Researchers Show How Microsoft Defender’s BTR.sys Driver Can Remove Security Software at Boot

· Original article ↗

Summary

Check Point researchers reverse-engineered Defender’s BTR.sys boot-remediation driver and showed BTR_CLI can use it for kernel-level file and registry changes, including deleting security software at reboot. It requires SeLoadDriverPrivilege; no real-world abuse was—

Key points

  • BTR.sys is embedded in Microsoft Defender and is present on Windows 7 through Windows 11 25H2; the technique uses a built-in driver rather than an externally imported driver or a software flaw.
  • Researchers reverse-engineered the driver’s undocumented protocol, finding its configuration transactions use RC4 encryption with a hard-coded key.
  • BTR_CLI extracts BTR.sys from Defender’s MpEngine.dll and installs it through direct registry writes, bypassing Service Control Manager installation logging, including Event ID 7045.
  • The driver can perform kernel-level file and registry operations. A reboot trigger can run in a “golden window” before Defender’s user-mode services start, allowing security binaries to be removed.
  • The technique requires an administrator account with SeLoadDriverPrivilege. Check Point demonstrated BTR_CLI removing Defender components from a fully updated Windows 11 25H2 system with Tamper Protection active.
  • Check Point identified Sysmon and Windows event patterns that may indicate abuse and recommends restricting SeLoadDriverPrivilege.
  • Check Point reported no evidence of real-world abuse. It said Microsoft did not consider the findings eligible for immediate servicing; a claim that no patch is planned appears in the tool repository and was not publicly confirmed by Microsoft.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • BTR_CLI extracts the embedded BTR.sys driver from MpEngine.dll and builds an encrypted transaction using the driver’s undocumented protocol.
  • The technique requires an administrator account with SeLoadDriverPrivilege.
  • BTR_CLI installs the driver service through direct HKLM registry writes, bypassing the Service Control Manager and its Event ID 7045 logging.
  • BTR.sys can perform kernel-level file and registry operations, including deleting locked files and security binaries; a trigger can also schedule operations for the next reboot.
Defensive Notes
  • Check Point Research recommends restricting assignment of SeLoadDriverPrivilege.
  • Monitor for Sysmon Event ID 15 writing a .sys:changelist stream, and service-key creation with an Args value containing :changelist and Group set to Boot Bus Extender, especially without Windows Event ID 7045.
  • Monitor for rapid creation and deletion of SystemRootTempBootClean.log by the System process (PID 4), and for Sysmon Event ID 6 followed by Event ID 23 attributed to PID 4.
  • Check Point Research says BTR.sys cannot be blocklisted or blocked with WDAC without disrupting Defender. The research says Microsoft MSRC did not consider the findings eligible for immediate servicing; the claim that no patch is planned comes from the BTR_CLI repository and is not publicly confirmed by Microsoft.

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