Mandiant Details ARMORY CASTLE’s Exploitation of a vCenter Zero-Day

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Summary

Mandiant reports suspected PRC-linked ARMORY CASTLE exploited VMware vCenter CVE-2026-123890 with BONESAW to create SSO administrator access and extract LMDB data, then used custom malware for persistence, credential theft and ESXi data theft.

Key points

  • GTIG attributes the activity to suspected PRC-nexus actor ARMORY CASTLE, formerly tracked as UNC5221, based on tooling and TTPs aligned with previously observed activity.
  • Mandiant says the actor exploited CVE-2026-123890, an unauthenticated vCenter SRP-6a session-key disclosure flaw over DCE/RPC, to establish an administrator session.
  • The Go utility BONESAW exploited the flaw to access vCenter’s LMDB database, hijack SAML signing capabilities and create an SSO administrator account.
  • Mandiant observed custom tools and malware including SLIMSAVAGE and CAGEMATCH webshells, the BEARBONES backdoor, and the SAWSNAKE SAML utility.
  • BEARBONES could bypass password authentication and log plaintext credentials; LAZYBONES used Slack for command-and-control and supported command execution and file transfer.
  • The actor accessed ESXi systems and extracted guest-VM files, including NTDS and Windows registry data. The article says the actor likely exfiltrated staged data.
  • Mandiant recommends promptly applying Broadcom’s patch and describes hardening measures including restrictive firewall rules, egress filtering and remote logging.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • ARMORY CASTLE moved laterally from a Remote Support appliance to internal Linux appliances, then used nmap to discover VMware-related services and ports.
  • The group exploited CVE-2026-123890 over vCenter's DCE/RPC interface on port 2012 to disclose an SRP session key, bypass authentication, and create an SSO administrator account.
  • SLIMSAVAGE provided shell command execution on a Linux appliance; CAGEMATCH accepted uploaded files and staged them in /tmp.
  • The group enabled SUID permissions on /bin/env using gdb to run commands as root.
  • BEARBONES provided an SSH listener with password-authentication bypass and plaintext credential logging.
  • ARMORY CASTLE forged SAML assertions and used SSH to access vCenter and ESXi, enumerate VMFS data, and extract files.
  • The group used SCP and staged archives to move collected data; the article says it likely exfiltrated the data through the Remote Support appliance.
  • LAZYBONES used Slack over HTTPS for command-and-control, command execution, and file transfer.
Defensive Notes
  • Promptly apply the official Broadcom patch for CVE-2026-123890 to affected systems.
  • Mandiant recommends the VCSA Hardening & Logging Tool, strict default-deny iptables policies, granular inbound and egress filtering, and remote forwarding of kernel and command logs to a SIEM.
  • Do not rely on the VAMI-managed host firewall alone; the article notes limitations in port-specific controls, egress filtering, and remote forensic visibility.
  • Test iptables changes rigorously and use formal change control before production deployment.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV4103[.]147[.]251[.]5Listed as a suspected obfuscation network IP in the article's network indicators.
IPV4103[.]190[.]38[.]3Listed in the article's Network Indicators IOC set; an individual role is not specified.
IPV4118[.]174[.]128[.]34Listed in the article's Network Indicators IOC set; an individual role is not specified.
IPV4118[.]174[.]128[.]36Listed in the article's Network Indicators IOC set; an individual role is not specified.
IPV4118[.]174[.]128[.]38Listed in the article's Network Indicators IOC set; an individual role is not specified.
IPV4176[.]9[.]89[.]66Listed in the article's Network Indicators IOC set; an individual role is not specified.
IPV4185[.]71[.]15[.]109Listed in the article's Network Indicators IOC set; an individual role is not specified.
IPV4220[.]121[.]128[.]41Listed in the article's Network Indicators IOC set; an individual role is not specified.
IPV4222[.]108[.]77[.]44Listed in the article's Network Indicators IOC set; an individual role is not specified.
IPV461[.]216[.]56[.]127Listed in the article's Network Indicators IOC set; an individual role is not specified.
IPV481[.]45[.]89[.]43Listed in the article's Network Indicators IOC set; an individual role is not specified.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1003.003 · NTDSThe group extracted the NTDS directory from a guest VM stored on an ESXi filesystem.T1021.004 · SSHARMORY CASTLE used SSH to access the vCenter and ESXi appliances and move between systems.T1046 · Network Service DiscoveryARMORY CASTLE used nmap to scan internal systems for open VMware-related ports.T1048.002 · Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 ProtocolThe group used SCP over SSH to transfer staged data from the ESXi filesystem; the article says onward exfiltration was likely.T1059.004 · Unix ShellSLIMSAVAGE ran commands through /bin/sh using ProcessBuilder.T1102.002 · Bidirectional CommunicationLAZYBONES polled a Slack channel for commands and supported command execution and file transfer over HTTPS.T1105 · Ingress Tool TransferCAGEMATCH accepted uploaded payloads into /tmp, and the group used curl to download a staged RAR utility and archive.T1136.001 · Local AccountBONESAW created an SSO administrator account, and the group also created a local vCenter administrator account.T1210 · Exploitation of Remote ServicesThe group exploited CVE-2026-123890 remotely against an internal vCenter server.T1505.003 · Web ShellThe group deployed the SLIMSAVAGE and CAGEMATCH webshells on a Linux appliance.T1543.002 · Systemd ServiceARMORY CASTLE established LAZYBONES persistence with a systemd service configured to restart every 50 minutes.T1548.001 · Setuid and SetgidARMORY CASTLE enabled SUID permissions on /bin/env to execute commands as root.T1552.001 · Credentials In FilesThe group retrieved the vCenter master crypto key and PostgreSQL password file; BEARBONES also logged plaintext passwords.T1560.001 · Archive via UtilityARMORY CASTLE archived extracted files into o.tar.gz before transferring them.T1606.002 · SAML TokensSAWSNAKE extracted signing material and forged SAML assertions for administrative vCenter access.

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