ClickFix Delivers macOS Malware That Steals Credentials and Drains Crypto Wallets

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Summary

Huntress analyzed a ClickFix infection that delivered a Go-based macOS stealer. It targets Keychain and browser credentials and can siphon cryptocurrency to attacker-controlled wallets; the campaign used infrastructure linked to sanctioned Aeza Group.

Key points

  • A victim was tricked by a fake CAPTCHA into pasting a command into Terminal, launching a shell-script loader.
  • The loader profiled the Mac and downloaded a Mach-O payload tailored to the CPU architecture.
  • The malware scrapes browser password stores, Apple Keychain data, cookies, and other cached credentials.
  • Its DRAIN function can redirect part or all of supported cryptocurrency wallet balances to attacker-controlled addresses.
  • The malware establishes persistence through macOS background-task mechanisms and can prompt victims for their passwords.
  • Delivery, hosting, and command-and-control infrastructure were linked to Aeza Group, which was sanctioned by the US, UK, and Australia.
  • Huntress recommends user education against fake CAPTCHA commands; suspected infections should be reported to IT and the device isolated.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • A ClickFix social-engineering popup impersonated a CAPTCHA and instructed the target to paste and execute a command in macOS Terminal.
  • The command downloaded and ran a Bash profiler/loader, which collected system information and fetched a CPU-architecture-matched macOS stealer.
  • The malware stole credentials from browser password stores, Apple Keychain, and cached browser credentials, and could redirect cryptocurrency wallet funds to attacker-controlled wallets.
  • The malware established persistence through the Background Task Management subsystem and prompted the victim for credentials using an osascript dialogue.
Defensive Notes
  • Use malicious-script mitigation browser add-ons, DNS blocking for known-bad domains, and user education about fake CAPTCHA prompts that request terminal commands.
  • If a user runs a ClickFix command, notify the IT team immediately and isolate the affected machine.
  • Remediation can include deleting any remaining malware binaries; the article states the malware does not spontaneously reconstitute after deletion.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINprofitnow[.]ioDomain used during the ClickFix phase to deliver the malicious command.
IPV4138[.]124[.]118[.]69Aeza Group address used by the stealer for exfiltration and C2.
IPV4193[.]29[.]224[.]151Aeza Group address used to host and deliver the loader.
IPV477[.]221[.]152[.]34Aeza Group address used to host and deliver payloads.
SHA2565bad988affc1094f12b8b8bed659ef55b20e2988eb25441e1c1b34dd03b3eb52SHA-256 of the profiler/loader Bash script.
SHA256619a99ba4ee9d7f33db8045c7e03c4265424977993fe8a53b0f45157c5abd3e5SHA-256 of the x86_64 stealer executable.
SHA256b43a909a01e954d6549558f2f7e9bb58e34959a0ae229f340d61091ab726bbd3SHA-256 of a payload the article says was deployed for persistence.
SHA256f0062f7e70e61493684a2f60748a475168e155bc2502163c844c42e87692abd0SHA-256 of the ARM64 stealer executable.
URLhxxp[:]//193[.]29[.]224[.]151/92392991a0cca55?force=1Loader-download URL embedded in the ClickFix command.

MITRE ATT&CK

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