Open Directory Reveals Phishing Campaign Targeting Google and Naver Credentials

· Original article ↗

Summary

Hunt analyzed an open directory hosting Google and Naver phishing pages, a modified Xeno-RAT sample, and victim data. Infrastructure and tactics show overlaps with Kimsuky, though attribution remains uncertain.

Key points

  • The campaign used spoofed domains and crafted URL paths to host fake Google and Naver login pages that prompted users to re-enter credentials.
  • Google phishing pages used an iframe mimicking a temporary login error; the Naver page appeared unfinished.
  • An exposed upload directory contained a modified Xeno-RAT sample configured with the server's IP and port 4444.
  • The directory also exposed KakaoTalk chats, screenshots, and cryptocurrency transaction records.
  • Infrastructure and tactics overlapped with activity associated with Kimsuky, but the actor's identity was not confirmed.
  • Google Safe Browsing flagged the spoofed Binance site, after which the operators shifted to custom phishing paths.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Phishing pages spoofing Google and Naver login experiences prompted users to re-enter credentials.
  • The campaign used crafted URL paths, redirects, and iframes to present fake login pages and transmit submitted credentials to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
  • A domain spoofing Binance was registered and used to host cloned content; after Google Safe Browsing marked the site malicious, the actor moved to targeted phishing pages.
  • A modified Xeno-RAT sample was found in the open directory. The article says it was configured to communicate with the directory's IP address on port 4444.
Defensive Notes
  • Remain vigilant for cloned websites, redirects, and login pages that request credentials after claiming a temporary communication error.
  • The article reports that Google Safe Browsing marked the spoofed site as malicious.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINbinace[.]homesSpoofed Binance domain used to host campaign content and phishing pages.
DOMAINgcuser[.]euDomain identified in the campaign's rewrite rules and infrastructure analysis.
DOMAINgduser[.]euDomain identified in the campaign's rewrite rules and infrastructure analysis.
DOMAINgeuser[.]euDomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
DOMAINghuser[.]euDomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
DOMAINgiuser[.]euDomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
DOMAINgjuser[.]euDomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
DOMAINhogmasil[.]lolDomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
DOMAINjandfolg[.]lolDomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
DOMAINkortiosdfp[.]lolDomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
DOMAINmasnail[.]shopCampaign domain hosting an open directory that mirrored phishing folders and iframes.
DOMAINmmori[.]lolDomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
DOMAINnaverscorp[.]shopDomain listed as campaign infrastructure associated with Naver-targeting phishing.
DOMAINnavincteam[.]shopDomain listed as campaign infrastructure associated with Naver-targeting phishing.
DOMAINncallserveiqnxme[.]storeDomain listed as campaign infrastructure associated with Naver-targeting phishing.
HOSTNAMEaccount[.]binace[.]homesSubdomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
HOSTNAMEccid[.]navincteam[.]shopSubdomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
HOSTNAMEgoto2corp[.]binace[.]homesSubdomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
HOSTNAMEkidsmanagement-pa[.]client6[.]binace[.]homesSubdomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
HOSTNAMEmil[.]masnail[.]shopSubdomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
HOSTNAMEnid[.]navincteam[.]shopSubdomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
HOSTNAMEpolicy[.]navincteam[.]shopSubdomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
HOSTNAMEsoundcaptchanidid[.]navincteam[.]shopSubdomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
HOSTNAMEstuff[.]gduser[.]euRewrite-rule destination host used to serve campaign content.
HOSTNAMEstuff[.]ilk[.]gduser[.]euExample host in the campaign's rewrite rules, which redirect requests to phishing content.
HOSTNAMEsupport[.]binace[.]homesSubdomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
HOSTNAMEworkspace[.]binace[.]homesSubdomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
HOSTNAMEwwwcorpid[.]navincteam[.]shopSubdomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
HOSTNAMEwwwid[.]navincteam[.]shopSubdomain listed as campaign infrastructure.
IPV4123[.]76[.]96[.]130IP address reported to resolve from gcuser[.]eu, which the article associates with the campaign.
IPV427[.]255[.]75[.]158IP address listed as campaign infrastructure.
IPV445[.]195[.]69[.]28IP address listed as campaign infrastructure.
URLhxxps[:]//binace[.]homes/middle/attach/PhishingURLPhishing link shown as the destination of the Naver iframe's login button.

MITRE ATT&CK

People

Threat Actors

Malware

Products

Countries

Industries

Related Articles