Dysphoria IoT Botnet Uses Blockchain C2 and Infected-Device Relays

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Summary

Researchers describe Dysphoria’s spread through weak IoT credentials and flaws, and its use of blockchain records and infected-device relays. Reported bot counts and attack capacity have not been independently verified.

Key points

  • Researchers trace Dysphoria’s lineage to JackSkid after a March law-enforcement disruption.
  • The botnet uses Ethereum Name Service and Solana Name Service records to resolve command-and-control infrastructure.
  • Infected devices relay traffic between bots and controllers, adding a layer that complicates disruption.
  • Researchers report propagation through weak Telnet and SSH credentials and known IoT remote-code-execution flaws.
  • A relay-only variant uses UPnP port mapping and Linux epoll to forward traffic.
  • Reported population and attack-capacity figures have not been independently reproduced; researchers name no operator.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Dysphoria spreads by guessing weak Telnet and SSH credentials on IoT devices.
  • The botnet exploits known remote-code-execution flaws in routers, gateways, and cameras; CVE-2025-9528 in the Linksys E1700 is cited as an example, although the article says its role in propagation is unexplained.
  • Dysphoria uses Ethereum Name Service and Solana Name Service records for command-and-control resolution.
  • Infected devices relay traffic between external connections and remote C2 services, obscuring the controllers behind distribution nodes.
  • A relay-only variant uses UPnP port mapping to traverse NAT gateways.
Defensive Notes
  • Patch exposed IoT devices and replace devices that can no longer be updated.
  • Eliminate default and weak credentials.
  • Disable remote management and UPnP where they are not needed.

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