Team Cymru Maps Yurei Ransomware Operators’ Toolkit and Attack Chain

Summary
Team Cymru analyzed files from two Yurei operator open directories, mapping likely credential use, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, persistence, defense evasion and lateral movement. The directories suggest activity in January 2026, though no new victims had been.
Key points
- Team Cymru identified two open directories associated with Yurei operators between December 2025 and January 2026, then analyzed their files and related sandbox submissions.
- File names led researchers to assess, with medium confidence, that stolen credentials may have been used for initial access; they also found tools for network discovery, share enumeration and sensitive-file searches.
- The toolkit included Rubeus and Invoke-TheHash for credential abuse, and PsExec and Invoke-SMBExec for remote execution and lateral movement.
- FixingIssues2.ps1 attempts to disable Windows Defender protections, delete shadow copies and disable System Restore.
- Vecna.ps1 uses a WMI trigger to launch StrangerThings.exe at explorer.exe startup; researchers identified that binary as Yurei ransomware written in Go.
- The server also contained SDelete, which could be used to hinder recovery or remove forensic evidence. Researchers could not recover w.exe to determine whether it was an Akira sample.
- RansomwareLive's analysis found three victims listed on the Yurei leak site since it appeared in September 2025; no victims had been posted since September, although the open directories may indicate operator activity in January 2026.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- The operators likely used stolen credentials for initial access; this assessment is based on ZIP filenames suggesting infostealer logs or credential databases and is stated with medium confidence.
- Network discovery and enumeration used SoftPerfect NetScan, NetExec, Everything.exe, and the Host_Discovery.ps1 script to identify servers, enumerate shares and users, and search for sensitive files.
- Rubeus was present for Kerberos-related activity, including AS-REP Roasting and Kerberoasting; Invoke-TheHash.ps1 supported pass-the-hash tasks.
- Persistence tooling included AnyDesk and a WMI trigger created by Vecna.ps1 to run StrangerThings.exe when explorer.exe starts.
- FixingIssues2.ps1 attempted to weaken Windows security protections, exclude paths and execution engines, delete shadow copies, and disable System Restore through Registry changes.
- PsExec and Invoke-SMBExec.ps1 were present for remote execution and movement to other systems.
- StrangerThings.exe was identified as Yurei ransomware; it encrypts files and drops README_Yurei.txt. The operators also ran a Tor data leak site for double extortion.
- Defensive Notes
- The article recommends using threat-hunting efforts to track tools listed in the Ransomware Tool Matrix and focus on what to block, detect, and hunt for.
- The article describes proactive internet telemetry and targeted open-port scanning as ways to identify live assets and operational infrastructure.
- Investigate suspected use of stolen credentials, credential-theft tooling, remote execution utilities, and scripts that disable security protections or delete recovery data.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| IPV4 | 44[.]210[.]101[.]86 | Yurei operator server hosting an open directory, observed by Team Cymru. |
| IPV4 | 44[.]223[.]40[.]182 | Yurei operator server hosting an open directory, observed by Team Cymru. |
| SHA256 | 1facf7cdd94eed0a8a11b30f4237699385b20578339c68df01e542d772ccbce5 | Hash of Host_Discovery.ps1, an internal enumeration script found on the Yurei operator server. |
| SHA256 | 26f51df1a12230b6bb583f3003c102a79106b049f89d9b9d43c6e85e072bd99e | Hash of Vecna.ps1, the script reported to establish persistence by executing StrangerThings.exe. |
| SHA256 | 4f88d3977a24fb160fc3ba69821287a197ae9b04493d705dc2fe939442ba6461 | Hash of StrangerThings.exe, identified as a Yurei ransomware binary. |
| SHA256 | ebfe75ab3223b036a4b886d497f2b172425b3e63890d485c99353773d4c436ea | Hash of FixingIssues2.ps1, a script found on the Yurei operator server that attempts to disable security protections and remove recovery options. |
MITRE ATT&CK
T1021.002 · SMB/Windows Admin SharesInvoke-SMBExec.ps1 and PsExec were present for remote execution on other hosts, including movement to sensitive systems.T1046 · Network Service DiscoverySoftPerfect NetScan was among the tools used to identify servers and scan IP, SNMP, and NetBIOS services.T1059.001 · PowerShellThe operator toolkit included PowerShell scripts for host discovery, defense evasion, SMB execution, and persistence.T1078 · Valid AccountsThe article assesses with medium confidence that the operator likely used stolen credentials for one initial-access method.T1083 · File and Directory DiscoveryEverything.exe was used to search for files containing keywords related to sensitive content.T1112 · Modify RegistryFixingIssues2.ps1 modifies the Registry through Group Policy to disable System Restore.T1135 · Network Share DiscoveryNetExec was used to enumerate network shares.T1486 · Data Encrypted for ImpactStrangerThings.exe was identified as Yurei ransomware, which encrypts files on the affected system.T1490 · Inhibit System RecoveryFixingIssues2.ps1 runs vssadmin to delete shadow copies and modifies the Registry to disable System Restore.T1546.003 · Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionVecna.ps1 creates a hidden WMI trigger that runs StrangerThings.exe when explorer.exe starts.T1550.002 · Pass the HashInvoke-TheHash.ps1 was present for pass-the-hash tasks on remote hosts.T1558.003 · KerberoastingRubeus was present, and the article identifies Kerberoasting as one of its Kerberos abuse capabilities.T1558.004 · AS-REP RoastingRubeus was present, and the article identifies AS-REP Roasting as one of its Kerberos abuse capabilities.T1562.001 · Disable or Modify ToolsFixingIssues2.ps1 attempts to add broad exclusions and turn off Windows security features, including real-time and behavior monitoring.
Malware
Prince Ransomwareleak site with a low number of victims listed at the time of writing. It is reportedly derived from Prince Ransomware, an open-source ransomware family written in Go. Check Point researchers noted that all samples wereSatanLockv2possibly uploaded by the developer themselves. Yurei ransomware samples also contained a link to SatanLockv2, based on the presence of the PDB path string “D:\satanlockv2” present in the Yurei samples.YureiActive since September 2025, Yurei is a double extortion ransomware campaign. The operators run their own Tor data leak site with a low number of victims listed at the time of writing. It is reportedly derived from
Products
AnyDeska number of tools to allow the attacker to maintain access even if the initial entry point is closed. AnyDesk, a legitimate remote desktop software used as a backdoor that often bypasses traditional antivirus andMicrosoft Windowswhich was written to evade security systems and is shown in the image below. It targets Windows Defender and attempts to prompt it to ignore most things, such as the entire C:\ drive, common tempWindows Defenderwhich was written to evade security systems and is shown in the image below. It targets Windows Defender and attempts to prompt it to ignore most things, such as the entire C:\ drive, common temp folders,
Tools
Everything.exeused to assess networks and enumerate shares and users, is used by the adversary as well. Tools like Everything.exe are also used to instantly search for files containing keywords for sensitive content. A PowerShellFixingIssues2.ps1FixingIssues2.ps1 (kills Windows security software such as Defender and a free backup tool SysRestore)Host_Discovery.ps1Host_Discovery.ps1 (Internal enumeration script)Invoke-TheHash.ps1Invoke-TheHash.ps1: A PowerShell script for passing-the-hash (PtH) tasks to perform actions on remote hosts without a plaintext password.NetExectools they may deploy is SoftPerfect NetScan, a fast, multi-threaded IP, SNMP, and NetBIOS scanner. NetExec (nxc.exe), another tool used to assess networks and enumerate shares and users, is used by the adversaryPsExecmove from the initial workstation to a Domain Controller or other sensitive system such as a file server. PsExec, a classic Sysinternals tool used to execute processes on other systems was present as well as aRubeusRubeus.exe.bak: A toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses (AS-REP Roasting, Kerberoasting).SDeleteSDelete (sdelete.exe) was also found on the server, which is a tool primarily used for securely deleting data from storage devices, making it unrecoverable. Microsoft develops it as part of Windows SysInternals.SoftPerfect NetScanand locate sensitive data inside the target environment. One of the first tools they may deploy is SoftPerfect NetScan, a fast, multi-threaded IP, SNMP, and NetBIOS scanner. NetExec (nxc.exe), another tool used toVecna.ps1On the Yurei server, we discovered a Stranger Things-themed PowerShell script called Vecna.ps1. The script's primary purpose is to establish permanent persistence on a Windows machine by creating a hidden trigger withinwinPEAStraditional antivirus and endpoint detection and response (EDR), was present Another tool called winPEAS as also identified, which is built for privilege escalation and can ensure the attacker has a high level
