DenoGate Backdoor Delivered Through Microsoft Teams IT-Helpdesk Impersonation

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Summary

eSentire analyzed a campaign that used email bombing and Microsoft Teams helpdesk impersonation to trick a retail customer into installing DenoGate, a Deno-based backdoor capable of command execution, persistence, and TCP tunneling.

Key points

  • In June 2026, eSentire identified the campaign targeting a retail customer. Attackers flooded victims with spam, then posed as IT helpdesk staff through Microsoft Teams.
  • The attackers sent a purported patch hosted on Amazon S3 and instructed victims to download and run it; the archive contained DenoGate files and the Deno runtime.
  • DenoGate uses a WebSocket connection to a CloudFront-based command-and-control server and sends victim details, including domain, username, computer name, and network information.
  • Its modules support command execution through cmd.exe, persistence through the Windows HKCU Run registry key, and TCP tunneling that can route connections through the victim’s device.
  • eSentire’s analysts isolated the affected host and assisted with remediation. The company said it was monitoring related campaigns and developing detection content.
  • The report recommends restricting or requiring approval for external Microsoft Teams contacts and using endpoint detection and response capabilities.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Email bombing followed by Microsoft Teams messages or calls in which operators impersonated the victim organization's IT helpdesk.
  • Victims were sent an Amazon S3-hosted page with instructions to download, unpack, and execute an archive named patch01309.txt containing the DenoGate backdoor.
  • DenoGate maintained C2 communications over WebSockets and exposed local HTTP endpoints for command execution and TCP tunneling.
Defensive Notes
  • Restrict or disable external Microsoft Teams messaging from unrecognized tenants where feasible; at minimum, require explicit approval before accepting contacts from external organizations.
  • Use a 24/7 multi-signal MDR provider, or at minimum NGAV or EDR, to detect and contain threats.
  • eSentire reported that its SOC analysts isolated the affected host and assisted with remediation.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINd1mjrkjsk5qy13[.]cloudfront[.]netDenoGate command-and-control domain.
SHA256ff5a477871a4b83e2b38e660f28ef998680dcb6ba21fddff3e3f66c04ffc3596SHA-256 of the DenoGate archive identified as patch01309.txt.

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