Datadog Details ARTEX Activity in AWS Environments

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Summary

Datadog details ARTEX-attributed activity observed in AWS in October 2026, including CloudWatch searches using compromised IAM keys and abuse of public Cognito pools, and shares behaviors and detections for hunting.

Key points

  • Datadog attributed in-the-wild activity across several AWS environments to ARTEX, an AI-native penetration framework.
  • Sessions reviewed by Datadog began with anonymous S3 read requests, including GetObject and ListObjects.
  • Using a valid long-term access key, ARTEX repeatedly called CloudWatch FilterLogEvents to search for financial organizations, file paths, storage links, and secrets.
  • In a public Cognito user pool example, ARTEX registered an account, collected tokens, obtained temporary AWS credentials, and attempted broad read-only resource enumeration; the calls failed because the role lacked permissions.
  • Datadog observed tenant-domain validation probing during Cognito sign-up attempts and user agents that sometimes identified ARTEX.
  • In early November 2026, Datadog linked activity IPs to a hosted console and found hundreds of additional internet-exposed ARTEX consoles.
  • Suggested hunting signals include ARTEX user agents, associated IP addresses, unusual S3 access, and spikes in permission-denied events.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • ARTEX used compromised long-term AWS access keys to search CloudWatch logs for financial information, file and storage links, internal secrets, internal IP addresses, and database information.
  • ARTEX made unauthenticated requests to S3, including GetObject and ListObjects calls.
  • Against public Cognito user pools, ARTEX attempted self-registration, collected tokens, exchanged them for AWS credentials, and then tried to enumerate AWS resources.
  • ARTEX used Cognito account-recovery operations, including InitiateAuth, ForgotPassword, and ResendConfirmationCode, in activity reported by Wiz.
Defensive Notes
  • Hunt for ARTEX-related user agents and activity from the IP addresses listed as indicators; user agents can be changed.
  • Review for large volumes of AccessDenied errors, S3 object enumeration, and unusual access patterns such as EC2 instance-role credentials used from a non-AWS IP.
  • Investigate CloudTrail events involving cloud resource discovery and secret enumeration.
  • Datadog recommends rotating AWS access keys every 90 days or less and deactivating or removing unused credentials.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV4102[.]216[.]154[.]102Listed in the article's indicators appendix as associated with ARTEX activity.
IPV4103[.]54[.]154[.]32Listed in the article's indicators appendix as associated with ARTEX activity.
IPV4103[.]54[.]154[.]40Source IP from which a compromised long-term AWS key was used during a reported ARTEX session.
IPV4154[.]36[.]136[.]197Listed in the article's indicators appendix as associated with ARTEX activity.
IPV4154[.]36[.]136[.]23Listed in the article's indicators appendix as associated with ARTEX activity.
IPV4154[.]64[.]252[.]77Source IP for a reported ARTEX Cognito sign-up activity spike on October 26 and 27.
IPV4169[.]128[.]55[.]214Listed in the article's indicators appendix as associated with ARTEX activity.
IPV445[.]145[.]228[.]25Listed in the article's indicators appendix as associated with ARTEX activity.
IPV482[.]158[.]88[.]233Listed in the article's indicators appendix as associated with ARTEX activity.
IPV488[.]229[.]22[.]232Listed in the article's indicators appendix as associated with ARTEX activity.

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