Analysis Details Rebex-Based Telegram RAT Delivered Through Trojanized CHM

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Summary

An analysis traces a Vietnam-uploaded trojanized CHM through a multi-stage infection chain to a Rebex-based Telegram RAT, detailing its persistence, command capabilities and limited attribution.

Key points

  • A ZIP uploaded to VirusTotal from Vietnam on April 1, 2026, contained a trojanized CHM that used a fake document-corruption prompt to trigger execution when opened.
  • The CHM launched a renamed Python runtime, which loaded a C++ DLL that used two XOR decryption layers to extract the next-stage components.
  • The chain used MSBuild to load a .NET loader, which decoded and decompressed the final payload in memory.
  • Persistence included a per-user Winlogon Shell hijack and a scheduled task named “Doubt,” configured to shut down the system weekly.
  • The final payload was a weaponized Rebex.Common.dll RAT that used Telegram for command-and-control and supported command execution, file downloads and token swapping.
  • The author assessed the activity as possibly targeted at Vietnam but could not confidently attribute it to a specific actor; the final DLL reportedly had zero VirusTotal detections at the time of writing.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • A trojanized CHM displays a fake document-corruption prompt and starts the infection when the user clicks either response.
  • The CHM uses hh.exe to extract files, then runs a renamed Python interpreter against an extracted .pyc that loads a C++ DLL.
  • The DLL decrypts an embedded blob with two XOR layers and drops an MSBuild XML file, a .NET loader, and other components.
  • The chain establishes persistence by hijacking the HKCU Winlogon Shell value and creating a scheduled task named "Doubt".
  • The final Rebex-based RAT uses a Telegram bot for command and control, supports optional SOCKS5, and accepts commands for check-ins, token swapping, file downloads, and cmd.exe execution.
Defensive Notes
  • Monitor for the described CHM-to-hh.exe-to-renamed-Python execution chain and the extracted .pyc and DLL files.
  • Review HKCU Winlogon Shell and HKCU Environment changes, along with creation of the scheduled task named "Doubt".
  • The article reports the mutex ODmVyekhvWKUFqvMEsyzbMpgpDcEdrJmGaLxpAMLvBjWXnOQvlottEzBOFftA in the .NET loader.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
SHA2561323278360d41a74ab09d310f08902087ff2798d1eda99be65d07c1b1123a25cSHA-256 hash of the decrypted Telegram RAT payload.
SHA25667b51a73c72f39b9cf41dd35eb22b369713ab2e576641b40b9089ebc9d4a1fb2SHA-256 hash of ioy24euj.dll, the .NET loader in the infection chain.
SHA2566db64b44305ff125f729713d7ff516e84e4ca38504a2ab0571eb19597f49feeeSHA-256 hash of the ZIP archive reported to contain the trojanized CHM sample.
SHA256a0d5b30578acd1df9139e7a8a4bfc659dc2cf48f4dc0c5804b70890adeb9fa21SHA-256 hash of the trojanized CHM delivery sample.

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