Konni-Linked Operation Poseidon Uses Google Ads Redirects to Deliver EndRAT

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Summary

Genians analyzes a Konni-attributed spear-phishing campaign that abuses advertising redirects and compromised WordPress sites to deliver EndRAT via LNK files and AutoIt scripts, and recommends behavior-based detection and layered defenses.

Key points

  • The campaign used spear-phishing emails impersonating South Korean financial institutions and a North Korean human-rights organization.
  • Attackers embedded malicious download destinations in Google advertising redirect URLs, with limited similar activity involving Naver ad tracking.
  • ZIP archives contained LNK shortcuts that launched AutoIt scripts disguised as PDFs and loaded EndRAT malware into memory.
  • Poorly secured WordPress sites served as malware distribution points and command-and-control infrastructure.
  • Shared infrastructure, code patterns, and an exposed AutoIt build path supported attribution to Konni; the path also contained the internal name “Poseidon.”
  • Email content padding and tracking pixels were used alongside sender impersonation to evade filtering and monitor recipient engagement.
  • Genians recommends inspecting redirect destinations and anomalous downloads, restricting risky attachments, and using EDR behavioral detection and response.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Spear-phishing emails impersonated South Korean financial institutions and human-rights organizations, using links disguised as legitimate Google or Naver advertising redirection URLs to deliver ZIP archives.
  • ZIP archives contained LNK files disguised as legitimate documents; executing a shortcut launched an AutoIt script masquerading as a PDF.
  • The AutoIt script downloaded and executed AutoIt3.exe and EndRAT-variant remote-access malware, including by loading malware directly into memory.
  • Phishing emails used invisible, repeated English text to evade filtering and included a web beacon to track whether recipients opened the message.
  • The operation used compromised WordPress websites for malware distribution and C2 infrastructure.
Defensive Notes
  • Quarantine or block unnecessary LNK attachments, including LNK files inside ZIP archives, and apply additional verification to emails impersonating financial institutions, public organizations, or human-rights groups.
  • Detect suspicious post-click redirection and file downloads based on behavior and final destinations rather than blocking legitimate advertising domains outright.
  • Use EDR behavior-based monitoring to identify abnormal process chains after LNK execution, including transitions to cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or AutoIt executables, and correlate process activity with network connections.
  • Use EDR response capabilities to isolate suspected endpoints, collect evidence, remove malicious LNK files and ZIP archives, and scope related processes and network connections.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINaceeyl[.]comDomain listed as C2 infrastructure for the threat activity.
DOMAINalthouqroastery[.]comDomain listed as C2 infrastructure for the threat activity.
DOMAINanupamaivf[.]comDomain listed as C2 infrastructure for the threat activity.
DOMAINcompromised-example[.]comShown as the malicious destination host for a sample malware-download URL.
DOMAINcreativepackout[.]coDomain listed as C2 infrastructure for the threat activity.
DOMAINencryptuganda[.]orgDomain listed as C2 infrastructure for the threat activity.
DOMAINgenuinashop[.]comDomain listed as C2 infrastructure for the threat activity.
DOMAINigamingroundtable[.]comDomain listed as C2 infrastructure for the threat activity.
DOMAINjlrandsons[.]co[.]ukC2 domain shared by the financial-themed and human-rights-themed attacks.
DOMAINkppe[.]plThreat-actor-controlled web-beacon server used to track email opens.
DOMAINkyowaind[.]co[.]jpDomain listed as C2 infrastructure for the threat activity.
DOMAINnationalinterestparty[.]comDomain listed as C2 infrastructure for the threat activity.
DOMAINoptique-leclercq[.]beDomain listed as C2 infrastructure for the threat activity.
DOMAINpomozzi[.]comDomain listed as C2 infrastructure for the threat activity.
DOMAINsparkwebsolutions[.]spaceDomain listed as C2 infrastructure for the threat activity.
DOMAINtatukikai[.]jpDomain listed as C2 infrastructure for the threat activity.
DOMAINvintashmarket[.]comDomain listed as C2 infrastructure for the threat activity.
HOSTNAMEappoitment[.]dotoit[.]mediaHostname listed as C2 infrastructure for the threat activity.
IPV4109[.]234[.]36[.]135C2 address listed in the article's threat-indicator section.
IPV4144[.]124[.]247[.]97C2 address listed in the article's threat-indicator section.
IPV477[.]246[.]101[.]72C2 address listed in the article's threat-indicator section.
IPV477[.]246[.]108[.]96C2 address listed in the article's threat-indicator section.
MD50171338d904381bbf3d1a909a48f4e92MD5 indicator listed for Operation Poseidon threat activity.
MD50777781dedd57f8016b7c627411bdf2cMD5 indicator listed for Operation Poseidon threat activity.
MD5303c5e4842613f7b9ee408e5c6721c00MD5 indicator listed for Operation Poseidon threat activity.
MD5639b5489d2fb79bcb715905a046d4a54MD5 indicator listed for Operation Poseidon threat activity.
MD56a4c3256ff063f67d3251d6dd8229931MD5 indicator listed for Operation Poseidon threat activity.
MD58b8fa6c4298d83d78e11b52f22a79100MD5 indicator listed for Operation Poseidon threat activity.
MD5908d074f69c0bf203ed225557b7827ecMD5 indicator listed for Operation Poseidon threat activity.
MD594935397dce29684f384e57f85beeb0aMD5 indicator listed for Operation Poseidon threat activity.
MD5a58ef1e53920a6e528dc31001f302c7bMD5 indicator listed for Operation Poseidon threat activity.
MD5a9a52e2f2afe28778a8537f955ee1310MD5 indicator listed for Operation Poseidon threat activity.
MD5ad6273981cb53917cb8bda8e2f2e31a8MD5 indicator listed for Operation Poseidon threat activity.
MD5d4b06cb4ed834c295d0848b90a109f09MD5 indicator listed for Operation Poseidon threat activity.
MD5d6aa7e9ff0528425146e64d9472ffdbdMD5 indicator listed for Operation Poseidon threat activity.
MD5f5842320e04c2c97d1f69cebfd47df3dMD5 indicator listed for Operation Poseidon threat activity.

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