Argamal RAT Targets Players Through Trojanized Hentai Games

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Summary

Kaspersky details Argamal, a RAT delivered in trojanized hentai games via websites and torrents. Its staged PowerShell loader uses COM hijacking and scheduled tasks; Kaspersky telemetry indicates hundreds of infections, mainly in four countries.

Key points

  • Kaspersky found Argamal DLL variants dating back to at least 2024 and identified a campaign discovered in April 2026 targeting players of hentai games.
  • In one delivery method, game archives contained legitimate files alongside a modified FFmpeg DLL and a loader DLL; other cases used payloads embedded in game files or a DLL disguised as a cheat.
  • The loader runs PowerShell stages that check for analysis tools, establish persistence, and schedule a delayed payload download. The downloader retrieves an encrypted payload from GitHub and decrypts it with AES-CBC.
  • Argamal persists by hijacking COM registration used by the Windows Color System Calibration Loader, enabling execution at user logon.
  • The RAT can execute commands, reboot or shut down systems, take screenshots, and perform file operations. It communicates with C2 servers over UDP and, in extended mode, TCP.
  • Kaspersky telemetry indicates hundreds of infections, with most victims located in Russia, Brazil, Germany, and Vietnam.
  • Kaspersky assesses with medium confidence that the downloader-chain developer speaks Spanish, based on language in code comments and variable names.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Trojanized hentai-game archives and torrents, including distribution through AniRena, delivered legitimate game files alongside a modified FFmpeg DLL and the malicious natives2_blob.bin loader.
  • The loader executes a Base64-encoded PowerShell stage. Stage1 establishes COM hijacking persistence and schedules Stage2 to run three days later.
  • Stage2 downloads and decrypts the RAT payload from GitHub using bitsadmin.exe; some variants instead package the payload in a game directory and load it through a patched library.
  • The RAT communicates with changing C2 infrastructure over UDP and TCP, collects system information, and supports remote command execution, screenshots, file operations, and uploads.
Defensive Notes
  • Kaspersky reports detecting the threat as Trojan.Win32.Termixia.*, Trojan.Win32.Agent.*, HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Argamal.gen, and HEUR:Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Argamal.gen.
  • The article reports that Kaspersky solutions prevented malicious activity in the earliest stages of the attack.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINasper1[.]freeddns[.]orgC2 domain used by earlier Argamal payload versions.
DOMAINcountry1[.]ignorelist[.]comLocale-based fallback C2 domain used when the victim's default locale is zh-CN.
DOMAINwinst0[.]kozow[.]comC2 domain used by the latest Argamal payload versions.
IPV4181[.]116[.]218[.]56Historical pDNS address associated with the first C2 domain; the article says this address was not observed in use.
IPV4186[.]158[.]223[.]35C2 server address to which the article says the listed Argamal domains resolve.
SHA102819d200d1424882af81cb504b3e8614b32397aListed as a Trojan downloader hash used in the campaign.
SHA11405a3c5e0aeb08012484134e16cdec4ab29b4a4Listed by the article as an Argamal RAT payload hash.
SHA117f8f8f34dfa737f36182fed7ff9e9814a114058Listed by the article as an Argamal RAT payload hash.
SHA12423a5bf0fa7cb9ec09211630a5488629499691bListed by the article as an Argamal RAT payload hash.
SHA129f1d346a6e71774c7dad25b90f446b2974393dfListed by the article as an Argamal RAT payload hash.
SHA142add9475e67a1ccc6a6af94b5475d3defc01b85SHA1 of the modified FFmpeg DLL included in infected game archives.
SHA1535f4337f261b6da20a3c614eb13270bed2d533aListed by the article as an Argamal RAT payload hash.
SHA15f1f3689bcf23de1b280b5f35712946da0f7978fListed by the article as an Argamal RAT payload hash.
SHA169331cfdac792dc79240e6a6bb6e803eabd70bebListed by the article as an Argamal RAT payload hash.
SHA176253fb55aed707440e808ea78e7101318436b1cListed by the article as an Argamal RAT payload hash.
SHA1901cfa97b1baaf908fd4a02bb52d970f576c4193Listed by the article as an Argamal RAT payload hash.
SHA1954722b0c9c678b1313d1f8b204e102842dc5889Listed by the article as an Argamal RAT payload hash.
SHA19803604ec45f31f9ef75bcca1e1310d8ac1fc3a6Listed as a Trojan downloader hash used in the campaign.
SHA1ae4601a19d28332a3ec6ac31b385cdf53be53450Listed by the article as an Argamal RAT payload hash.
SHA1c2d9d48b3b10bd58cdf5df9463e3ffcd60533ff3Listed by the article as an Argamal RAT payload hash.
SHA1d2cb0d7a9ad2b5d4ea7c2da8aec62beb37cf36d6Listed by the article as an Argamal RAT payload hash.
SHA1dad26f61da7b8bccc78364411812be74c025b475Listed by the article as an Argamal RAT payload hash.
SHA1e05f1767c2a337910ed75e90288838d6d0541164Listed by the article as an Argamal RAT payload hash.
SHA1e815a9b418d09c2d4bcd074c2c0bc21406eeb22fListed by the article as an Argamal RAT payload hash.
SHA1edce72f59e4c1d136cd1946af70d334c19df858dSHA1 of natives2_blob.bin, the malicious loader that executes the initial PowerShell stage.
SHA25676253fb55aed707440e808ea78e7101318436b1c1405a3c5e0aeb08012484134SHA256 identified for an Argamal RAT payload.
URLhxxps[:]//github[.]com/DnyP/filesGitHub repository identified by the article as a campaign delivery or hosting source.
URLhxxps[:]//github[.]com/gmz159/uGitHub repository identified by the article as used in the campaign to host or deliver payloads.
URLhxxps[:]//github[.]com/mgzv/pGitHub repository identified by the article as a campaign delivery or hosting source.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1012 · Query RegistryStage1 and Stage2 set, read, and remove registry values used to configure COM hijacking and locate payload files.T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationThe article describes Base64-encoded scripts, encrypted payloads, AES-CBC decryption, and string substitution used to obscure Argamal content.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelThe RAT can send files to the C2 or upload them to a specified server.T1053.005 · Scheduled TaskStage1 creates a scheduled task to launch Stage2 three days later; the malware also uses the Windows Color System calibration loader task for logon execution.T1057 · Process DiscoveryThe payload checks tasklist output for security software and sends process-list information to the C2.T1059.001 · PowerShellThe loader executes a Base64-encoded PowerShell Stage1, which sets persistence data and prepares the Stage2 downloader.T1082 · System Information DiscoveryThe RAT collects system details including architecture, OS version, hostname, display settings, and mounted-drive metadata.T1095 · Non-Application Layer ProtocolThe RAT exchanges heartbeat and command traffic with its C2 over UDP and uses a separate TCP connection in extended mode.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferStage2 uses bitsadmin.exe to download the encrypted zaesdl.dat payload from GitHub.T1106 · Native APIThe RAT executes received commands using Windows functions including ShellExecuteW, WinExec, and CreateProcessW.T1113 · Screen CaptureThe RAT can capture screenshots and send them to its C2 server.T1546.015 · Component Object Model HijackingArgamal persists by changing the InprocServer32 entry for a Windows Color System calibration COM object so the payload runs at logon.T1560.001 · Archive via UtilityRAT commands can compress selected files or folders into ZIP or TAR archives.T1571 · Non-Standard PortThe article identifies C2 communication on UDP ports 57441 and 63559 and TCP port 3747.

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