Report: AI Is Scaling Iran’s Cyber and Influence Operations, Not Transforming Its Playbook
Summary
Recorded Future finds that AI is accelerating Iran’s existing cyber and influence operations, while evidence of AI’s role in military operations remains limited or unconfirmed. It recommends resilience against combined cyber, information, and physical threats.
Key points
- The report says AI is improving the speed and scale of Iran’s existing capabilities rather than creating a fundamentally new strategic approach.
- Iran-linked actors have used AI to assist reconnaissance, malware development, phishing, social engineering, and translation.
- AI-generated propaganda and inauthentic accounts have helped spread pro-regime narratives and fabricated claims about military successes.
- Public evidence does not confirm that AI-enabled drones or missiles were used in Iran’s 2026 attacks; possible Russian technology and tactics transfers remain unverified.
- Russian facial-recognition software and established surveillance systems likely supported Iran’s domestic monitoring, though specific use during the 2026 crackdown is not confirmed.
- The report advises organizations, especially critical-infrastructure and regional operators, to prepare for AI-assisted intrusions, influence campaigns, and combined cyber and physical disruption.
Article Details
- Publisher
- Recorded Future
- Report Period
- January–June 2026
- Scope
- Iran’s use of AI in cyber operations, influence operations, military capabilities, and domestic surveillance, assessed through open-source reporting.
- Key Statistics
- According to Bitdefender, phishing emails targeting Gulf countries surged by nearly 130% in 2026, while cyberattacks targeting the UAE doubled in March; the article does not provide baseline counts.
- An Institute for Strategic Dialogue analysis found that Iranian diplomatic accounts generated nearly one billion views in 50 days and 22 million likes, described as 30 times their prewar baseline.
- Cyabra identified 47 inauthentic accounts generating over 40 million views of AI-generated content depicting American casualties, military distress, and bereavement.
- Group-IB reported four novel malware families in an operation first observed on 2026-01-26; its analysis identified emoji-containing debug strings in four separate instances of the CHAR backdoor.
- The report describes an 88-day Iranian internet blackout beginning on 2026-01-08, which substantially limited visibility into domestic AI deployments.
- Recommendations
- Strengthen defenses against AI-assisted phishing, social engineering, and cyber intrusions targeting operational technology.
- Prepare continuity-of-operations plans for combined cyber and physical disruption of energy and critical infrastructure environments.
- Prioritize awareness and protection against AI-generated influence operations targeting organizational and public trust.
- Monitor geopolitical intelligence and cyber threat analysis for changes in Iranian AI-enhanced tactics affecting physical and cybersecurity.
- Governments targeted by Iran should prepare coordinated defenses across cyber, informational, and kinetic domains.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 · Visual BasicHarfangLab identified an allegedly LLM-assisted VBA macro in malicious documents used by RedKitten.T1485 · Data DestructionAbabil of Minab reportedly refined a script used to enumerate and drop databases in an attack on Vyncs.T1566.001 · Spearphishing AttachmentReported Iranian operations delivered malware through spearphishing and weaponized Excel documents.T1656 · ImpersonationReported operations impersonated aviation and software organizations, an Israeli warning application, and a senior Iran International executive.
People
Abdul Nasser Al HumaidiUAE Defense Ministry spokesperson who reported interception of several Shahed variants without mentioning AI-enabled variants.Ali KhameneiIssued a 2021 directive underpinning Iran’s centralized national AI strategy.Alireza TangsiriIRGC Navy commander who publicly promoted alleged AI-enabled missile and autonomous naval capabilities.Benjamin NetanyahuA subject of AI-generated Iranian propaganda, including a fabricated image implying his death.Donald TrumpA recurring subject of Iranian AI-generated propaganda; publicly rebuked AI disinformation concerning an alleged strike on the USS Abraham Lincoln.Mohammad AkraminiaIranian Army spokesman who claimed Arash-2 was used in an airport strike that the report says was not independently confirmed.Mojtaba KhameneiDepicted in AI-generated state-media content as succeeding his father; the report says he was reportedly injured and absent from public view.Nima FatemiIranian cybersecurity researcher cited by Forbidden Stories as assessing that evidence indicated FindFace was operational during the protest crackdown.Reza PahlaviTargeted by pro-regime AI imagery portraying him as subordinate to Israel.Vladyslav KlochkovUkrainian Major General who described an AI-equipped Shahed variant as a digital predator.Yuriy CherevashenkoUkrainian Air Force colonel who described Russian AI-assisted flight planning and drone mesh networks as adaptive challenges.
Threat Actors
Ababil of MinabHacktivist persona assessed as likely tied to MOIS; reportedly used ChatGPT to refine a database-destruction script and claimed other disruptive attacks.Attack AlarmSocial media persona that impersonated an Israeli missile-warning service before shifting to pro-Iran narratives and amplifying hacker-front claims.CALANQUE IONReportedly used Gemini for personalized phishing and malicious-tool development; explicitly identified as an alternate name of GreenBravo, Charming Kitten, and Mint Sandstorm, with overlap involving Educated Manticore.Charming KittenExplicitly identified as an alternate name of GreenBravo, APT42, and Mint Sandstorm, whose AI-assisted activities include malicious-tool development; also described as overlapping with Educated Manticore.Cyber Av3ngersNamed hacker front whose claims were amplified by Attack Alarm.Cyber Isnaad FrontAn attack on an Israeli industrial refrigeration system was attributed to this persona; the report identifies no direct evidence of AI use in that incident.CyberAv3ngersIran-linked hacktivist persona reported by OpenAI to have used ChatGPT for PLC reconnaissance.Dust SpecterIran-linked actor reported to have used TWINTALK and GHOSTFORM against Iraq’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs; described as overlapping with the APT34 subcluster TAG-135.Educated ManticoreUsed AI-assisted email and WhatsApp lures against Israeli technology and cybersecurity experts; explicitly described as overlapping with GreenBravo, APT42, Charming Kitten, and Mint Sandstorm.GreenBravoGoogle reported its use of Gemini for malicious-tool development; explicitly identified as also known as APT42, Charming Kitten, and Mint Sandstorm, and as overlapping with Educated Manticore.GreenGolfGroup-IB attributed a spearphishing operation delivering four malware families to this actor, explicitly also known as MuddyWater and Mango Sandstorm.Handala Hack TeamNamed hacker front whose claims were repackaged and amplified by Attack Alarm.Imperial KittenIRGC-aligned actor whose domestic-dissident targeting tradecraft HarfangLab compared with RedKitten; no alias relationship was established.IRGCIdentified as backing or affiliating with cyber personas and participating in Iran’s surveillance and hybrid operations.Mango SandstormExplicitly identified as an alternate name of GreenGolf and MuddyWater in an operation delivering four malware families.Mint SandstormExplicitly identified as an alternate name of GreenBravo, APT42, and Charming Kitten, whose AI-assisted activities include malicious-tool development; also described as overlapping with Educated Manticore.MuddyWaterExplicitly identified as an alternate name of GreenGolf and Mango Sandstorm; reportedly experimented with Gemini for file-transfer and remote-execution code.Nimbus ManticoreIRGC-affiliated actor reportedly used organizational impersonation lures and the MiniFast backdoor; Check Point assessed indications of AI-assisted development.OilRigExplicitly presented as an alternate name of APT34 and TA402 in reporting on phishing using compromised Iraqi government infrastructure.RedKittenHarfangLab reported its targeting of Iranian NGOs and human rights activists through malicious Excel files, assessing evidence of LLM-assisted development.SOLAR IONReportedly used compromised Iraqi government infrastructure for phishing against another Middle Eastern government; explicitly also called TA402 and OilRig, with Dust Specter overlapping its TAG-135 subcluster.Storm-0817OpenAI reported its use of ChatGPT to translate LinkedIn profiles into Persian for targeting work.Storm-2035Iranian influence network using AI-generated personas and multilingual content; reportedly remained operational despite a Meta takedown.TA402Explicitly presented as an alternate name of APT34 and OilRig in reporting on phishing using compromised Iraqi government infrastructure.TAG-135Tracked APT34 subcluster described as overlapping with Dust Specter in attacks against Iraq’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Malware
CHARThe campaign delivered four novel malware families (CHAR, GhostFetch, GhostBackDoor, HTTP_VIP) against MENA targets via spearphishing.GhostBackDoorThe campaign delivered four novel malware families (CHAR, GhostFetch, GhostBackDoor, HTTP_VIP) against MENA targets via spearphishing.GhostFetchThe campaign delivered four novel malware families (CHAR, GhostFetch, GhostBackDoor, HTTP_VIP) against MENA targets via spearphishing.GHOSTFORMSimilarly, ZScaler ThreatLabz observed several “fingerprints” of generative AI in the TWINTALK and GHOSTFORM malware used by Iran-linked threat actor Dust Specter (who overlaps with the APT34 subcluster tracked asHTTP_VIPThe campaign delivered four novel malware families (CHAR, GhostFetch, GhostBackDoor, HTTP_VIP) against MENA targets via spearphishing.MiniFastCheck Point based its assessment on “multiple indicators” of AI use in the MiniFast backdoor’s coding patterns and operational implementation.TWINTALKSimilarly, ZScaler ThreatLabz observed several “fingerprints” of generative AI in the TWINTALK and GHOSTFORM malware used by Iran-linked threat actor Dust Specter (who overlaps with the APT34 subcluster tracked as
Vendors
GoogleThe pattern is consistent with what Google, OpenAI, and other AI developers have documented since 2024: AI accelerates and scales what Iranian actors were already doing, rather than enabling new capabilities.Hikvisiontelecom companies such as Huawei and ZTE, as well as camera-based visual surveillance technology from Hikvision and Tiandy.Huaweiinspection (DPI) technologies for internet traffic monitoring from Chinese telecom companies such as Huawei and ZTE, as well as camera-based visual surveillance technology from Hikvision and Tiandy.KamaTwo years later, Kama (Kavoshgaran Marzhaye Danesh Ilia) — a company headed by an IRGC member — took over from Rasadco and distributed the operating licenses throughout Iran, including to other companies that providedMizarVisionmay have benefited from AI-enhanced satellite imagery produced by the Chinese geospatial AI company MizarVision to help identify and tag US and its allies’ military infrastructure in the Gulf, according to anNtechLabis based on leaked Russian and Iranian corporate records, indicates that Russian state-affiliated firm NtechLab granted Iranian start-up Rasad Intelligent Technologies (Rasadco) the right to use its software product.NvidiaThe drone was equipped with an Nvidia Jetson Orin AI module paired with a thermal imaging camera, enabling autonomous target identification and terminal-phase guidance without reliance on GPS.OpenAIThe pattern is consistent with what Google, OpenAI, and other AI developers have documented since 2024: AI accelerates and scales what Iranian actors were already doing, rather than enabling new capabilities.Rasad Intelligent Technologiesrecords, indicates that Russian state-affiliated firm NtechLab granted Iranian start-up Rasad Intelligent Technologies (Rasadco) the right to use its software product.Recorded FutureFigure 6: Pro-regime AI-generated images circulated on social media blaming Israel and the US for the unrest (left), and portraying Crown Prince Pahlavi as Israel’s pet (Source: Recorded Future)Tiandysuch as Huawei and ZTE, as well as camera-based visual surveillance technology from Hikvision and Tiandy.ZTE(DPI) technologies for internet traffic monitoring from Chinese telecom companies such as Huawei and ZTE, as well as camera-based visual surveillance technology from Hikvision and Tiandy.
Products
Abu Mahdiits AI-enhanced missile capability was anchored in claims about a specific group of systems — the Abu Mahdi naval cruise missile, the Fath-360 short-range tactical ballistic missile, the Ghadir (Qadir) cruiseAlmastactical ballistic missile, the Ghadir (Qadir) cruise missile, the Qaem air-to-ground bomb, and the Almas anti-armor missile — most of which were touted publicly by IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral AlirezaArash-2Iran had previously touted the Arash-2 long-range drone as featuring AI-based autonomous navigation, electronic-warfare resistance, and radio-frequency homing.ChatGPTIn October 2024, OpenAI reported that Iran-linked hacktivist persona “CyberAv3ngers” used ChatGPT to conduct reconnaissance on programmable logic controllers (PLCs), a use case that has continued to bolster IranianEmadadvantages: the combat debut of the Fattah-2 hypersonic glide vehicle on March 1, massed salvos of Fattah, Emad, and Qadr ballistic missiles, the ability to penetrate layered air defenses such as THAAD, and coordinatedExcelThe campaign used malicious Excel files purportedly listing protesters killed during the regime crackdown between December 22, 2025, and January 20, 2026.Fath-360was anchored in claims about a specific group of systems — the Abu Mahdi naval cruise missile, the Fath-360 short-range tactical ballistic missile, the Ghadir (Qadir) cruise missile, the Qaem air-to-ground bomb,Fattahstatements on Operation True Promise 4 highlighted more traditional advantages: the combat debut of the Fattah-2 hypersonic glide vehicle on March 1, massed salvos of Fattah, Emad, and Qadr ballistic missiles, theFattah-2statements on Operation True Promise 4 highlighted more traditional advantages: the combat debut of the Fattah-2 hypersonic glide vehicle on March 1, massed salvos of Fattah, Emad, and Qadr ballistic missiles, theFindFacethat constrained information environment, however, two AI-related insights have emerged: Russian-made FindFace facial recognition is a key tool that Iranian authorities very likely employed during the protestGeminiTracker reported that GreenBravo (also known as APT42, Charming Kitten, Mint Sandstorm) has been using Gemini “as an engineering platform to accelerate the development of specialized malicious tools,” including forGeran-2posted of drone debris allegedly discovered near Dubai's Jebel Ali port on March 4, 2026, documented Geran-2 wreckage bearing the Cyrillic “KB” serial marking, indicating it was produced around 2024 at the KupolGhadirof systems — the Abu Mahdi naval cruise missile, the Fath-360 short-range tactical ballistic missile, the Ghadir (Qadir) cruise missile, the Qaem air-to-ground bomb, and the Almas anti-armor missile — most of whichMicrosoft WindowsWhile there is no direct evidence of AI use in this incident, the attack required expertise in both Windows internal coding and refrigerant physics to ensure maximum damage, suggesting in-depth research into the targetMS001Upon technical exploitation, HUR specialists found it to be an upgraded “MS001” series variant that matched the description of a Shahed-236 in Russian documentation.Nvidia Jetson OrinThe drone was equipped with an Nvidia Jetson Orin AI module paired with a thermal imaging camera, enabling autonomous target identification and terminal-phase guidance without reliance on GPS.Qadir— the Abu Mahdi naval cruise missile, the Fath-360 short-range tactical ballistic missile, the Ghadir (Qadir) cruise missile, the Qaem air-to-ground bomb, and the Almas anti-armor missile — most of which were toutedQadrthe combat debut of the Fattah-2 hypersonic glide vehicle on March 1, massed salvos of Fattah, Emad, and Qadr ballistic missiles, the ability to penetrate layered air defenses such as THAAD, and coordinatedQaemmissile, the Fath-360 short-range tactical ballistic missile, the Ghadir (Qadir) cruise missile, the Qaem air-to-ground bomb, and the Almas anti-armor missile — most of which were touted publicly by IRGC NavyShahed-107during a March 3 press briefing that the UAE’s air defenses had neutralized hundreds of Shahed-136, Shahed-107, and Shahed-238 drones, without mentioning AI-enabled variants.Shahed-136when Ukrainian air defense units intercepted what was initially assessed as a standard Iranian-made Shahed-136 over Sumy Oblast in northeast Ukraine.Shahed-161In November 2025, Iranian media reported on the IRGC’s Shahed-161 drone, which Iran describes as a “stealth” drone featuring AI-enabled targeting and coordination.Shahed-236Upon technical exploitation, HUR specialists found it to be an upgraded “MS001” series variant that matched the description of a Shahed-236 in Russian documentation.Shahed-2383 press briefing that the UAE’s air defenses had neutralized hundreds of Shahed-136, Shahed-107, and Shahed-238 drones, without mentioning AI-enabled variants.Starlinkprovide Iran with “unjammable” drones, including fiber-optic and satellite-guided drones equipped with Starlink terminals, as well as training on how to use them in the early weeks of the war.THAADcaptions), AI-generated images of the destruction of a US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) site in Al Ruwais, UAE, and an AI-generated image implying Netanyahu had been killed after canceling aVyncsChatGPT to refine the script used to enumerate and drop databases in an April 11 cyberattack targeting Vyncs, a US-based consumer GPS vehicle-tracking service.
Countries
Bahrainthrough Tehran; burning US facilities in the Gulf; and satellite imagery showing damage to a US base in Bahrain.ChinaAt the start of the conflict, a China-linked influence network began posting AI-generated content seeking to undermine the legitimacy of US strikes on Iran, highlight morale issues among the US armed forces, and amplifyIranUltimately, Iran demonstrated that its strategic resilience does not depend on possessing the most advanced AI capabilities; rather, the source of Iranian power remains the asymmetric playbook itself.IraqIran-linked threat actor Dust Specter (who overlaps with the APT34 subcluster tracked as TAG-135) against Iraq’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including telltale emojis and Unicode text in the codebase.IsraelAI-enabled tactics and capabilities, refined in Ukraine, contributed to Iranian drone attacks against Israel and Persian Gulf states.RussiaHowever, the support Russia provided to Iranian military operations increases the likelihood that AI-enabled tactics and capabilities, refined in Ukraine, contributed to Iranian drone attacks against Israel and PersianSaudi ArabiaAuthority (SFRTA), and UNIMAC (United Maintenance and Contracting Company), which is based in Saudi Arabia.UAEIn 2026, phishing emails targeting Gulf countries surged by nearly 130%, according to Bitdefender, with cyberattacks targeting the UAE doubling in March.Ukrainemilitary operations increases the likelihood that AI-enabled tactics and capabilities, refined in Ukraine, contributed to Iranian drone attacks against Israel and Persian Gulf states.United Kingdompivoted within 24 hours of the February 28 strikes from divisive Western political content (anti-United Kingdom monarchy, pro-Scottish independence) to overtly pro-regime messaging, such as an AI-generated imageUnited StatesAs low-level conflict persists and the risk of a return to war with the United States (US) and Israel remains heightened, Iran’s expanding use of AI-enabled cyber operations will likely pose an elevated threat to
Industries
AviationDuring the Iran War, IRGC-affiliated Nimbus Manticore reportedly used malicious lures impersonating organizations in the aviation and software sectors across the US, Europe, and the Middle East.commercial shippingthe disruption of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, and attacks against commercial shipping.DefenseEpstein-themed captions), AI-generated images of the destruction of a US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) site in Al Ruwais, UAE, and an AI-generated image implying Netanyahu had been killed afterEnergygovernment agencies, human rights groups, academic and NGO institutions) and industries (IT, defense, energy, logistics, aviation, and maritime) targeted by Iran in 2026 should understand the persistent risks tofood productionon identifying vulnerabilities in adversaries’ supply chains, logistics, industrial operations, and food production.ITIn May 2026, an attack attributed to “Cyber Isnaad Front” targeted an Israeli industrial refrigeration system, sabotaging the system by programming it to fail.logisticsAs Iran rebuilds its military arsenal, its acquisition of Russian-backed drone capabilities will pose an ongoing risk to critical infrastructure and maritime logistics in the region.MaritimeAs Iran rebuilds its military arsenal, its acquisition of Russian-backed drone capabilities will pose an ongoing risk to critical infrastructure and maritime logistics in the region.SoftwareDuring the Iran War, IRGC-affiliated Nimbus Manticore reportedly used malicious lures impersonating organizations in the aviation and software sectors across the US, Europe, and the Middle East.