OCI Identity Domains Flaw Let User Managers Create Administrator API Keys

· Original article ↗

Summary

A researcher found that an OCI User Manager could create an identity domain administrator’s API key, enabling privilege escalation. Oracle deployed a fix, which the researcher validated on June 10, 2026.

Key points

  • The flaw let Identity Domain AppRole permissions bypass protections that blocked lower-level administrators from changing an Identity Domain Administrator’s email or resetting their password.
  • A User Manager could create an API key for the administrator through the Identity Domains SCIM API, gaining the ability to act with that user’s OCI access.
  • Testing indicated the privilege escalation required no traditional OCI IAM policy permissions for the lower-level user.
  • The issue involved two distinct authorization models: classic OCI IAM policies and Identity Domain AppRoles.
  • Oracle deployed fixes in June 2026; the researcher found the issue still reproducible after the first deployment, then confirmed it was resolved on June 10.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • A User Manager in an OCI Identity Domain could create an API key for an Identity Domain Administrator through the SCIM API, bypassing the intended administrator-role boundary and enabling privilege escalation.
  • The same lower-level role could create SMTP credentials and auth tokens for the administrator.
Defensive Notes
  • Oracle reported deploying fixes on June 4 and June 8, 2026; the researcher confirmed the issue was resolved in their environment on June 10, 2026.
  • The fix addressed the AppRole-based privilege-escalation path. The article says it does not prevent API-key creation when the caller has appropriate OCI IAM policy permissions.

MITRE ATT&CK

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