Genians Details NodeLinkRAT Campaign and Assesses a Moderate-Confidence Kimsuky Link

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Summary

Genians traced a spearphishing campaign using a public note page to rotate payloads, from XenoRAT and data-theft scripts to NodeLinkRAT. It assesses a Kimsuky link with moderate confidence and recommends behavior-based detection.

Key points

  • The campaign used reply-based spearphishing themed around a seminar honorarium to deliver an archive containing an HWP-disguised LNK file.
  • The LNK launched obfuscated PowerShell, which established scheduled-task persistence and repeatedly retrieved and executed changing code from a public note page.
  • Payloads observed from June to October 2026 included XenoRAT, system-information collection and document-theft scripts, and NodeLinkRAT.
  • NodeLinkRAT runs JavaScript on an installed Node.js runtime and supports remote command execution, file operations, folder exfiltration, and screen capture.
  • Genians assesses a Kimsuky connection with moderate confidence, citing overlapping account assets, phishing infrastructure, malware build characteristics, and targeting; it notes that imitation cannot be ruled out.
  • The article recommends correlating process activity, scheduled tasks, file creation, and network behavior, and retaining initial-execution logs to reconstruct activity.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Reply-based spearphishing impersonated a senior aide and delivered a ZIP archive containing an HWP-disguised LNK file.
  • The LNK launched hidden PowerShell through cmd.exe; obfuscated commands downloaded and executed scripts in memory.
  • A PowerShell script established scheduled-task persistence and repeatedly retrieved commands from a public note page.
  • The changing third-stage code deployed XenoRAT, collected system information, or exfiltrated documents through cloud storage and free web hosting.
  • NodeLinkRAT installed Node.js and JavaScript packages, then used a hidden JavaScript file for remote control, file transfer, and screen capture.
Defensive Notes
  • Retain endpoint logs from initial LNK execution so activity can be reconstructed even after the shortcut is deleted.
  • Correlate process trees, command lines, file creation, scheduled tasks, and network connections as one attack sequence.
  • Monitor repeated script retrieval and in-memory execution, including hidden PowerShell and VBScript launched by wscript.
  • Investigate unexpected Node.js installations under public folders, hidden node.exe execution, and unusual MEGAcmd activity.
  • Assess the process, installation path, scripts, API use, and follow-on behavior rather than trusting legitimate signatures or blocking shared services solely by domain.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
DOMAINepaper[.]dothome[.]co[.]krFree-hosting domain used to deliver a PowerShell stage from the LNK command.
DOMAINinmain[.]22web[.]orgDomain used in the earlier phishing infrastructure discussed as overlapping with this case.
DOMAINnid[.]weffm[.]p-e[.]krFree-domain-service address reported as an occasional C2 address.
DOMAINoppsite[.]dothome[.]co[.]krFree-hosting domain used to receive stolen document and image files.
DOMAINowna[.]loveslife[.]bizDomain used in the earlier phishing infrastructure discussed as overlapping with this case.
EMAILc0653159@gmail[.]comRegistration email for a Dropbox account identified in a related case; the article says it was also used in phishing targeting people working on North Korean affairs.
IPV4103[.]81[.]116[.]10XenoRAT C2 server used by two reported variants.
IPV4185[.]27[.]134[.]120Infrastructure used for a 2024 phishing page that the article says closely matched the page observed in this case.
IPV4185[.]27[.]134[.]207Infrastructure used for a 2024 phishing page that the article says closely matched the page observed in this case.
IPV4207[.]148[.]112[.]166NodeLinkRAT C2 server identified in the article.
IPV4211[.]223[.]14[.]75C2 server used by a reported XenoRAT variant.
MD56985f297c03520a5852734a385322d8dMD5 hash of a XenoRAT variant listed in the article's variant comparison.
MD57575d230350299cfde0c4f993d761333MD5 hash listed in the article's campaign IOC section; its specific sample role is not stated.
MD5a151531b792b1df1eec8d3a6a8e1ded5MD5 hash of a XenoRAT variant listed in the article's variant comparison.
MD5a15df586bf29e7c1a5db64d603cee382MD5 hash of a XenoRAT variant listed in the article's variant comparison.
MD5cbcb66b530fb4f03d7dc9d55271b2ce4MD5 hash listed in the article's campaign IOC section; its specific sample role is not stated.
MD5ef317291bf88651666133abe84f115f0MD5 hash listed in the article's campaign IOC section; its specific sample role is not stated.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1005 · Data from Local SystemThe campaign collected local system information and stole document and image files from victim profiles.T1027 · Obfuscated Files or InformationThe attack used character substitution, XOR, Base64, and HTML decoding to conceal commands and code.T1041 · Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelNodeLinkRAT followed C2 commands to upload files and compressed folders to the remote controller.T1053.005 · Scheduled TaskThe second-stage script created a scheduled task named CommonMaintenanceHost to run repeatedly.T1059.001 · PowerShellPowerShell reconstructed obfuscated commands, downloaded scripts, and executed them in memory.T1059.003 · Windows Command ShellThe LNK used cmd.exe to launch hidden PowerShell.T1059.005 · Visual BasicA scheduled task launched a VBScript file through wscript; the VBScript then ran a PowerShell script.T1059.007 · JavaScriptNode.exe executed the JavaScript-based NodeLinkRAT script.T1082 · System Information DiscoveryCollection scripts gathered operating-system and system information from infected machines.T1083 · File and Directory DiscoveryScripts searched user-profile folders and enumerated documents and other files for collection or transfer.T1105 · Ingress Tool Transfercurl.exe and later scripts downloaded payloads, scripts, and the Node.js runtime.T1113 · Screen CaptureNodeLinkRAT used screenshot-desktop to capture the victim's screen.T1204.002 · Malicious FileThe attack began when the victim extracted and executed the HWP-disguised LNK file.T1566.001 · Spearphishing AttachmentThe spearphishing email led the recipient to a ZIP archive containing a malicious LNK file.T1567.002 · Exfiltration to Cloud StorageCollection results were uploaded through Dropbox and MEGA cloud storage.

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