Researchers Link AsyncRAT Campaign to Attacks on Libyan Organizations

Summary
Researchers report Libya-themed spear-phishing against a refinery, telecom provider and state institution, delivering AsyncRAT via VBS and PowerShell droppers. Samples suggest activity may date to April 2025; no actor attribution was established.
Key points
- Researchers report activity against a Libyan oil refinery, a telecom provider and a state institution from November 2025 to mid-February 2026.
- Likely spear-phishing used Libya-themed lures, including files referencing current affairs.
- A VBS downloader fetched a PowerShell dropper from KrakenFiles; the dropper used a scheduled task named “devil” to install and run payloads.
- The final payload was AsyncRAT, which can support keylogging, screen capture and remote command execution.
- Related files on VirusTotal suggest the campaign may have begun as early as April 2025.
- The researchers could not attribute the activity to a named actor; state sponsorship is presented as a possibility, not a finding.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- Likely spear-phishing using Libya-themed lure documents and VBS files.
- A VBS downloader fetched a PowerShell dropper from a KrakenFiles URL; the dropper created and ran a scheduled task named "devil" and downloaded AsyncRAT.
- Defensive Notes
- The article advises organizations, particularly those in the energy sector, to be alert to phishing lures based on current events and geopolitical developments.
- The article identifies the scheduled task named "devil" as a persistence artifact observed on compromised hosts.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| SHA256 | 0499152c6dd775491ce099eee4c382a94f72c07031081db164de921effa9664f | Hash identified in the article as executing AsyncRAT. |
| SHA256 | 0f3344e672d1ea6cde382b68b27063ed766fced717e9f5f2e15e6c79ce0737f7 | Hash identified in the article as an AsyncRAT sample. |
| SHA256 | 12c65ac4e02313ed1aa2d32d56428f0a135b281604d536e5ae6ca08b6b4232c9 | Hash identified in the article as an AsyncRAT sample. |
| SHA256 | 1d32f451d18c3dc8dbf00cd7df1200f83efa27cbaddeb9b2bed726e6d08ef5b1 | Listed among hashes of VBS downloaders associated with the campaign. |
| SHA256 | 22a1cf91fbac104e2dd374dd06e93488cfdf216890088ef18318d90f440f00f6 | Listed among hashes of VBS downloaders associated with the campaign. |
| SHA256 | 3101cc378db2665eb2969b62e28efb9bfd5ca6f9bd3ebc27b422d5a29bfd1b17 | Hash associated in the article's IOC list with the VBS downloader audio_libya.vbs. |
| SHA256 | 34ae832427b03df5f8cb90e78b5b174665c19602575b37fc7cad8100978898d2 | Hash of the VBS downloader named list_name_libya.vbs. |
| SHA256 | 39eade26c5680d20f5a8032a0d3996a29058e52c147e4b49a2072d2dcb353325 | Hash of the VBS downloader named video_saif_gadafi_2026.vbs. |
| SHA256 | 3ca93362559db4da9d44d614345cbdfdb81d882367af05651bb718e1cc57ab08 | Listed among hashes of VBS downloaders associated with the campaign. |
| SHA256 | 3d5ada3b035e2adc8de1db24ab9d8e0e828eec1b7601ed9d064b41fa9d026a34 | Hash of the VBS downloader named libya_russia_video2025.vbs. |
| SHA256 | 43c5d9a267742ee3c6c9bcf3e6f63ec397fbe0233a5d99bdb7dacbfa1a0f69d5 | Hash of the VBS downloader named Audio_Libya_algeria.vbs. |
| SHA256 | 5b573743306a2324608fdbd9c5cceba6bd5abfaccd1ea8b94c60f73da279e636 | Hash identified in the article as an AsyncRAT sample. |
| SHA256 | 85e01e36b7b2b90af79642732a17dd566af0b10a85fd8a4cc85ea11583a0ff00 | Hash of the VBS downloader named video_saif_eslam.vbs. |
| SHA256 | 946ae65e508acb4dbf6b29432889511a76636453cc04256230fbce25cef86b6a | Hash identified in the article as an AsyncRAT sample. |
| SHA256 | 9843874eb6217a79ba5a51a6a886745169b1a1ad43f7ae12de6e610324e88ab7 | Hash associated in the article's IOC list with the VBS downloader Libya_Jordan_File.vbs. |
| SHA256 | ad4e27fe06fae2325faa2a00be7b41f40aa9c63fe79713597b3330ad7e583ca8 | Hash of the VBS downloader named names_libya444.vbs. |
| SHA256 | ad796fc0ac17b58e47dbadd42bf164790c18ac67aade8c6bf2251056ef68138d | Hash identified in the article as an AsyncRAT sample. |
| SHA256 | b4a3f2f5091df7174e82283ed59cd557eea2e8ddd7a018dafc5e8151fd683429 | Hash associated in the article's IOC list with the VBS downloader Libya_voice2025.vbs. |
| SHA256 | c03120163d9401d66d482899421d9dd68db63d34bac2b32e3090e8ad0b911d83 | Hash of VBS downloader samples, including audio_hafter_saif_eslam_rusia.vbs and list_names_libya.vbs. |
| SHA256 | c2a2c2b26b235bad31a352e1fd475794167ec79928c52d98bccb3607e932c7b2 | Hash of the VBS downloader named Voice_Egypt_hafter_Libya.vbs. |
| SHA256 | c3eef096073dd0873a821c35dd2e7eaf391863264ab72e1b91f2ca73218c2d04 | Hash of the dropper named image.png. |
| SHA256 | cd7e16ca636f6e5cb86cd41561d57620a131a26b53c6e25a36edcbbcb2b5276a | Hash of the VBS downloader named voice_dbeibeh2025.vbs. |
| SHA256 | d884a17046bbefd73f76f88533e1f2da40d5233b15caa48245de65d2c19c50dc | Hash of the PowerShell payload named payload_1.ps1. |
| SHA256 | eb76f0797c27821635992ef23a570fe3a11c848998bc9f7735e968adc6b2f33c | Hash identified in the article as an AsyncRAT sample. |
| SHA256 | ece81cdc6fc12a07a984b98df58e34c92998cdd957e1f45cabd925056bb0f92e | Hash identified in the article as an AsyncRAT sample. |
| SHA256 | f307f8fa89b9f9eb8c2ae346055dffb80c93f56034aa3abe7a8a25d6e5e680c6 | Hash identified in the article as an AsyncRAT sample. |
| SHA256 | f8b5a5429fb1da677ab8c09fc95b26e3b3d8bcd27521a56cc835fbf5878dbcd8 | Hash identified in the article as an AsyncRAT sample. |
| SHA256 | f8d2c5cb898cf92495fdcb7e20f509603e1bdd62ba4b61bd7694a8e33a4c738f | Listed among hashes of VBS downloaders associated with the campaign. |
| URL | hxxps[:]//hs8[.]krakenfiles[.]com/uploads/15-02-2026/JCaF7rrPQm/image.png | KrakenFiles-hosted URL used to deliver the VBS downloader and PowerShell dropper. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1053.005 · Scheduled TaskThe dropper created and ran a scheduled task named "devil" using schtasks.exe.T1056.001 · KeyloggingThe article states that the deployed AsyncRAT can perform keylogging.T1059.001 · PowerShellA PowerShell dropper installed persistence and downloaded the AsyncRAT payload.T1059.005 · Visual BasicVBS downloader files were found on targeted networks and used to fetch additional payloads.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferThe VBS downloader retrieved a PowerShell dropper from a KrakenFiles-hosted URL.T1113 · Screen CaptureThe article states that the deployed AsyncRAT can capture screens on infected hosts.T1219 · Remote Access ToolsThe article describes AsyncRAT as the final remote-access payload deployed in the campaign.T1566.002 · Spearphishing LinkThe article assesses spear-phishing as the likely initial access vector and describes Libya-themed lure documents.
