Federal Agencies Warn of Ongoing Attacks on PLCs in U.S. Critical Infrastructure

Summary
Federal agencies say attackers are exploiting internet-exposed PLCs across U.S. government, water, and energy sectors, using legitimate engineering software and manipulating operator displays. The updated advisory reports operational disruption and financial losses.
Key points
- The July 2026 advisory expands affected PLC manufacturers beyond Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley to include Schneider Electric and Siemens.
- Attackers scan for internet-exposed controllers and connect using legitimate engineering software and credentials, without relying on a software vulnerability.
- The activity alters controller logic and, in some cases, operator displays to conceal changes from personnel.
- Agencies report confirmed operational disruption and financial losses, unlike the largely disruption-free 2023 campaign.
- The advisory adds guidance for detecting malicious changes hidden in reusable code modules.
- Recommended steps include removing PLCs from direct internet access, securing remote access with MFA, checking logs for listed indicators, and maintaining offline backups.
Article Details
- Event Type
- Ongoing exploitation of internet-exposed programmable logic controllers (PLCs), involving changes to controller logic and, in some cases, operator displays.
- Impact
- The article reports confirmed operational disruption and financial loss for some affected organizations. Targeted sectors include U.S. government facilities, water systems, and energy infrastructure.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| DOMAIN | ocferda[.]com | Listed as a C&C server and in the article's C&C DNS-resolution query. |
| DOMAIN | tylarion867mino[.]com | Listed as a C&C server and in the article's C&C DNS-resolution query. |
| DOMAIN | uuokhhfsdlk[.]tylarion867mino[.]com | Listed as a C&C server and as a matching hostname in the article's C&C DNS-resolution query. |
| IPV4 | 135[.]136[.]1[.]133 | Listed as a C&C server in the CISA-sourced indicators. |
| IPV4 | 141[.]11[.]164[.]153 | Listed as a C&C server in the CISA-sourced indicators. |
| IPV4 | 175[.]110[.]121[.]107 | Listed as a C&C server in the CISA-sourced indicators. |
| IPV4 | 175[.]110[.]121[.]39 | Listed as a C&C server in the CISA-sourced indicators. |
| IPV4 | 175[.]110[.]121[.]41 | Listed as a CISA-sourced indicator with detection label “Computers/Internet”; no more specific malicious role is stated. |
| IPV4 | 175[.]110[.]121[.]42 | Listed as a C&C server in the CISA-sourced indicators. |
| IPV4 | 185[.]225[.]17[.]225 | Listed as a C&C server in the CISA-sourced indicators. |
| IPV4 | 185[.]82[.]73[.]162 | Listed as a C&C server in the CISA-sourced indicators. |
| IPV4 | 185[.]82[.]73[.]164 | Listed as a C&C server in the CISA-sourced indicators. |
| IPV4 | 185[.]82[.]73[.]165 | Listed as a C&C server in the CISA-sourced indicators. |
| IPV4 | 185[.]82[.]73[.]167 | Listed as a C&C server in the CISA-sourced indicators. |
| IPV4 | 185[.]82[.]73[.]168 | Listed as a C&C server in the CISA-sourced indicators. |
| IPV4 | 185[.]82[.]73[.]170 | Listed as a C&C server in the CISA-sourced indicators. |
| IPV4 | 185[.]82[.]73[.]171 | Listed as a C&C server in the CISA-sourced indicators. |
| IPV4 | 185[.]82[.]73[.]175 | Listed as a C&C server in the CISA-sourced indicators. |
| IPV4 | 192[.]142[.]54[.]79 | Listed as a CISA-sourced indicator with detection label “Computers/Internet”; no more specific malicious role is stated. |
| IPV4 | 79[.]133[.]46[.]209 | Listed as a C&C server in the CISA-sourced indicators. |
| IPV4 | 84[.]200[.]205[.]165 | Listed as a CISA-sourced indicator with detection label “Computers/Internet”; no more specific malicious role is stated. |
| IPV4 | 88[.]80[.]150[.]199 | Listed as a C&C server in the CISA-sourced indicators. |
| IPV4 | 88[.]80[.]150[.]200 | Listed as a C&C server in the CISA-sourced indicators. |
| IPV4 | 88[.]80[.]150[.]202 | Listed as a C&C server in the CISA-sourced indicators. |
| SHA1 | 366e435a1ea0f597deb6ebe7c0c5acdb6e8b33eb | File hash listed with the detection name Backdoor.Linux.IOCONTROL.CIGBCBF. |
| SHA1 | 95bd07b4400095acdafce05888da27228d7d07ca | File hash listed with the detection name Trojan.Win64.MALPDB.A. |
Threat Actors
CyberAv3ngersNamed as the group responsible for the 2023 PLC compromises; the article says current activity is consistent with those attacks but stops short of formally naming the same group.Hydro KittenIdentified in the article as another name used to track CyberAv3ngers.Shahid Kaveh GroupIdentified in the article as another name used to track CyberAv3ngers.Storm-0784Identified in the article as another name used to track CyberAv3ngers.
Malware
Vendors
Rockwell AutomationThe July 2026 update widens the manufacturer scope beyond Rockwell Automation / Allen-Bradley to include Schneider Electric and Siemens equipment, and adds detection guidance for malicious changes hidden in shared,Schneider Electric2026 update widens the manufacturer scope beyond Rockwell Automation / Allen-Bradley to include Schneider Electric and Siemens equipment, and adds detection guidance for malicious changes hidden in shared, reusableSiemensthe manufacturer scope beyond Rockwell Automation / Allen-Bradley to include Schneider Electric and Siemens equipment, and adds detection guidance for malicious changes hidden in shared, reusable code modules.
Products
CompactLogixWider scope: The advisory’s original April 2026 publication centered on Rockwell Automation / Allen-Bradley CompactLogix and Micro850 controllers.Micro850Wider scope: The advisory’s original April 2026 publication centered on Rockwell Automation / Allen-Bradley CompactLogix and Micro850 controllers.STEP 7102 (ISO-TSAP, primarily used by Siemens STEP 7 and the S7comm protocol, though other protocols such as ICCP also run over it)Studio 5000 Logix DesignerOn Rockwell Automation / Allen-Bradley equipment, it’s a binary .ACD file, built in Studio 5000 Logix Designer, that stores much more than the logic alone: the ladder logic plus the tag database, I/O and controllerTIA PortalRockwell operators should follow the current SD1771 guidance; Siemens operators should configure protection in TIA Portal.
Countries
Industries
EnergyTargeted sectors include government facilities, water systems, and energy infrastructure across the U.S.GovernmentTargeted sectors include government facilities, water systems, and energy infrastructure across the U.S.waterTargeted sectors include government facilities, water systems, and energy infrastructure across the U.S.