Wiz Finds Internet-Exposed MCP Servers Leaking Sensitive Data and Cloud Credentials

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Summary

Wiz Research found unauthenticated Internet-exposed MCP servers at organizations including Fortune 500 companies, with some exposing sensitive data, destructive tools, code execution, or temporary cloud credentials.

Key points

  • MCP servers appeared in 80% of cloud environments studied; about one in six environments exposed at least one server.
  • About 70% of exposed servers disclosed their tool catalogs to anonymous callers, 42% returned real data when tools were called, and 10% exposed a sensitive backend.
  • Researchers found access to sensitive records, internal systems, and credentials, as well as tools capable of modifying or deleting records.
  • A small confirmed number of servers allowed server-side requests to cloud metadata endpoints and returned temporary credentials.
  • Nearly all observed servers used the original 2024-11-05 protocol version, predating the March 2025 addition of authentication to the specification.
  • Wiz recommends auditing Internet exposure, requiring authentication for tool execution, capturing agent prompts and invocation logs, and limiting backend credentials to the minimum necessary.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • Internet-reachable MCP servers without authentication expose tool catalogs and, in some cases, sensitive data or write and delete operations through backend credentials stored in the deployment.
  • Some exposed tools can execute commands or evaluate code on the server, including through language-model agents with shell access.
  • Tools that fetch URLs or proxy requests can be used for server-side request forgery to reach internal services and cloud instance metadata; the research confirmed temporary credentials were returned by the metadata service on a small number of hosts.
  • Some tools directly disclose secrets, including API keys in Lambda function logs and database connection strings with embedded credentials.
Defensive Notes
  • Audit Internet-reachable MCP servers and determine whether they require authentication.
  • Gate tool execution behind authentication, using OAuth 2.1 where possible; otherwise restrict server permissions to prevent anonymous access to sensitive data or destructive actions.
  • Capture agent prompts and enable invocation logs, particularly for servers capable of code execution.
  • Apply least privilege and scope MCP server backend credentials to the minimum required.

MITRE ATT&CK

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