Armory Castle Used VMware vCenter Zero-Day in Intrusions

· Original article ↗

Summary

Mandiant says China-linked Armory Castle chained a BeyondTrust entry point through Linux appliances to exploit a VMware vCenter zero-day, using custom tools to create admin sessions, bypass MFA and access ESXi systems.

Key points

  • Mandiant described a campaign moving from BeyondTrust Remote Support through Linux appliances to VMware environments.
  • The article reports that Armory Castle exploited CVE-2026-123890, a critical vCenter authentication-bypass flaw, before its disclosure.
  • The flaw involved predictable time-based UUIDv1 generation in SRP authentication, which the attackers used to obtain a shared session key and create administrator sessions.
  • The Bonesaw tool automated copying vCenter's internal directory database and creating accounts; Sawsnake forged authentication tokens to bypass MFA and impersonate users.
  • Attackers used Linux appliances with limited EDR visibility to establish persistence and stage malware, then moved to ESXi hypervisors and extracted system files.
  • Mandiant advised patching and isolating management systems, tightening administrator controls, forwarding logs to a separate SIEM, and not relying solely on vCenter's built-in firewall.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • The campaign began with exploitation of a zero-day in BeyondTrust Remote Support, followed by credential and secret theft.
  • From the compromised Remote Support systems, the attackers scanned victims’ internal environments for open VMware-related ports and established footholds on other Linux appliances to stage malware and maintain persistence.
  • Bonesaw exploited CVE-2026-123890 in vCenter’s SRP authentication handling, using predictable time-based UUIDv1 timestamp generation to obtain a shared session key and create administrator sessions.
  • Bonesaw copied vCenter’s internal directory database and created powerful accounts; Sawsnake used a stolen login-signing key to forge authentication tokens, bypass MFA, and impersonate users.
  • The attackers moved to ESXi hypervisors and extracted system files.
Defensive Notes
  • Update VMware instances to patched versions, while not relying on patching alone.
  • Isolate management systems, encrypt particularly sensitive systems, and apply tight controls to administrator accounts.
  • Forward logs to a separate SIEM because vCenter may not record all relevant OS activity and local logs may be deleted after compromise.
  • Do not rely solely on vCenter’s built-in firewall; the article notes limitations in remote logging, egress-policy enforcement, and its placement on the system it is meant to secure.
  • Mandiant recommended a proactive Zero Trust approach to infrastructure hardening.

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