ASEC Details Vidar Infostealer Campaigns Targeting Korea in 2026

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Summary

ASEC analyzed Vidar phishing campaigns targeting Korea in the first half of 2026. A Go-based packer decrypts the infostealer in memory; Vidar uses Telegram and Steam profiles to find its C&C server and steals credentials, browser data, tokens, and files.

Key points

  • ASEC observed Vidar distribution campaigns targeting Korea in the first half of 2026 and assessed that the campaigns likely involved the same threat actor.
  • Phishing emails used job-application and copyright-infringement themes, with resume-like text and executable attachments disguised with a Word document icon.
  • A Go-based packer decrypts and executes Vidar in memory; the malware also uses obfuscation, NtGlobalFlag checks, and VM and sandbox checks.
  • Vidar uses a Dead Drop Resolver: it checks Telegram and Steam profile pages for a C&C address, using a hard-coded marker to identify it.
  • The malware can download additional configuration, payloads, or commands from its C&C server, including lists of targeted browsers, plugins, wallets, and files.
  • ASEC found Vidar targeting browser credentials, cookies and history, FTP client credentials, cryptocurrency-related files, Discord, Telegram and Steam data, Azure data, and screenshots.
  • ASEC advises caution with email attachments and unknown executables and recommends keeping V3 updated.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Phishing emails used job-application and copyright-infringement themes, with resume-like body text and executable attachments disguised with a Word document icon.
  • When a victim ran the attachment, a Go-based packer decrypted Vidar in memory and executed it.
  • Vidar retrieved its C&C address from attacker-posted Telegram and Steam profile pages using a hard-coded marker string.
  • Vidar collected browser data, credentials, cookies, history, screenshots, cryptocurrency-related files, Discord, Telegram and Steam data, and Azure data, then transmitted stolen information to its C&C server.
Defensive Notes
  • Exercise extreme caution with email attachments and executable files from unknown sources.
  • Keep V3 updated to the latest version.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINctl[.]it-bd[.]comCampaign-related domain listed by ASEC in the indicators of compromise.
DOMAINfrr[.]ambil-disini[.]web[.]idCampaign-related domain listed by ASEC in the indicators of compromise.
DOMAINgor[.]emiraride[.]comCampaign-related domain listed by ASEC in the indicators of compromise.
DOMAINgre[.]syslicense[.]netCampaign-related domain listed by ASEC in the indicators of compromise.
DOMAINlat[.]sodstreams[.]comCampaign-related domain listed by ASEC in the indicators of compromise.
IPV4107[.]189[.]24[.]190C&C server IP address listed in ASEC's indicators of compromise.
MD50b8af4afd26175ba818c0fdb4622bf14MD5 hash listed by ASEC for a Vidar malware sample.
MD51bbf1e83eea55e70d59f0d633789011eMD5 hash listed by ASEC for a Vidar malware sample.
MD52fba9ec34fdf4b1584dd9c69b9ec9393MD5 hash listed by ASEC for a Vidar malware sample.
MD54e885b1a0c1d0636e940b4af20fdc8dbMD5 hash listed by ASEC for a Vidar malware sample.
MD5536dd0b0f6dff75dc01869df9809df61MD5 hash listed by ASEC for a Vidar malware sample.
URLhxxp[:]//107[.]189[.]24[.]190/C&C server URL listed in ASEC's indicators of compromise.
URLhxxps[:]//steamcommunity[.]com/profiles/76561198694626397Specific Steam profile page used by Vidar to retrieve the C&C address.
URLhxxps[:]//steamcommunity[.]com/profiles/76561198698223785Specific Steam profile page used by Vidar to retrieve the C&C address.
URLhxxps[:]//steamcommunity[.]com/profiles/76561198703616215Specific Steam profile page used by Vidar to retrieve the C&C address.
URLhxxps[:]//steamcommunity[.]com/profiles/76561198706525776Specific Steam profile page used by Vidar to retrieve the C&C address.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1005 · Data from Local SystemVidar collected local browser databases, application data, wallet files, and other targeted files from the infected system.T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationVidar variants used obfuscated code and data to hinder analysis.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelVidar transmitted collected information, including information.Txt and other stolen files, to its C&C server.T1102.001 · Dead Drop ResolverVidar accessed attacker-posted Telegram and Steam profile pages to obtain its actual C&C server address.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferVidar could download additional payloads or commands from its C&C server.T1113 · Screen CaptureVidar captured and exfiltrated screenshots.T1119 · Automated CollectionVidar automatically collected data specified by configuration, including browser information, wallet files, screenshots, and files matching grabber criteria.T1140 · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationThe Go-based packer decrypted the embedded Vidar payload before executing it in memory.T1204.002 · Malicious FileThe malicious attachment ran when a victim executed the executable disguised with a Word document icon.T1497.001 · System ChecksVidar checked CPU, RAM, and disk usage to detect virtual environments or sandboxes.T1539 · Steal Web Session CookieVidar collected web browser cookies, including Chromium and Firefox cookie data.T1555.003 · Credentials from Web BrowsersVidar collected Chromium-based saved logins and related browser credential data.T1566.001 · Spearphishing AttachmentThe campaign delivered Vidar through phishing emails with executable attachments and job-application or copyright-infringement lures.T1622 · Debugger EvasionVidar used NtGlobalFlag checks as an anti-debugging measure.

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