Huntress Finds Attackers Reused Tactics in CrushFTP and CentreStack Intrusions

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Summary

Huntress compared intrusions exploiting CrushFTP and CentreStack/Triofox, finding shared infrastructure and tools despite different file-transfer methods. In some incidents, security tools detected and quarantined files before further activity.

Key points

  • Huntress observed CrushFTP and CentreStack/Triofox exploitation in April 2025, with the same source IP, 2.58.56.16, appearing in activity involving both products.
  • In CrushFTP incidents, logs showed files d3d11.dll and the Mesh Agent installer transferred from the source IP. Windows Defender quarantined d3d11.dll before analysts observed it loading.
  • Some Mesh Agent installations were configured to connect to rtb[.]mftadsrvr[.]com:2087.
  • In CentreStack/Triofox incidents, attackers used base64-encoded PowerShell commands to download files, including Centre.exe, which Defender detected as Cobalt Strike and quarantined.
  • Huntress found that Centre.exe, identified as the Wallpaper Engine Launcher, referenced d3d11.dll in its import table, indicating it was intended to sideload the DLL.
  • Huntress suggests the attacker may have changed file-transfer methods after earlier incidents were contained; it also observed an incident where initial access was gained on an endpoint without its agent installed.
  • Huntress recommends maintaining an asset inventory, reducing attack surface, patching and configuring necessary applications, and deploying monitoring and response capabilities across endpoints.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Exploitation of CVE-2025-31161 in CrushFTP for initial access.
  • Exploitation of the Gladinet CentreStack and Triofox vulnerability, CVE-2025-30406, for initial access.
  • Use of base64-encoded PowerShell commands to download files to compromised endpoints.
  • Attempted DLL side-loading: Centre.exe referenced d3d11.dll in its import table and was intended to load the DLL.
Defensive Notes
  • Huntress recommends inventorying physical and virtual assets, installed applications, and their versions.
  • Reduce the attack surface by removing unnecessary applications, patching and properly configuring required applications, and installing monitoring, detection, and response capabilities on all endpoints.
  • In the reported incidents, Windows Defender detected and quarantined d3d11.dll and a process identified as Cobalt Strike; monitored endpoints were isolated.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINrtb[.]mftadsrvr[.]comEndpoint configured as the Mesh Agent connection destination.
IPV4196[.]251[.]85[.]31Reported threat-actor source of tool downloads.
IPV42[.]58[.]56[.]16Reported threat-actor source IP used in CrushFTP and CentreStack incident activity.

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