Check Point Details The Gentlemen Ransomware's GPO-Based Attack Chain

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Summary

Check Point Research reconstructs an intrusion involving an affiliate of The Gentlemen RaaS, describing Cobalt Strike, a blocked SystemBC attempt, lateral movement and GPO-based ransomware deployment, and analyzing the locker’s evasion, persistence and encryption.

Key points

  • The initial access vector was not determined; the earliest activity established with confidence was attacker presence on a Domain Controller with Domain Admin privileges.
  • The attacker deployed Cobalt Strike through administrative shares and RPC. Mimikatz evidence showed credential access, while PsExec, WMI, scheduled tasks and services supported lateral movement.
  • An affiliate attempted to deploy SystemBC, but endpoint protection blocked the activity. Telemetry from the SystemBC C2 server showed over 1,570 victims; the report says they were likely mostly organizations and that SystemBC’s relationship to The Gentlemen remains unclear.
  • The ransomware was deployed through Group Policy, enabling rapid execution across domain-joined computers.
  • The report details attempts to disable Defender and firewalls, delete shadow copies and logs, and establish persistence; an optional mode wipes free disk space.
  • The Gentlemen offers Go lockers for Windows, Linux, NAS and BSD, plus a C-based ESXi variant. The analysis describes X25519 and XChaCha20 encryption, including partial-encryption modes for large files.
  • The group had publicly claimed more than 320 victims, with most reported attacks occurring in early 2026.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • The initial access vector was not determined. The earliest confirmed activity was on a Domain Controller with Domain Admin-level privileges.
  • The affiliate deployed Cobalt Strike through administrative shares and RPC. An attempt to deploy SystemBC for proxy communication was blocked by endpoint protection.
  • The Windows locker supports propagation using domain credentials, PsExec, WMI, remote scheduled tasks, services and Group Policy. In the investigated incident, Group Policy distributed the locker across domain-joined systems.
  • The Windows locker encrypts local and network-accessible files. Its ESXi variant shuts down virtual machines before encrypting targeted files.
Defensive Notes
  • Endpoint protection blocked the observed SystemBC deployment.
  • The article provides a YARA rule for detecting the Go-based Windows locker using ransomware-specific strings.
  • The locker attempts to disable Defender and firewalls, delete shadow copies and event logs, and optionally overwrite free disk space.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV445[.]86[.]230[.]112SystemBC command-and-control server contacted during a blocked deployment attempt.
IPV491[.]107[.]247[.]163Cobalt Strike command-and-control server contacted by rundll32.exe.
SHA256025fc0976c548fb5a880c83ea3eb21a5f23c5d53c4e51e862bb893c11adf712aThe Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA2561eece1e1ba4b96e6c784729f0608ad2939cfb67bc4236dfababbe1d09268960cThe Gentlemen Linux ransomware sample hash.
SHA25622b38dad7da097ea03aa28d0614164cd25fafeb1383dbc15047e34c8050f6f67The Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA2562ed9494e9b7b68415b4eb151c922c82c0191294d0aa443dd2cb5133e6bfe3d5dThe Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA2563ab9575225e00a83a4ac2b534da5a710bdcf6eb72884944c437b5fbe5c5c9235The Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA25648d9b2ce4fcd6854a3164ce395d7140014e0b58b77680623f3e4ca22d3a6e7fdThe Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA2565dc607c8990841139768884b1b43e1403496d5a458788a1937be139594f01dcaThe Gentlemen Linux ransomware sample hash.
SHA25662c2c24937d67fdeb43f2c9690ab10e8bb90713af46945048db9a94a465ffcb8The Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA256788ba200f776a188c248d6c2029f00b5d34be45d4444f7cb89ffe838c39b8b19The Gentlemen Linux ransomware sample hash.
SHA256860a6177b055a2f5aa61470d17ec3c69da24f1cdf0a782237055cba431158923The Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA25687d25d0e5880b3b5cd30106853cbfc6ef1ad38966b30d9bd5b99df46098e546cThe Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA2568c87134c1b45e990e9568f0a3899b0076f94be16d3c40fa824ac1e6c6ee892dbThe Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA25691415e0b9fe4e7cbe43ec0558a7adf89423de30d22b00b985c2e4b97e75076b1The Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA256992c951f4af57ca7cd8396f5ed69c2199fd6fd4ae5e93726da3e198e78bec0a5SystemBC malware sample hash.
SHA256994d6d1edb57f945f4284cc0163ec998861c7496d85f6d45c08657c9727186e3The Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA2569f61ff4deb8afced8b1ecdc8787a134c63bde632b18293fbfc94a91749e3e454The Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA256a7a19cab7aab606f833fa8225bc94ec9570a6666660b02cc41a63fe39ea8b0adThe Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA256b67958afc982cafbe1c3f114b444d7f4c91a88a3e7a86f89ab8795ac2110d1e6The Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA256c46b5a18ab3fb5fd1c5c8288a41c75bf0170c10b5e829af89370a12c86dd10f8The Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA256c7f7b5a6e7d93221344e6368c7ab4abf93e162f7567e1a7bcb8786cb8a183a73The Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA256ec368ae0b4369b6ef0da244774995c819c63cffb7fd2132379963b9c1640ccd2The Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA256efaf8e7422ffd09c7f03f1a5b4e5c2cc32b05334c18d1ccb9673667f8f43108fThe Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA256f736be55193c77af346dbe905e25f6a1dee3ec1aedca8989ad2088e4f6576b12The Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA256fc75ed2159e0c8274076e46a37671cfb8d677af9f586224da1713df89490a958The Gentlemen Windows ransomware sample hash.
SHA256fe1033335a045c696c900d435119d210361966e2fb5cd1ba3382608cfa2c8e68Hash of the ransomware's embedded gentlemen.bmp wallpaper.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1021.002 · SMB/Windows Admin SharesThe attacker copied Cobalt Strike executables to ADMIN$ shares, while the locker can copy itself to remote C$ shares.T1047 · Windows Management InstrumentationThe locker uses remote WMI process creation to run defense-disabling scripts and ransomware.T1053.003 · CronThe ESXi variant adds a reboot cron entry to relaunch its hidden binary.T1053.005 · Scheduled TaskThe locker creates local startup tasks and remote scheduled tasks to execute its payload.T1059.001 · PowerShellPowerShell downloaded the staged locker and was used for Defender and firewall changes.T1070.001 · Clear Windows Event LogsThe locker clears the System, Application and Security Windows event logs.T1484.001 · Group Policy ModificationThe affiliate used Group Policy to deploy the ransomware to domain-joined systems during policy refresh.T1486 · Data Encrypted for ImpactThe Gentlemen encrypts files on Windows and ESXi, with optional partial-encryption speed modes.T1489 · Service StopThe locker stops services and processes, while the ESXi variant powers off virtual machines before encryption.T1490 · Inhibit System RecoveryThe locker deletes shadow copies and can overwrite free disk space to hinder recovery.T1547.001 · Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderThe Windows locker attempts to add itself to Run registry keys for startup persistence.T1555.004 · Windows Credential ManagerRecovered Mimikatz output showed access to stored credentials from Windows Credential Manager.T1562.001 · Disable or Modify ToolsThe locker disables Defender real-time monitoring and adds process and path exclusions.T1562.004 · Disable or Modify System FirewallThe locker attempts to disable firewall profiles and stop the firewall service.T1569.002 · Service ExecutionThe locker creates and starts remote services such as DefSvc and UpdateSvc to execute its payload.

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