StrikeShark Campaign Uses SharkLoader to Deploy Cobalt Strike Beacon

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Summary

Kaspersky reports that StrikeShark uses SharkLoader to deploy Cobalt Strike Beacon after exploiting public-facing applications or using malicious droppers. The campaign targets organizations in multiple countries; no active data exfiltration has been observed.

Key points

  • Kaspersky tracks the campaign as StrikeShark and reports targets including diplomatic, government, and software development organizations across multiple countries.
  • Reported initial access routes include Exchange Server flaws CVE-2021-26855 and CVE-2021-27076, Openfire CVE-2023-32315, and GeoServer CVE-2024-36401.
  • The operators use web shells and DLL side-loading to deliver SharkLoader, or custom droppers disguised as legitimate installers; some droppers use decoy PDFs.
  • SharkLoader decrypts and loads DscCoreR.mui, which decompresses and launches Cobalt Strike Beacon in a suspended thread.
  • The malware uses API hooks involving Microsoft Detours and MinHook; the Sleep hook may help evade memory scanning, according to Kaspersky.
  • Post-compromise activity includes persistence through Registry Run keys and scheduled tasks, Active Directory enumeration, and credential theft targeting LSASS and the NTDS database.
  • Kaspersky reports no active data exfiltration observed so far; the campaign’s goals remain unclear, and attribution to a Chinese-speaking actor is an assessment rather than a confirmed identification.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • The campaign used known vulnerabilities in Exchange Server, Openfire, and GeoServer for initial access, including CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2023-32315, and CVE-2024-36401.
  • After gaining access, operators deployed web shells and used a DLL side-loading chain involving SystemSettings.exe and SystemSettings.dll to deliver SharkLoader.
  • Custom droppers masqueraded as legitimate software installers or applications, including Google Update and Cisco AnyConnect. Some droppers used decoy PDFs to encourage victims to open the malicious file.
  • SharkLoader decrypted and decompressed components used to load Cobalt Strike Beacon into a suspended thread; hooks on VirtualAlloc and Sleep were used during Beacon execution.
  • Operators used Registry Run keys and scheduled tasks to launch SystemSettings.exe, including at user logon.
  • Post-compromise activity included Active Directory enumeration, credential theft targeting LSASS and the NTDS database, and use of FScan, Searchall, and Pillager.

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