BlueShell Backdoor Remains in Use, With Attackers Modifying Its Capabilities

Summary
Researchers describe BlueShell’s continued use, tracked C2 servers, and a customized Linux ELF sample with added file-server and reverse-shell features. The backdoor has been reported in attacks targeting organizations in South Korea and Thailand.
Key points
- BlueShell is a Go-based backdoor that supports Windows, Linux, and macOS, communicating with victim systems over TCP and TLS.
- Its standard capabilities include remote shell commands, file uploads and downloads, and SOCKS5 proxying.
- The article associates BlueShell campaigns with Dalbit and cites prior reporting of targets in South Korea and Thailand.
- Researchers tracked servers using BlueShell’s default TLS certificate, while warning that attackers can change certificates and ports.
- A customized 7.7 MB, 64-bit ELF sample communicated with 8.218.243[.]239:8443 and contained client credentials, an embedded image, and added file-server and reverse-shell functionality.
- The sample also checks a hardcoded password-derived value before running additional system-utility commands.
Article Details
- Attack Vectors
- BlueShell backdoor communicates with victim systems over TCP sockets and encrypts messages using TLS.
- BlueShell can run commands and upload or download files on victim systems.
- The customized ELF sample adds file-server and reverse-shell functionality.
- Defensive Notes
- Do not rely solely on BlueShell's default TLS certificate; attackers may change certificates and server ports.
- When identifying suspected BlueShell C2 servers, combine indicators with third-party intelligence and consider non-HTTP ports, geographic location, and service provider.
- The listed IP addresses may no longer host the identified indicators by publication time.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| IPV4 | 103[.]140[.]186[.]8 | BlueShell C2 server listed among the infrastructure monitored by Hunt. |
| IPV4 | 141[.]98[.]212[.]34 | BlueShell C2 server listed among the infrastructure monitored by Hunt. |
| IPV4 | 204[.]194[.]65[.]48 | BlueShell C2 server listed among the infrastructure monitored by Hunt. |
| IPV4 | 39[.]98[.]81[.]60 | BlueShell C2 server listed among the infrastructure monitored by Hunt. |
| IPV4 | 39[.]98[.]91[.]83 | BlueShell C2 server listed among the infrastructure monitored by Hunt. |
| IPV4 | 8[.]218[.]243[.]239 | BlueShell C2 server communicating with the analyzed ELF sample; listed as monitored adversary infrastructure. |
| MD5 | 7d960f77fda453c8f0c7f6c7448a35b4 | MD5 hash of the analyzed BlueShell ELF sample. |
| SHA1 | ee0257a6645aca2232ad270f2c08ac6b1b9cfc68 | SHA1 hash of the analyzed BlueShell ELF sample. |
| SHA256 | 5dc72a9b98b3293f10e294c4fc7a6881776c38e8bf2d8ed6073dea5c773927fd | SHA256 hash of the analyzed BlueShell ELF sample. |
MITRE ATT&CK
Threat Actors
Malware
Products
Tools
Countries
Chinaof targeting aligns with the operational profile of Dalbit, a threat group believed to originate from China and the only threat actor publicly associated with the deployment of BlueShell in an attack campaign.South Koreato insights from AhnLab, the BlueShell backdoor has predominantly targeted organizations within South Korea and Thailand, spanning various industry verticals. This pattern of targeting aligns with theThailandfrom AhnLab, the BlueShell backdoor has predominantly targeted organizations within South Korea and Thailand, spanning various industry verticals. This pattern of targeting aligns with the operational profile of