enforce authentication, and provide enterprises with greater control and visibility into external URL access.
  • Defenders should treat AI service domains as sensitive egress and monitor for unusual or automated usage patterns.
  • Include AI-service traffic in threat hunting and incident-response playbooks.

MITRE ATT&CK

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