GigaWiper Combines Three Wiping Methods With Spyware Capabilities

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Summary

Microsoft’s analysis describes GigaWiper, a Windows backdoor combining three destructive methods with surveillance and remote control. Binary Defense links the same samples to BLUERABBIT and, citing Google’s Threat Intelligence Group, assesses a likely Iran-nexus link.

Key points

  • GigaWiper offers three destructive options: raw disk wiping, repeated overwriting of the Windows drive, and fake ransomware that encrypts files without saving a recovery key.
  • The backdoor can capture screenshots and screen recordings, provide hidden VNC control, collect system details, manage services, edit the registry, and erase Windows event logs.
  • It masquerades as OneDrive, creates a scheduled task that runs every minute, and uses RabbitMQ, Redis, and MinIO for command traffic, results, and exfiltration.
  • Microsoft and Binary Defense list the same four file hashes and matching command servers for GigaWiper and BLUERABBIT.
  • Binary Defense, citing Google’s Threat Intelligence Group, assesses a likely Iran-nexus connection targeting Israeli organizations; Microsoft does not name a country.
  • Suggested detection signals include the recurring OneDrive Update task, RabbitMQ or Redis traffic from ordinary desktops, and unexpected use of takeown and icacls on Windows boot files.
  • Microsoft recommends tamper protection, endpoint detection in block mode, cloud-delivered protection, automatic remediation, and blocking the two known command-server IPs.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • GigaWiper is run after an attacker has gained access to a Windows system; the article does not specify the initial access method.
  • The backdoor accepts numbered commands for disk wiping, overwriting the Windows drive, or destructive fake-ransomware encryption.
  • The backdoor can take screenshots, record the screen, and provide hidden VNC control.
  • GigaWiper uses a recurring OneDrive Update scheduled task for persistence and disguises itself as OneDrive.
  • Command traffic uses RabbitMQ for tasking, Redis for results, and MinIO for exfiltration.
Defensive Notes
  • Look for a OneDrive Update scheduled task that runs every minute and the registry key HKCUSOFTWAREOneDriveEnvironment.
  • Investigate RabbitMQ or Redis traffic originating from ordinary desktop systems rather than servers.
  • Investigate use of takeown and icacls against Windows boot files such as bootmgr and ntoskrnl.exe outside maintenance windows.
  • Block the two reported command servers: 185.182.193[.]21 and 212.8.248[.]104.
  • Microsoft recommends enabling tamper protection, running endpoint detection in block mode, and enabling cloud-delivered protection and automatic remediation.
  • Maintain clean, offline backups; the article says wiped drives and files encrypted without a saved key cannot be recovered through decryption.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV4185[.]182[.]193[.]21Reported command server that Microsoft recommends defenders block.
IPV4212[.]8[.]248[.]104Reported command server that Microsoft recommends defenders block.

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