Walkthrough Demonstrates How NTLM Reflection and Delegation Misconfigurations Can Compromise Active Directory

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Summary

A lab walkthrough chains NTLM reflection/relay, disabled SMB signing, unconstrained delegation and Kerberos ticket abuse to escalate from low-privileged domain access to DCSync and Active Directory domain control, then outlines mitigations.

Key points

  • The lab starts with low-privileged domain credentials and identifies a workstation with unconstrained delegation enabled and SMB signing disabled.
  • DNS redirection and authentication coercion direct NTLM authentication to a relay; reflection against the workstation enables local SAM hash extraction.
  • The walkthrough uses the compromised delegated host to capture a Domain Controller Kerberos TGT after coercing the controller to authenticate.
  • Reusing the captured TGT enables DCSync and domain credential-hash extraction; the article presents this as full domain compromise in the lab.
  • Recommended defenses include enforcing SMB signing, disabling unconstrained delegation, restricting NTLM, disabling unnecessary services and monitoring Kerberos and DCSync activity.

Article Details

Topic
Unconstrained delegation and NTLM reflection/relay abuse to compromise Active Directory domains

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV4192[.]168[.]188[.]131Attacker-system IP used for the malicious DNS redirection and to host post-exploitation tools and payloads.
URLhxxp[:]//192[.]168[.]188[.]131/Rubeus.exeAttacker-hosted URL used to deliver Rubeus to the compromised target for Kerberos ticket operations.

MITRE ATT&CK

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