CloudSEK Finds Botnet Loader Service Distributing RondoDoX, Mirai and Morte Payloads

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Summary

CloudSEK analyzed six months of exposed botnet logs showing attacks on routers, IoT devices and enterprise applications, including command injection, default-credential attempts and delivery of RondoDoX, Mirai and Morte payloads.

Key points

  • The operation targeted SOHO routers, embedded Linux and enterprise applications, including WebLogic, WordPress and vBulletin systems.
  • Attack methods included command injection through web-interface fields, default credentials and exploitation of known vulnerabilities.
  • Logged commands show fetch-and-execute payload delivery using tools such as wget, curl, BusyBox, TFTP and FTP.
  • Payloads included RondoDoX, Mirai and Morte malware, as well as cryptomining components; the report describes multi-architecture binaries.
  • CloudSEK reported an attack spike of more than 230% from July to August 2025; threat actors later revoked access to the logger server.
  • CloudSEK says it alerted customers whose technology stacks overlapped with the campaign’s targeted vectors.
  • Recommended defenses include updating firmware, replacing default credentials, disabling unnecessary remote management, filtering egress and isolating IoT devices.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Shell-command injection through unsanitized web-admin POST parameters, including NTP, syslog, hostname, ping, MAC, and firmware fields.
  • Default-credential login attempts and automated brute-force or credential-spray attempts against device administration interfaces.
  • Abuse of firmware-upgrade and diagnostics endpoints to execute commands or deliver payloads.
  • Enterprise application exploitation involving console or servlet RCE, deserialization attacks, OGNL injection attempts, and JNDI injection.
  • Staged delivery using shell-script downloaders followed by architecture-specific native binaries, with HTTP downloads and TFTP or FTP fallbacks.
  • Redundant payload-hosting infrastructure used to maintain delivery availability.
Defensive Notes
  • Block outbound traffic to identified malicious infrastructure and restrict router update traffic to approved servers.
  • Inventory exposed administration interfaces and isolate devices whose POST parameters contain injected download-and-execute commands.
  • Change default credentials, apply available firmware patches, and disable unnecessary remote-management functionality.
  • Inspect HTTP request bodies and command logs for wget or curl piped to sh, BusyBox download commands, and suspicious shell characters in administration fields.
  • Block unnecessary TFTP and FTP egress from IoT segments and separate IoT devices from production networks.
  • Investigate high CPU utilization accompanied by JSON-RPC mining traffic or connections to unknown mining endpoints.
  • Quarantine devices executing /tmp/morte.* or communicating with mining pools; preserve temporary files, shell-command history, and process trees for investigation.
  • Reimage compromised devices that cannot be patched.
  • Treat panel success responses as candidate-compromise evidence rather than standalone confirmation of successful payload execution.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV4152[.]89[.]170[.]51Identified as a Mirai downloader host.
IPV4160[.]187[.]246[.]150Identified as a Mirai downloader host.
IPV4176[.]65[.]142[.]122Identified as a Mirai downloader host.
IPV4196[.]251[.]117[.]179Identified as a Mirai downloader host.
IPV4196[.]251[.]66[.]32Identified as a RondoDoX downloader host.
IPV4196[.]251[.]73[.]215Identified as a Morte downloader host.
IPV4196[.]251[.]73[.]24Identified as a Morte downloader host.
IPV4220[.]158[.]234[.]135Identified as a Mirai downloader host.
IPV438[.]59[.]219[.]27Identified as a RondoDoX downloader host.
IPV45[.]59[.]248[.]169Identified as a Mirai downloader host.
IPV474[.]194[.]191[.]52Identified as a RondoDoX downloader host.
IPV480[.]66[.]75[.]121Identified as a Mirai downloader host.
IPV483[.]252[.]42[.]112Identified as a RondoDoX downloader host.
SHA2560059634f55caf3694c56a2403cce672c2151f4df4a95a983ac4aa0250489b81dMirai payload hash listed under multiple downloader hosts, including 160.187.246.150, 152.89.170.51, and 5.59.248.169.
SHA2560081bdf4fdd13e6d46668a998eaa02e7bb0ec8328e8b93890bc66a1f380c485bRondoDox payload hash listed with downloader host 196.251.66.32.
SHA256017e0409a066dbdb4e9bcd23c61d9291a3d54256a80448b743a4a9bba8bb9cc9Morte payload hash listed with downloader host 196.251.73.215.
SHA2560a31a2b27d64ebb90bd4da3d559f15d2063bded6e3a483c0ca5992e668701040Morte payload hash listed with downloader host 196.251.73.24.
SHA256282ada9a29a5f3144114373ef3c5826bcc8fb5018cd0f2ecb97d2a7bee1df296Mirai payload hash listed with downloader host 220.158.234.135.
SHA256b6302061d56916a2357796eee3b5b69c6e2e5286200751f6e4083f7495413c2dRondoDox payload hash listed with downloader host 74.194.191.52.
SHA256c11bce7a2a07e1da4921a97e0c73445a49130dc87bea22ca938568840f11f5fbRondoDoX payload hash listed with downloader host 83.252.42.112.

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